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About SmartNet 
The project SmartNet (http://smartnet-project.eu) aims at providing architectures for optimized interaction between TSOs and 
DSOs in managing the exchange of information for monitoring, acquiring and operating ancillary services (frequency 
control, frequency restoration, congestion management and voltage regulation) both at local and national level, taking into account 
the European context. Local needs for ancillary services in distribution systems should be able to co-exist with system needs for 
balancing and congestion management. Resources located in distribution systems, like demand side management and distributed 
generation, are supposed to participate to the provision of ancillary services both locally and for the entire power system in the 
context of competitive ancillary services markets.  
Within SmartNet, answers are sought for to the following questions: 
• Which ancillary services could be provided from distribution grid level to the whole power system? 
• How should the coordination between TSOs and DSOs be organized to optimize the processes of procurement and 
activation of flexibility by system operators? 
• How should the architectures of the real time markets (in particular the markets for frequency restoration and 
congestion management) be consequently revised? 
• What information has to be exchanged between system operators and how should the communication (ICT) be 
organized to guarantee observability and control of distributed generation, flexible demand and storage systems? 
The objective is to develop an ad hoc simulation platform able to model physical network, market and ICT in order to analyse 
three national cases (Italy, Denmark, Spain). Different TSO-DSO coordination schemes are compared with reference to three 
selected national cases (Italian, Danish, Spanish). 
The simulation platform is then scaled up to a full replica lab, where the performance of real controller devices is tested. 
In addition, three physical pilots are developed for the same national cases testing specific technological solutions regarding: 
• monitoring of generators in distribution networks while enabling them to participate to frequency and voltage 
regulation, 
• capability of flexible demand to provide ancillary services for the system (thermal inertia of indoor swimming pools, 
distributed storage of base stations for telecommunication). 
Partners 
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Executive Summary 
This deliverable describes the cost benefit analysis (CBA) performed within the H2020 SmartNet 
project aimed at determining which of the TSO-DSO coordination schemes (CSs) proposed during the 
project is the most suitable one to be deployed in each of the demo countries (Denmark, Italy and Spain) 
by 2030. 
The growing penetration of medium and small-scale generation, flexible demand and storage systems 
in distribution networks requires an exhaustive analysis to determine to which extent the distributed 
energy resources (DER) can replace traditional generation in the provision of the network services; the 
resources should be aggregated effectively and an appropriate coordination between transmission 
system operators (TSOs), distribution system operators (DSOs) and aggregators is necessary.  
SmartNet compares four TSO-DSO interaction schemes and different real-rime market architectures, 
with the aim of finding out which one could deliver the best compromise between costs and benefits for 
the system. For that purpose, an ad-hoc platform was developed to carry out simulations and perform a 
CBA to compare the benefits drawn by the system with the costs needed to implement each TSO-DSO 
interaction scheme, mainly the investments in information and communication technologies (ICT). 
As a first step of the process, the analysis of several investment alternatives led to a CBA instead of 
Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) process. The main advantages of CBA method compared to MCDM 
are that this method is most acknowledged and widely-used tool for assessing costs and benefits of 
industrial projects and that it includes detailed sector-specific guidelines which provide results by easy-
to-read economic metrics. However, the main key issue of CBA method is identified as the high risk of 
double counting. Therefore, this preliminary analysis results in a list of metrics to be calculated: 
1. Total mFRR cost: This metric includes the total balancing cost of the market defined in SmartNet. 
The energy activated is remunerated at the nodal price resulting from the clearing process. The 
mFRR activations in the SmartNet balancing market are aimed to solve the network imbalance 
and to avoid congestions predicted in advance for the next time step.  
2. Total aFRR cost: This is the cost of re-balancing the system after the mFRR market. In this case, 
the bids submitted to the SmartNet market are ordered according to a system-wide merit order 
and the resulting price will be applied as marginal price (off-line simulation of aFRR market).  
3. Cost of unwanted measures: this is the cost of emergency actions taken by network operators 
caused by unpredicted network congestions. They are valued at the bid price. 
4.  ICT costs: These costs comprise the communications and information technologies, including the 
software for the aggregation and market clearing process. Only those ICT costs that are directly 
related to the implementation of each coordination scheme have been considered. In this sense, 
communication costs have been assumed to be very similar in all coordination schemes and, 
therefore, differences stem from the software needed for aggregation and market clearing. 
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These metrics are calculated for Denmark, Italy and Spain. The obtained results are shown below: 
 
Figure 1: Annual costs for the Danish scenario 
 
Figure 2: Annual costs for the Italian scenario 
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Figure 3: Annual costs for the Spanish scenario   
As demonstrated in the figures above, mFRR is the biggest cost component, the cost of unwanted 
measures is negligible and ICT costs only represent a very small part of total costs. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of the TSO-DSO coordination schemes depends on the level of services requested by the DSO 
and, hence, CS A performs best when there are few congestions at distribution level (as in the Danish 
case), but CS D is the most efficient one when there are frequent congestions at distribution level (as in 
the Italian case). In general, two-step markets (CS B and CS C) are less efficient than markets optimising in 
a single step (CS D) and may suffer from scarcity and/or illiquidity of resources; this effect is even more 
notorious in the case of CS C, where an additional constraint is introduced by fixing the active power 
exchange in the TSO-DSO interconnection and, thus, further taking the solution away from the overall 
optimum obtained in CS D. However, in rare circumstances (i.e. severe congestions at transmission level) 
the selection of two-step market architectures can be more beneficial than other schemes, as market 
separation potentially prevents the spreading of high nodal prices among distribution and transmission 
systems. 
These indicators represent the economic impact of the different coordination schemes at power 
system- level, therefore their efficiency is assessed through the described CBA. However, CSs must also 
allow the involved actors to have a profitable business case, that is, CSs must lead to an appropriate 
allocation of costs and benefits among them. As an example, it is expected that aggregators will bear a 
large portion of ICT costs (communications with DERs, aggregation software, etc.), so they should be able 
to obtain a high enough return in order to pay for those investments. Therefore, a business-level analysis 
(also called “micro-level analysis”) is needed to assess the economic impact of the different CSs for all the 
relevant actors. 
However, many of the specific data and financial parameters required to be used in these calculations 
are difficult to estimate, mainly due to two reasons: 
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i) The deployment of the proposed coordination schemes implies regulatory changes which are 
not defined yet. These modifications can take years, so, some of the estimated values could 
imply a considerable inclusion of inherent uncertainty on the long-term forecast.    
ii) For the business-level economic analysis, the annual cash flows must be calculated. The 
obtained results from the SmartNet simulations can be considered representative for the 
system as a whole, but the results obtained with the number of time step simulated are less 
likely to be representative of the exchanges among the actors over a complete year. 
Consequently, the business-level analysis developed only includes the identification of relationships 
and the formulas to be applied, but the specific data to be used is specified. Nevertheless, several 
theoretical boundary conditions (minimum set of economic parameters) are detailed in order to establish 
the issues which may strengthen or threaten the deployment of the proposed coordination schemes. 
As a summary of the main findings by the CBA developed in the SmartNet project, it could be settled 
that in a more than likely scenario in which the fit-and-forget reinforcement remuneration approach is 
abandoned and the forecasting errors are more accurately calculated (on the one hand by the 
improvement in the calculation and on the other hand by shifting the gate closure toward real-time), the 
CS D could be the most feasible approach between the ones proposed. However, due to complexity 
reasons, the network observability cannot be pushed till single low-voltage nodes and, hence, it will be 
necessary to determine, for each specific case and country, the observability level to be deployed, 
assessing that the observability provision to the distribution grids implies new important investments by 
the system. 
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1 Introduction 
The main objective of the SmartNet project is to provide optimised architectures for Transmission 
System Operator (TSO) – Distribution system operator (DSO) interaction [1][2]. Such optimisation must 
take into account the economic behaviour of each different coordination scheme (CS) and, thus, a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) is of utmost importance. Since the main objective of this deliverable is the analysis 
of the CSs from an economic perspective, an exhaustive definition of these CSs has not been included in it. 
However, sections from 5.3.1 to 5.3.4 show a brief overview of their main characteristics. For a more 
detailed information on the CSs definition, please see SmartNet deliverable 1.3 [1].    
The CBA is oriented to identify the impacts at system-level (also called “macro-level analysis”), since 
the aim of the economic assessment was to identify which CS provides more efficient results in each 
country. Additionally, coordination schemes must also allow the involved actors to have a profitable 
business case, that is, that costs and benefits are properly allocated among them, which required a 
business-level analysis (also called “micro-level analysis”).  
In order to carry out such CBA, an ad-hoc simulation platform was developed [3], where different 
scenarios were analysed for the three countries where SmartNet focuses: Italy, Denmark and Spain [4]. 
The flexibility market considered in the SmartNet project, which is called “Integrated Reserve Market”, is 
aimed at solving real-time imbalances and congestions between gate closure of intraday markets and real 
time until the opening of the next intraday market session  [2], [3], [4], [5]. Its operation time is 
compatible with the timings of existing manual Frequency Restoration Reserve (mFRR) and Replacement 
Reserve (RR) markets [6], depending on the country. Although more details can be found in [2], for 
simplification purposes, the reader can understand that Integrated Reserve Market, SmartNet market, 
tertiary regulation market and mFRR market are the same kind of market. Likewise, automatic Frequency 
Restoration Reserve (aFRR) market can be assumed to be the same as secondary regulation market. 
 The results obtained in the simulation environment were the core input for the CBA described in this 
report. However, these results required an appropriate methodology to be applied. In a first step, a 
review of the literature related to economic assessment methodologies was performed, with a view to 
select the metrics to be considered within the CBA described in this report.  
As shown in Figure 1.1, the CBA, which is highlighted in light blue, is an integral part of the long-term 
analysis performed for the three countries considered within SmartNet. In parallel to the development of 
the simulation software [3] and the definition of the 2030 scenarios [4], the most appropriate metrics 
were selected. Then, based on the results of simulations, which were also used for the laboratory tests [7], 
metrics were calculated and monetised to feed the system-wide CBA. The value chain was identified in 
parallel to the system-wide CBA, so that some guidelines on how to run a business-level CBA could also be 
extracted. 
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Figure 1.1: Approach for CBA in SmartNet project 
Next chapters describe the process to select the metrics (chapter 2), the methodologies to calculate 
and monetise them (chapter 3) and present the results of the CBA (chapter 4). Then, chapter 5 provides 
an overview of the process to perform the business-level analysis and chapter 6 summarises the main 
conclusions. 
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2 Selection of metrics for the CBA  
2.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making 
The selection of the best alternative in complex investment processes, like the selection of the most 
appropriate CS, requires a deep analysis of the different implications that each of them has on the final 
result of the project. The best way to identify such implications is to use a set of metrics and to assign a 
weight to each of them. Defining the criteria (and their respective metric) is critical, because they must 
fulfil several characteristics to ensure that they really represent the complexity of the analysis. 
Furthermore, defining the weights is even more critical and controversial, since it needs to consider the 
whole conception of values, which is inherently subjective. The most important characteristics that the 
metrics must have is to be complete, non-overlapping, applicable, system-oriented, simple, reproducible, 
realistic, objective and documentable. Metrics can be of technical, social, environmental or economic 
nature, but the assessment described here focuses on the economic performance of the different 
coordination schemes and, hence, only the economic scope is relevant.  
The use of metrics for analysing investment alternatives may lead to a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or 
to a Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) process. 
On the one hand, a CBA is an analytical method for evaluating the costs and the benefits of a decision 
to determine the economic advantages and disadvantages of implementing that decision and to assess 
whether its benefits outweigh the costs or not. The basic assumption underlying CBA is the rationality of 
decision making. Cost benefit analysis can be performed either form a societal perspective which consider 
cost and benefits of a decision for the whole society or from a single or a group of stakeholders’ 
perspectives. Most common applications of CBA are to find optimal resource allocation between different 
alternatives and to find most profitable investment option among a set of different alternatives. The most 
widely used indicators of CBA results are Net Present Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and Cost 
Benefit Ratio (CBR). NPV is equal to discounted benefits minus discounted costs over a specific time span 
and defined in equation (1). In this equation,  is time,  is the time span,  is discount rate,   is the 
benefits at time  and   is the costs at time . A positive NPV means that the decision has added value for 
decision makers and negative NPV means that the decision would bring losses to the decision makers.  
	 =  − 1 + 


 
 
(1) 
When there is only one single investment at the beginning of the project and the expected incomes are 
the same during all the years of its lifetime, the NPV can be replaced by a comparison between the annual 
incomes and the annuitisation of the initial investment. In that case, the investment is economically 
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attractive if the annual cash-flow (B) is bigger than the investment (C) multiplied by the uniform capital 
recovery factor, as described in equation (2). 
 >  ∗ 1 + 
 ∗ 
1 +  − 1  (2) 
IRR is the rate of return or discount rate that sets the NPV of a decision equal to zero. A higher IRR 
would be more favourable for decision makers. Another metric for cost benefit analysis is CBR which is 
the ratio of total discounted costs of a decision over its life span divided by total discounted benefits over 
the same life span. 
On the other hand, MCDM is mainly a qualitative approach for evaluating costs and benefits in 
complex decision-making problems and identifying the best decision among a set of alternatives [8]. In 
[9], the main advantages of MCDM are mentioned as: a) assessing mutually conflicting criteria, b) 
assessing simultaneously both tangible and intangible impacts, c) allowing probabilistic modelling of 
decision making problem, d) encouraging problem decomposition, e) involving stakeholders’ view 
directly in decision making process, f) allowing quantitate evaluations. A MCDM problem can be 
expressed in matrix format as:  
 = 	


 …  …  … 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ … ⋮
   … 
 
 
  (3)
 = !	"	"…	"	# 
 
(4) 
Where ,	,…,	 are possible alternatives among which decision makers have to choose. , 
	,…,	 are criteria which demonstrate alternative performance, $%  is the rating of alternative $  with 
respect to criterion %  and "%   is the weight of criterion % . [8] 
2.2 Literature review 
The first step to find the optimal interaction between TSO and DSO was to determine which approach, 
i.e. CBA or MCDM, was the most appropriate for this project. To this aim, several existing sector specific 
CBA and MCDM methodologies in the literature were reviewed. 
The main advantages of CBA method compared to MCDM are that this method is most acknowledged 
and widely-used tool for assessing costs and benefits of industrial projects and that it includes detailed 
sector-specific guidelines which provide results by easy-to-read economic metrics [9]. However, the main 
key issue of CBA method is identified as the high risk of double counting. 
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In the following subsections, some of the most important CBA methodologies in the smart grids sector 
and their characteristics are described. However, since the CBA seemed to provide advantages over 
MCDM, more CBA methodologies were taken into account. 
2.2.1 JRC method 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) method provides a general guideline for CBA in smart grid projects. This 
approach has three main steps including definition of the boundary conditions, performing the CBA and 
performing a sensitivity analysis on the main parameters [10]. Defining the boundary conditions refers to 
identifying the conditional and parameters which are influential on the cost and benefit evaluations, 
identify the uncertainty of the available data for parameters and determining the time horizon for the 
CBA.  
 
Figure 2.1: JRC approach for CBA in smart grid projects [10]  
The main approach of JRC method is to define assets, map them to different functionalities and map 
these functionalities into associated costs and benefits. Then, these costs and benefit are monetized and 
compared with a predefined baseline scenario. This step is followed by performing the CBA, which is 
shown in Figure 2.1. The third (and last) step of JRC method is to perform a sensitivity analysis on the key 
parameters to evaluate the impact of a variation in these parameters on the final CBA results. 
The JRC method was based on the EPRI method, which is described in the next subsection. 
2.2.2 EPRI method 
The CBA framework proposed by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for smart grid 
demonstration projects mainly consists of three main sections, including project overview 
documentation, developing a research plan, and estimating project impacts, costs and benefits [11]. The 
cost and benefit estimation of a project consists of four steps including estimating physical impacts from 
measurements, monetising estimated physical impacts, estimating the annual costs for customers and 
utilities in the project and baseline scenario, and summarising total costs and benefits. 
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Figure 2.2: EPRI approach for CBA in smart grid demonstration projects [11] 
Figure 2.2 shows the process to interpret the costs and benefits of specific devices, such as 
components of a system or project. First, each device is mapped to one or more functionalities according 
to their capabilities. A selection of these functions is defined as a set of applications which are classified 
into different branches. Then, measurable physical changes derived from a defined set of applications are 
translated as a set of impacts. Impact can be either direct, which means that they are confined to the 
project environment, or indirect, which means that they are out of the project scope. Metrics are 
calculated either directly from measurements or from impacts using relevant algorithms. Finally, both 
costs and benefits are derived by monetising associated impacts and metrics. 
2.2.3 SG MCA method 
Smart Grid Multi-Criteria Analysis (SG-MCA) is a method developed by State Grid cooperation of China 
and combines fuzzy logic with Analytic Hierarchy Process to assess costs and benefits of a smart grid 
project. This method is using a hierarchical structure so that, in each hierarchy, a set of metrics is 
assigned with a set of associated weights determined by experts. This method evaluates the projects 
based on four main categories of metrics including technical, social, economic, and practical. As a result, 
the performance of the project in terms of both four categories and as an entity is calculated in a final 
score [12].  
2.2.4 ISGAN method 
International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN) method for CBA aims to develop a global framework 
to identify, define, and quantify in a standardized way the costs and benefits which can be realized from 
the demonstration and deployment of smart grids technologies and related practices in electricity 
systems. By using this tool, analysts, regulators, utilities and other electricity system stakeholders can 
define and decide on system needs and priorities for smart grid system investment and regulatory 
changes. The results generated by the benefit-cost tools could be used to develop specific business cases, 
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considering specific regulatory and market structures, as well as current system status, available 
generation assets and resources and demand profiles [13]. 
2.2.5 Task specific methods 
Additionally, there are CBA methods which are specific to some decisions and tasks in power systems: 
• Investment project appraisal [14]: Figure 2.3 shows the main steps of this approach to evaluate 
investment decisions or project appraisal. These steps include i) definition of the socio-economic, 
institutional and political context, ii) definition of main objectives, iii) identification of project 
activities and responsibilities, iv) evaluation of technical feasibility and environmental 
sustainability, v) financial cost and befit analysis, vi) (only in case of negative financial values) 
economic analysis and re-evaluating market and non-market aspects, vii) risk assessment.  
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Figure 2.3: CBA approach for investment project appraisal or investment decision making 
• Grid development projects: The European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO-E) presents a guideline for CBA in grid development projects [15] and 
proposes a combined CBA and MCDM approach for regional grid investment plans to develop the 
Europe-wide Ten Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP). The goal is to characterise the 
impact (including added values and costs) of transmission grid extension projects for society. This 
study defines the benefit categories including improved security of supply, socio-economic 
welfare, RES integration, variation in losses, variation in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, technical 
resilience and flexibility. The cost category is defined as total project expenditure.  
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Besides, a multi-criteria cost-benefit analysis for the assessment of transmission grid expansion is 
proposed in [16]. This study defines a top-down tree structure to avoid double counting of 
criteria. On the top of the tree, a rough classification of domains such as economic or 
environmental criteria are defined. Each of these domains is branching down to represent 
measurable criteria such as social welfare, CO2 emissions and so on. An example of the tree 
structure to determine Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for transmission grid expansion project 
is shown in Figure 2.4. Then, all criteria and different alternatives are sorted in an evaluation 
matrix. The next step is to convert all criteria indicators into a utility value that represent the 
value of the indicator to the society. This task can be done by defining a utility function. The utility 
values of the indicators relevant to a single alternative can be combined in a weighted linear way 
to calculate the ranking parameter of that alternative. In the weighed linear combination, the 
weights vector incorporates the importance of one criterion (for decision makers or society) with 
respect to the others. 
 
Figure 2.4: Top-down tree approach to determine KPIs for transmission expansion projects [16] 
2.3 Preliminary list of metrics and consultation 
As stated above, there was a preference for CBA before the literature review, which was confirmed 
during the process. The literature review process also resulted in a preliminary list of metrics, which are 
listed below: 
i. Increased utilisation and hosting capacity of renewable energy sources (RES), i.e. less curtailment 
of RES 
ii. Reduced Network losses 
iii. System Congestion Reduction 
iv. Reduced Ancillary service cost (Voltage Quality and Frequency Stability improvement) 
v. System balancing improvement 
vi. Avoided and deferred network investment 
vii. Emissions savings 
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 20  
 
viii. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) cost 
This list was further elaborated by grouping or re-naming some of the initial metrics. In the case of “vi. 
Avoided and deferred network investment”, the time span of network and reserve investments is much 
longer than that of the operational real time markets. The combined optimisation problem of long-term 
investment and short-term operation is very stiff and, thus, numerically very difficult to solve accurately 
and efficiently without splitting. Moreover, the combined optimisation problem does not change much if 
the fast and slow parts are solved separately and, in order to solve the investment problem, it is necessary 
to consider the operational optimisation problem. Therefore, it was decided that SmartNet should focus 
on developing the fast, operational time span solutions and, thus, this metric was converted into “d) Cost 
attributable to network limitations”. 
 Then (July 2017), a consultation to the Advisory Board was organised, Ideas and alternatives for the 
cost-benefit analysis performance, with the aim to support the decision-making process for the system 
level analysis. The complete consultation document and its corresponding analysis can be found in the 
Appendix I. The metrics and monetisation methods proposed in the consultation document, are described 
below: 
a) Enhanced provision of ancillary services: The TSO-DSO coordination schemes investigated in 
SmartNet are aimed at increasing the competitiveness of ancillary service provision, by extending 
their related markets to distributed energy resources (DER), i.e., where the centre of mass of 
power flexibility is expected to be in a near future. In particular, SmartNet simulations are 
focused on the real-time market devoted to the activation of the flexible DER for the energy 
balance of the system (mFRR and RR depending on the country) taking into account also the 
network limitations (congestion management). The proposed metric to evaluate this aspect is the 
balancing cost which can be monetised by multiplying the cleared balancing cost and the 
activated volume, for each node ‘n’ and each time-step ‘t’. 
b) Reduction of unwanted measures adopted by network operators in order to solve 
congestions: As anticipated above, the real-time market simulated in SmartNet includes the 
network models and limits. Depending on the TSO-DSO coordination scheme, this model is 
limited to transmission network or extended to the distribution grid. In addition, the market 
architecture impacts on the ability of the market operator in predicting network congestions and 
to, consequently, activate the right resources to avoid them. Having considered that the 
simulated coordination schemes are expected to solve congestions with different effectiveness, 
network operators will inevitably deal with some critical situations (unexpected congestions) to 
be immediately solved with dedicated (unwanted) measures, such as: 
• Immediate curtailment of load/RES generation. 
• Blocking of activation signals. 
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• Inhibition of bidding of non-prequalified resources. This case is of special importance in 
the Centralised Market Model, where the DSO does not have access to DER flexibility and 
the constraints in the distribution grid are not taken into account by the market clearing 
algorithm; however, the DSO can pre-qualify DER to bid into markets, after checking that 
those bids will not create constraints in the distribution grid. 
Even in this case, the monetization of the unwanted measures can be easily performed. In 
particular, since these actions inevitably1 cause an imbalance in the system, a good metric can be 
represented by the consequent imbalance price. However, when such imbalance price does not 
represent the price to compensate for curtailment, the compulsory limitation of flexibility can be 
evaluated according to the associated resource costs. 
When monetising this metric several approaches were proposed in the consultation; i) 
considering the flexibility cost (the cost of the resources affected), ii) considering the average 
imbalance price or iii) considering the free market approaches. 
c) Reduced network losses: Because of the non-ideal behaviour of network components, energy 
losses are an unavoidable element of power systems and it may have a significant impact on the 
management of both transmission and distribution grids. Taking into account the market 
architectures investigated within SmartNet, there is a concrete potential of reducing energy 
losses by approaching supply and demand of ancillary services. The proposed CBA will compare 
the effects of each TSO-DSO coordination scheme on the energy losses by processing the 
simulation results. Their associated cost can be calculated by multiplying them by the energy 
price profile (resulting from the market). Thanks to this integration, the CBA will also consider 
the coordination scheme ability of selecting the optimal energy paths depending on the current 
price of energy. 
d) Cost attributable to network limitations: The real-time market simulated in SmartNet takes 
into account complete network models and it guarantees that the final activations are selected in 
order to avoid (voltage and loading) congestions and to keep energy losses limited. Depending on 
the TSO-DSO coordination scheme, the market effectiveness in taking into account network 
limitations is expected to be different and, consequently, the activated resources as well (with a 
direct impact on the cleared balancing price). Network operators are carefully considering the 
occurrence/severity of congestions and losses in order to evaluate grid refurbishment actions 
which, in turn, are inversely proportional to the effectiveness of the market in solving undesired 
situations. This effectiveness can be evaluated by comparing the cleared balancing price of the 
following two situations: 
                                                                   
1 Obviously, there is a minimum threshold under which compensations should not be compulsory. Likewise, some flexibility 
activations might cancel each other (as it is already the case in the integration of the EU balancing markets). 
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• Real situation, in which the entire physics of the network (losses, transmission capacity) is 
simulated. 
• Ideal situation (busbar simulation), in which electricity network is simulated disregarding the 
physics and with zero losses. 
It is immediate to deduce that the price difference between these two situations corresponds to 
the cost attributable to congestion management and to network losses compensation (an 
intermediate situation could be performing a copperplate simulation, where the electricity 
networks have infinite transmission capacity, but network losses are taken into account, so that 
only the cost of congestion management could be derived from the price difference). This 
difference also directly returns a monetary value and it is a valuable metric for the profitability 
evaluation of refurbishment investments2. 
e) Emissions savings: A more efficient cooperation between TSOs and DSOs, together with the 
integration of network/resources models in the market clearing algorithms, is expected to be 
beneficial in the optimal management of available flexibility, including the one provided by low-
carbon generation technologies (which are gradually replacing conventional plants with higher 
carbon emissions). Generation dispatch and unit commitment model is used for calculation of 
emissions savings in each coordination scheme compared to the reference scheme. Standard 
emission rates for each generation technology will be taken into account. 
The monetization of CO2 costs is based on forecasted CO2 prices for electricity in the studied 
horizon. The price can be derived from official sources such as the International Energy Agency. 
In this case, the volume of CO2 emissions will be based on the generation mix resulting in the 
simulation of each coordination scheme. 
f) ICT costs. Since there were several aspects to be asked to the advisory group, the questions 
related to this metric are described below. 
In general, respondents agreed with the proposed metrics and monetisation methods, although they 
proposed different approaches for the analysis of some metrics. This feedback was used as an important 
input for the discussions leading to the selection of the final metrics to be considered and which are 
described in section 2.4. 
Since the aim is to identify the most efficient TSO-DSO coordination scheme, i.e. the one with the 
lowest implementation and operational costs, in each of the countries under investigation (Italy, 
Denmark, Spain), the same metrics have been used, but the results of simulations are different for each 
country and, thus, also their calculation and monetisation results, leading to different CBA results in each 
                                                                   
2 A detailed analysis should consider the situation after each grid refurbishment investment, so that the economically sound 
refurbishments would be identified (there may be some bottlenecks which only appear in very extreme situations and, hence, 
whose removal would not be economically efficient), but it is not the aim of this analysis to be so detailed. 
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country. It is assumed that any kind of coordination between TSO and DSO will be more efficient than 
having no coordination at all, so there is no baseline scenario against which the different coordination 
schemes are compared.  
However, the participation of DER in the provision of ancillary services for TSO and DSO requires the 
existence of an advanced communication infrastructure, which can also be used for additional 
applications, either for the DSO (billing, monitoring of grid status in real-time, etc.) or for the participation 
in other markets (day-ahead or intraday). Therefore, when considering ICT costs, it is worthwhile to 
consider that part of such communication infrastructure will already be there, as an evolution of present 
communication systems, as described in section 0. Since the centralized ancillary service market model 
(CS A), is the closest one to present situation, it has been taken as the baseline scenario as well. The topic 
of the baseline was also included in the consultation to the Advisory Board and the answers received 
supported the decision made. 
An additional consequence of having such ICT infrastructure is that the ICT cost is one of the obvious 
metrics to be included in the CBA. Therefore, the consultation also included some questions about the ICT 
costs to be considered. The answers requested to include the following items, both in capital and 
operational expenditures: 
•  Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA): 
o Main control centre software, licenses, etc. for SCADA, Energy Management System 
(EMS) and Distribution Management System (DMS). 
o Operator Training Simulator (OTS), either in house or outsourced. 
o Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and local substation hardware. 
o Telecommunication systems between substation RTUs and distribution control 
centre. 
o Front-end at control centre.  
• Operational planning applications: 
o Network applications. 
o Market applications – system services. 
o Forecast applications. 
o Regional coordinator (which can be outsourced). 
• Metering cost (if needed): 
o Meters, either at consumers’ or producers’ facilities. 
o Telecommunications (dial up). 
o Database. 
o Applications. 
• Other costs: 
o 
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o Staff in ICT for maintaining the database and applications. 
o Staff in ICT team for development of new applications. 
o Uninterrupted Power Supply. 
In general, there was a preference of outsourcing ICT services, although cyber-security is a critical 
point and the DSOs must be aware of this challenge. Cyber-security and interoperability were expected to 
be the most critical aspects to be considered in ICT costs. 
Based on the results of the consultation to the advisory board and on several internal discussions, 
some modifications were made to the preliminary set of metrics. On the one hand, some of them were 
disaggregated to a lower level, so that the CBA analysis can provide more accurate and detailed results. 
To this end, the metric Enhanced provision of ancillary services was disaggregated into two metrics: i) 
provision of mFRR service, and ii) provision of aFRR service. Likewise, the reduction of unwanted 
measures adopted by network operators in order to solve congestions metric was divided in two 
metrics: i) unwanted measures, and ii) forecasting errors. On the other hand, Reduced network losses 
affect the relative value of the bids when calculating the nodal prices in the mFRR market, so it is included 
into the first metric and, thus, it was excluded from the list. Likewise, Emissions savings was removed 
from the CBA, because aggregators already include a cost for CO2 emissions when they create the bids to 
be sent to the mFRR market. As a result, CO2 emissions were calculated and compared for the different 
coordination schemes but were not monetised and added to the cost of the rest of metrics. 
The resulting list of metrics was presented in different dissemination activities during the Autumn in 
2018 [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]: 
A. Total mFRR cost: This metric includes the total balancing cost of the market defined in SmartNet 
[2]. The energy activated is remunerated at the nodal price resulting from the clearing process3. 
The mFRR activations in the SmartNet balancing market are aimed to solve the network 
imbalance and to avoid congestions predicted in advance for the next time step.  
B. Total aFRR cost: This is the cost of re-balancing the system after the mFRR market. In this case, 
the bids submitted to the SmartNet market are ordered according to a system-wide merit order 
and the resulting price will be applied as marginal price (off-line simulation of aFRR market).   
C. Cost of unwanted measures: Each coordination scheme results in a different market setup. 
Depending on the market setup adopted, the grid model included in the market clearing process, 
which aims at solving and avoiding congestion issues in the network, is more or less detailed. For 
example, the centralised AS market model (CS A) does not consider congestions at distribution 
level and, thus, the distribution grid model considered in the market clearing process is very 
simple. These simplifications, which allow a faster execution of the market clearing algorithm, 
                                                                   
3 Nodal prices were obtained for MV nodes at distribution level. The details on how the simulations were performed can be 
found in D4.2 [4].  
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may create infeasibilities when dispatching units cleared in the market. This way, some bids 
accepted in the market may create congestions not identified by the grid model used. In this case, 
grid operators may need to take emergency actions to re-dispatch some resources aiming to solve 
real congestions in the grid. They can be caused by the partial activation of accepted bids or by the 
activation of non-accepted bids (flexibility requested to be activated even if the market did not 
select the related bid). 
D. Cost of forecasting errors: This term also refers to deviations between market activations 
(mFRR) and actual activations, but in this case, they are not due to limitations in the grid models 
used, but because the requested flexibility cannot be physically activated due to either flexibility 
modelling errors and/or flexibility forecasting errors. They can be caused by the partial activation 
of accepted bids or by the activation of non-accepted bids (flexibility requested to be activated 
even if the market did not select the related bid).  
E. ICT costs: The term ICT cost comprises the communications and information technologies, 
including the software for the aggregation and market clearing process. Only those ICT costs that 
are directly related to the implementation of each coordination scheme have been considered4. In 
this document, the term implementation is used to refer to the work in designing, specifying, 
coding, testing, validating and documenting software. 
The CO2 emissions were also presented as an additional metric, but not monetised, as described above. 
For clarification purposes, Figure 2.5 below presents the characteristics of the different frequency 
regulation processes, as described by ENTSO-E. 
 
                                                                   
4 See section 2.4 for the final definition of this metric. 
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Figure 2.5: Timing for different frequency regulation processes [22] 
The questions received during the dissemination activities led to a final reflection about the suitability 
of the proposed metrics. In particular, the impact of the cost of forecasting errors was unclear for the 
audiences. Forecasting errors are caused by deviations between mFRR market activations and real 
activations, because the requested flexibility cannot be physically activated due to either flexibility 
modelling errors and/or flexibility forecasting errors. Forecasting errors may result in partial activations 
of accepted bids or in activations of non-accepted bids. As the CBA is focused at system level (and not at 
the business-case level), imbalance penalties were deemed not to be advisable, because they usually 
express the cost of the aFRR required to solve them and it has already been accounted for in the second 
metric. Hence, it was first decided to monetise this metric as the mFRR cost of the flexibility affected by 
the forecasting errors, that is, since some bids were matched in the mFRR market (and increased the 
mFRR cost) but did not provide the promised flexibility, leading to a need to dispatch the same amount of 
flexibility in the aFRR market (with its associated cost), it was decided to subtract the cost of those bids 
from the total mFRR cost, to account for the cost of that flexibility for the system only once. 
However, subtracting these costs would have prevented the analysis to really account for the capacity 
of coordination schemes to deal with uncertainty. Although forecasting errors when calculating the 
available flexibility should not be widespread in AS markets, the decarbonisation of power systems will 
lead to progressive dismantling of firm-capacity, fossil fuel-based, big power plants, which will be 
replaced by intermittent, renewable, smaller power plants. Whatever coordination scheme is 
implemented in the future, it must deal with the intermittent nature of renewable-based power plants, so 
the impact of forecasting errors should not be removed from the scoring of CSs. 
 
2.4 Final metrics selection 
As a result, the final list of metrics in the following one: 
1. Total mFRR cost: This metric includes the total balancing cost of the market defined in SmartNet 
[2]. The energy activated is remunerated at the nodal price resulting from the clearing process. 
The mFRR activations in the SmartNet balancing market are aimed to solve the network 
imbalance and to avoid congestions predicted in advance for the next time step.  
2. Total aFRR cost: This is the cost of re-balancing the system after the mFRR market. In this case, 
the bids submitted to the SmartNet market are ordered according to a system-wide merit order 
and the resulting price will be applied as marginal price (off-line simulation of aFRR market).  
3. Cost of unwanted measures: this is the cost of emergency actions taken by network operators 
caused by unpredicted network congestions. These measures are activated on available flexibility 
and they are valued at the correspondent bid price. 
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4.  ICT costs: The term ICT cost comprises the communications and information technologies, 
including the software for the aggregation and market clearing process. Only those ICT costs that 
are directly related to the implementation of each coordination scheme have been considered. In 
this sense, communication costs have been assumed to be very similar in all coordination schemes 
and, therefore, differences stem from the software needed for aggregation and market clearing5. 
Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of the metrics to be used in the CBA along the different stages. Since 
the cost of CO2 emissions is already included in the bids sent by aggregators to the mFRR, the metric was 
not monetised in the final list, but included as a complementary metric for informative purposes (that is 
why it is included in yellow). Likewise, network losses affect the relative value of the bids when 
calculating the nodal prices in the mFRR market, so it is included into the first metric and, thus, it was 
excluded from the final list. 
 
Figure 2.6: Evolution of the metrics considered within the different stages of the CBA 
It is important to highlight that the scenarios simulated in SmartNet, which provide the input for the 
CBA in this report are aimed at analysing normal situations in the operation of the power systems. 
Therefore, they represent three typical days for each of the countries under analysis and, thus, 
exceptional situations are not included in this analysis. Ancillary services are critical especially in 
exceptional situations in terms of system stability and resilience against abnormal conditions. However, 
                                                                    
5 This assumption allows for scalability of the results obtained because communication costs are the only ones which increase 
directly with the number of DER units involved. 
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exceptional situations must have been excluded from SmartNet studies in order to keep the task 
manageable. 
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3 Methodologies for calculating the metrics for the CBA 
The CBA was selected as the most suitable approach for the calculation of the macro-level analysis 
since this method tries to reduce the complexity of the problem by converting all metrics into a monetary 
unit (no need to assign weights as such, but just converting all the metrics into money). The CBA method 
allows a more straightforward comparison between the different alternatives and, for some metrics, the 
monetisation process in the CBA is more objective than assigning subjective weights as requested in the 
multi-criteria analysis. 
In the SmartNet macro-level analysis, each TSO-DSO coordination scheme was assessed for Denmark, 
Italy and Spain and the results compared against a baseline (the centralised AS market model, CS A). 
Metrics were elaborated and applied for comparing the TSO-DSO interaction schemes for each national 
case and, as result, the different schemes were independently scored for each country, so that the most 
convenient architecture, which is different for each national case, could be identified.  
Figure 3.1 shows the macro analysis synthesis, in which it can be seen that most of the metrics take 
the simulation results as a basis, but the ICT costs related to the coordination schemes were managed 
separately from the rest of the costs directly linked to the coordination schemes deployment. The reason 
is that most of the metrics result in operational costs, while ICT costs have a predominant investment 
component. As a result,  the selected approach for the calculation of each operational metric is detailed in 
section 3.1, while the procedure for the ICT costs estimation is detailed in section 0. 
 
Figure 3.1: Macro analysis synthesis 
In addition to the metrics monetised and included in the system-wide CBA, CO2 emissions were 
investigated as a complementary metric (and included in section 3.1), because they can provide extra 
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information for the CBA. However, CO2 emissions were not monetised because the bids sent by 
aggregators to the mFRR market already include an estimation of the cost of the CO2 ton.  
3.1 Operational metrics calculation 
The flexibility market considered in the SmartNet project, which is called “Integrated Reserve Market”, 
is aimed at solving real-time imbalances and congestions between gate closure of intraday markets and 
real time until the opening of the next intraday market session [2], [3], [4], [5]. The market horizon can 
vary as a function of the market requirements, but in general it would last from 15 minutes to 1 hour. 
When a market session is opened, bidders, which can be conventional and/or distributed energy sources 
at transmission and distribution networks, are asked to submit their flexibility bids. These can be in both 
directions, positive or negative, depending if they contribute to upward or downward balancing, 
respectively. Complex bids including temporal and/or logical constraints are also allowed. 
Other important characteristics of the market clearing algorithm are that it considers a pay-as-clear 
approach and that it calculates nodal prices. In the pay-as-clear approach, all the activated bids receive 
the same price, which corresponds to the most expensive activated flexibility (as opposite to the pay-as-
bid approach, where each activated bid receives the price they bid), so that the risk of market participants 
bidding in terms of what they want to receive instead of their real cost of flexibility is removed [23]. 
Likewise, nodal pricing is the most granular pricing approach, i.e. each node in the considered network 
has a different price, so that the effect that network losses and limitations in grid elements have in the 
price creation can be accounted for. 
As described in [3], the simulation environment has been divided into three main layers: 
1. Market layer: This layer integrates the market clearing algorithms, which process the bids 
proposed by the different market players and returns the optimal activations aimed at restoring 
the system balance and solving/avoiding network congestions. 
2. Bidding and dispatching layer: In this layer the bids that different agents (both traditional 
producers and retailers and aggregators that represent the numerous flexible resources 
connected in distribution) send to the market layer are created. For that purpose, market players 
use different algorithms to process the available flexibility of energy resources into bids and to 
translate market results into activations. 
3. Physical layer: This layer simulates the physical processes of the electrical network (transmission 
and distribution) as well as the generation, consumption and storage equipment connected to it. 
Therefore, it simulates the effects of the activations on transmission and distribution networks, 
including the physics of each (flexible and non-flexible) device connected to them. 
With the data corresponding to each of the scenarios, as described in sections 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 4.4.1, the 
appropriate simulations have been carried out for the five coordination schemes in the three countries. In 
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this way, it has been possible to calculate the foreseen productions by the different types of technology, 
the consumptions and the prices in each one of the network nodes for each programming period. 
3.1.1 Total mFRR cost 
This indicator includes the total balancing cost in the SmartNet market. The mFRR activations are the 
result of the SmartNet balancing market. They are aimed at solving the network imbalance and 
congestions predicted for the next time steps. 
As the motivation of the SmartNet market is to allow a fair and cost-efficient competition between 
different sources of flexibilities, including the ones located at the distribution level, it appears natural to 
use the most economically efficient approach of the marginal price. In the SmartNet market, network 
constraints, both at transmission and distribution levels, have to be taken into account. Marginal pricing 
can be adapted to a system with network constraints in different ways, becoming a Locational Marginal 
Price (LMP). This is the approach applied in the SmartNet market [2]. 
Therefore, the cost of the SmartNet market will be valued multiplying the energy matched in the 
SmartNet market by the corresponding nodal marginal price. 
3.1.2 Total aFRR cost 
Real power systems and energy resources are affected by forecasting errors and, for this reasons, 
mFRR activations are not typically capable of perfectly balancing the system and a residual imbalance is 
constantly experienced. In addition, actual power exchanges of resources, as well as unforeseen 
congestions, may require the intervention of network operators in re-dispatching programmable units 
(with a consequent impact on the mFRR balancing effectiveness – see section 3.1.3). Especially for this 
last motivation, TSO-DSO coordination schemes are expected to have an impact on the imbalance after the 
mFRR activation. 
CBA needs to consider the residual imbalance to accurately evaluate (and compare) the performance 
of each TSO-DSO coordination scheme and to convert it into a cost. A possible approach consists of 
calculating the cost of activated aFRR, reserve that groups all the resources responsible of restoring the 
balance of the system after the mFRR activations.  
aFRR resources are often experiencing economic losses in managing a regulation reserve (e.g. 
conventional generators cannot produce up to their technical limits, since a given percentage of power 
flexibility needs to be reserved for aFRR). For this reason, aFRR is typically more expensive than mFRR 
and the three reference countries are adopting different remuneration schemes: 
• in order to take into account these losses, Denmark and Spain are recognizing a reward for 
the allocated capacity; 
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• Italy, since reserve capacity is not remunerated, flexibility resources are submitting aFRR bids 
more expensive than mFRR ones (Figure 3.2).6 
 
Figure 3.2: Comparison between mFRR and aFRR flexibility prices 
By 2030, these remuneration schemes are expected to change, but it is difficult to predict their 
evolution. For the sake of simplicity, an evolution of the Italian procurement method is supposed to be 
functional in all the considered countries with the following structure: 
1. aFRR dimensioning at each balancing market session; 
2. Construction and submission of aFRR bids by flexible resources; 
3. Selection of aFRR participating resources on the basis of a merit order list; 
4. Calculation of the aFRR cost on the basis of the actual aFRR activations and cleared price (cost 
of the most expensive selected resource). 
3.1.2.1 aFRR dimensioning at each balancing market session 
At each balancing market session, the aFRR total needs (downward and upward separately) are 
calculated for the next time steps. In theory, aFRR is dimensioned by using dedicated tools [24], with the 
role of anticipating the balancing reserve necessities. SmartNet is not dealing with the reserve 
dimensioning problem and, for this reason, aFRR procurement and activations are considered in an 
approximated way.  
The simulation platform returns the residual imbalance after the selected mFRR activations and the 
application of re-dispatch measures by network operators for each time step7. This imbalance 
                                                                   
6 In general, aFRR price is also more expensive than mFRR price in Denmark and Spain. 
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corresponds to the theoretical aFRR activation needs, and the resulting profile can be used for the 
dimensioning of aFRR volumes. This, of course, cannot be happening in the real world since activated 
volumes of aFRR are not known a priori. However, for the SmartNet investigations, the actual imbalance 
is considered a reasonable approximation of its prediction (the one used by a real reserve dimensioning 
tool). At this point, taking into account some simple safety margins (a minimum amount of reserve 
aFRRmin and a coverage factor kaFRR), aFRR between the generic time instants t1 and t2 is dimensioned as: 
&'())*+,-./ 	 ÷  = min4'())$	, −min!678'9:7_9<='>'6?7 ÷ # × A-())B'())/C,,-./ 	 ÷  = max4−'())$	, max!FGH99:7_9<='>'6?7 ÷ # × A-())B (5) 
 
Figure 3.3 reports an example of aFRR dimensioning based on the simulation results achieved for one 
day of Denmark. From the figure it is evident how aFRR is recalculated every hour, i.e. at each balancing 
market session, on the basis of the experienced residual imbalance. 
 
Figure 3.3: aFRR dimensioning based on residual imbalance returned by simulations  
(kaFRR=2 and aFRRmin=100 MW 
3.1.2.2 Flexibility resources submit aFRR participation bids 
According to the SmartNet investigations reported in [25], all the simulated flexible resources can 
theoretically participate in aFRR services. Since the simulation platform is not considering the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
7 The simulation platform includes aFRR, but the selected activations are aimed at maintaining the stability of the system, rather 
than the full restoration of the residual imbalance. In addition, the aFRR resources are selected with practical criteria oriented to 
maintain a simple simulation structure. For these reasons, aFRR activations returned by the simulator are not always a realistic 
representation of the residual imbalance cost. 
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procurement of the resources, the available flexibility to be offered for aFRR has to be calculated in 
post-processing. A possible way of creating aFRR bids consists of: 
• looking at the submitted mFRR bids (mFRR bids are describing in an accurate way the 
available flexibility in every single simulated time step); 
• hypothesizing aFRR flexibility identical to a fixed portion ka/mFRR of the submitted mFRR bids 
(this portion has to be selected in order to make the available aFRR resources higher than the 
dimensioned aFRR needs – it might be varying country by country); 
• applying penalization coefficients to aFRR flexibility costs in order to make it more expensive 
than mFRR (according to the data reported in Figure 3.4, possible choices are kpositive=1.24 and 
knegative=0.65 – to be applied to positive and negative costs respectively). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Comparison between mFRR and aFRR bidding curves for  
ka/mFRR=0.1, kpositive=1.24 and knegative=0.65 
3.1.2.3 Selection of aFRR participating resources 
Once the aFRR bids are generated, the balancing market is assumed to process them by means of a 
merit order based procedure. While mFRR is used for both balancing and congestion management, its 
activation is beneficial for both transmission and distribution networks, and TSO DSO coordination 
schemes are affecting the selection procedure of the mFRR resources. On the contrary, aFRR is called to 
support balancing (which is not a distribution service) and the selection of the participating resources can 
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The submitted flexibility quantities are compared with the reserve needs for the next time intervals, 
and the less expensive resources are selected to participate in aFRR services (Figure 3.5). Since SmartNet 
has adopted a pay as clear pricing for energy balancing, aFRR is remunerated with the marginal price of 
the most expensive selected resource. Figure 3.6 reports the resulting aFRR marginal price for (the 
simulated day of one scenario). 
 
Figure 3.5: Comparison between the aFRR bidding curves and the reserve needs for a given time instant 
 
Figure 3.6: Resulting aFRR marginal price for each simulated time instant  
(ka/mFRR=0.1, kpositive=1.24 and knegative=0.65) 
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multiplying, for each time instant, the aFRR energy with the marginal price returned by the hypothesized 
balancing market (Figure 3.6), the total cost of aFRR can be finally calculated (Figure 3.7). 
 
Figure 3.7: Resulting total cost of activated aFRR 
3.1.3 Cost of unwanted measures 
Market clearing and bidding algorithms result in activations decided on the basis of a forecasted 
situation. This means that, in addition to a residual imbalance after mFRR activations, network operators 
could also face unexpected congestions that have to be promptly solved by re-dispatching flexible 
resources in order to avoid the intervention of grid protections. Most of the time, re-dipatching consists of 
renewables curtailment, storage units and conventional generation rescheduling. These “unwanted 
measures” has a cost for the system and are dependent on the applied TSO-DSO coordination scheme8: 
• Unwanted measures require the activation of flexibility, which is paid by the network 
operator (TSO or DSO depending on the re-dispatching competency) to the activated 
resources. It is assumed that re-dispatched resources are remunerated according their actual 
cost for reaching the requested set-point (pay as bid). 
• From the cost perspective, unwanted measures have a more significant impact on the system 
imbalance. In fact, emergency re-dispatching is not operated in consideration of network 
balancing, increasing the requested volumes of aFRR (with a significant effect on the system 
total costs). 
                                                                   
8 TSO-DSO coordination scheme A does not consider distribution network limitations and, in case of activation of distributed 
flexibilities, congestions at this level have to be solved separately with unwanted measures. This is not happening with market 
architectures including distribution grid modelling. 
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3.1.4 CO2 emissions assessment 
A more efficient cooperation between TSOs and DSOs can enable low-carbon generation technologies 
to replace conventional plants with higher carbon emissions, thus facilitating the necessary energy 
transition. A detailed network and resources model, in combination with the generation dispatch and unit 
commitment model, is used to evaluate the management of the available flexibility, including the one 
provided by low-carbon generation technologies in each coordination scheme. Standard emission rates 
for each generation technology are taken into account [26]. 
The achieved savings in CO2 emissions can be calculated from the difference between dispatched 
power of conventional generators and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants before and after SmartNet 
market is dispatched, and the CO2-emissions factors for the different technologies. For all conventional 
and CHP devices (power plants): 
i. To calculate the dispatch of these devices before SmartNet market, the nominal power for each 
device is multiplied by the active power injection of that device. The result is the time series of 
injected power by each device within the simulated period.  
$ = 6G<	$ ∗ 	'?9:7G"7I6J7?9G6	$											9: L7:9?7 (6) 
ii. To calculate the dispatch of these power plants after SmartNet market, the set points for the 
devices in the physical layer, which represent the active power injection after the SmartNet 
market, are considered. As a result, a time series of injected power by each device is obtained.  
$ = FℎN	$																9: L7:9?7 (7) 
iii. The difference between $  and $  is the (either upward or downward) activation of conventional 
devices. By multiplying this value by the emission coefficient of each device, the additional CO2 
emissions for each coordination scheme are calculated. 
O	P<9HH9G6	9QQ776?7 =$ − $ ∗ P<9HH9G6('?G	$
$
							9: L7:9?7	 (8) 
The CO2 emission factor is assumed to be 0.2015 ton/MWh for the Combined Cycle Gas Turbines 
(CCGT) and CHP plants and 0.3388 ton/MWh for the coal power plants [26]9. 
  
                                                                   
9Since this analysis looks at the conditions in 2030, the emission factors considered take into account recent improvements in 
CCGT, CHP and coal power plants, which used to be higher in the past. 
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3.2 ICT costs 
The main goals of the estimation of ICT costs are: 
• To discover cost differences in terms of ICT systems for upgrading the centralized AS market 
model (CS A) to alternative CSs, under the assumption that the centralized AS market model (CS A) 
will be implemented by 2030. 
• To analyse future requirements of a general ICT system (market and aggregation platforms and 
bidding systems), the amount of communication, and the requirements in the coordination 
schemes. 
3.2.1 Assumptions, framework and limitations of ICT cost estimation 
The ICT cost estimation task was formulated as follows: 
Based on current arrangements and developments in the electricity markets, and under the 
assumption that the centralized ancillary service (AS) market model (CS A) will be in use by 2030, 
the ICT costs discussed here are estimated costs of upgrading from the centralized AS market model 
to i) Local AS market model (CS B), ii) Shared balancing responsibility model (CS C), or iii) Common 
TSO-DSO AS market model (CS D). 
Since the communication systems required to have the centralized AS market (CS A) in operation by 
2030 are the same as for the rest of the coordination schemes, the estimation of ICT costs concentrated on 
IT systems required to implement bidding and market clearing functionalities in different coordination 
schemes. The systems and communications that are not directly related to coordination schemes were 
left outside the scope of this analysis. Note that this ICT cost estimation involves large uncertainties on 
technology and cost development, since energy markets and grids are currently changing and the target 
year 2030 is relatively far, at least from the ICT development cycle point of view. 
In practice, this analysis consisted of estimating what kind of ICT infrastructure will be applied to the 
baseline scenario and how the baseline infrastructure will be upgraded in order to realize other market 
model alternatives. Assuming that the centralized AS market model will exist in 2030 implied a number of 
consequences. Also, focusing the analysis on 2030 required predictions about technology and cost 
developments that needed to be pointed out explicitly. Thus, the assumptions about the framework 
during the process of estimating ICT cost are listed below. 
1) The communication requirements for all relevant DERs to participate in AS markets will already 
exist by 2030. Thus, there will be a communications connection to each flexible DER of any size 
and type and its cost will be low enough so that participation in CS A will provide benefits to the 
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DER owner. There is no certainty if this assumption will apply in 203010. Adequate technological 
solutions already exist now, but it is highly uncertain if they will be implemented everywhere by 
2030, because unbundling of the electricity market fractionalises the business case and separates 
the benefits and costs to different actors. Meeting the minimum compulsory requirements of the 
AS communication needs is one possible solution.   
2) Aggregation services will be in place by 2030 and aggregators will have algorithms to aggregate 
devices in distribution grids in order to bid in the TSO AS market. There will be functional AS 
markets in which even small entities will benefit from participating (directly or indirectly).  
Again, there is no certainty about the existence in the future of  aggregation services suitable for 
very small DERs in the SmartNet real-time market.  
3) The central market clearing will be implemented and therefore all necessary communications, 
data management and other services will exist at the level needed for the centralized AS market 
in 2030. 
4) The central AS market clearing will have access to and information of the transmission network, 
to solve congestions and imbalances. It was assumed that, in the CS D, access to similar 
information of the connecting distribution networks will be possible. 
5) There could be service providers that implement SmartNet coordination schemes and offer, for 
example, all services needed to run local AS markets to DSOs. This will be particularly relevant if 
there is a large number of small DSOs.  
6) Only the ICT costs directly associated with the coordination schemes were compared. Note that 
the coordination schemes will have different indirect costs and benefits, e.g. they may need 
different amounts of investments to compensate for their weaknesses. Some of these investments 
may even be alternative ICT solutions. For example, the performance of the centralized AS 
market (CS A) regarding DER hosting capacity etc. can be improved, if the distribution network 
constraints are managed via dynamic grid tariffs [28], [29], [30]. Such differences were not 
considered here. 
7) No investments or development costs were included in the analysis regarding systems, facilities 
or communication connections that will exist in 2030, regardless of the studied coordination 
schemes. These were assumed to be available for the purposes of a coordination scheme. Hence, 
the usage of a coordination scheme will not require new machine rooms or such facilities. The 
existing communications were assumed to accommodate messages related to a coordination 
scheme as the data amount will be low.  
                                                                   
10  System Operation Guideline UE/2017/1485 and the European gird connection codes set mandatory requirements for the 
real time information and remote controllability of distributed generation and will be developed to cover smaller DERs.  
The requirements and standards do not define adequately the critical details for the control connectivity of very small DERs. 
Thus, it is not certain yet to what extent these requirements facilitate the needed fast control communications to all DER sizes and 
types crucial for the fast SmartNet ancillary services. Very small flexible resources (roughly down to 1kW) including loads, 
embedded generation and storage may be needed to make sure that each node has adequate market liquidity. 
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8) The cost of all ICT needed to monitor and control own systems or assets, in order to participate in 
the AS markets, was considered as an internal cost for monitoring and asset management. This 
also includes the cost of making decisions on what and when to bid, as well as receiving 
activation instructions. Thus, such costs were not included in the implementation cost estimation 
of the coordination schemes.  
9) Some costs were not included in the costs estimation, as the IT system cost estimation was 
expected to contain uncertainty that is higher than the share of these costs. These costs include: 
a. Solver license costs: It was assumed that optimisation problem solver can be used in 
server mode to solve local markets for several DSOs. Hence, the solver costs will be very 
low in comparison to the cost of developing aggregation and market clearing 
implementations. 
b. Cost of multiple computing sites: It was assumed that DSOs and TSO will already have 
multiple computing sites that can be utilized for coordination scheme computations 
without additional investment on machine rooms or equivalent infrastructure. 
Abnormal and restorative energy grid/market or telecommunications situations were left out of the 
scope of the analysis (see [31], [32] and [33] for concepts in grid security). Typically, for an electricity 
grid, N-1 security standard is assumed, which means that normal operation functionality can be securely 
maintained during any single fault in the grid by provisions of ancillary services or other available 
resources. The abnormal events are typically related to technical system operation. However, it is also 
important to have means to address an unusual market situation and maintain grid functionality and 
security. Also, ICT failures or cyber reasons can lead to an abnormal situation. It was assumed that ICT 
systems for implementing the coordination schemes will be built according to standard reliability 
practices. However, further analysis of abnormal and restorative power grid states may provide 
information that affects ICT systems and thus their costs. 
The ICT cost estimation work focuses on capital expenditure (CAPEX) costs. According to a common 
practise, operating expenditure (OPEX) costs can be assumed to be proportional to CAPEX costs [27]. 
Annual OPEX costs can be considered as 20% of CAPEX contemplating the current rate of maintenance 
fees of commercial solvers11. 
Furthermore, real purchase costs of IT systems can be very different from the development costs due 
to various reasons. In general, market opportunity, cost estimate uncertainty, contractual terms, 
requirements diversity, and financial health are listed as main factors affecting software pricing in [34]. 
The estimates provided in this work considered development costs of IT systems, but this does not 
change the relations of candidate coordination schemes (CS B, CS C, and CS D) with each other.  It was 
very hard to predict what will be the actual purchase costs related to one particular coordination scheme 
                                                                   
11 See: https://ampl.com/products/standard-price-list/ 
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in the future when the implementation of the coordination scheme takes place. Recall that the word 
implementation is used to refer to the work in designing, specifying, coding, testing, validating and 
documenting software. 
3.2.2 The COCOMO method 
Estimation of a work effort needed to implement IT systems is generally very difficult. According to 
software engineering literature, the software development process usually consists of five main phases, 
whose relative shares are [34]: 
1. analysis 15%, 
2. design 25%, 
3. coding 20%, 
4. testing 30%, and 
5. documentation 10%. 
There are some functional methods to derive rough estimates of software development efforts, even 
though they contain a large uncertainty. One of the classic and the best-known methods is the 
COnstructive COst MOdel (COCOMO) [35], which estimates the number of person months (PM) as a 
function of source code lines: 
R = 		 × STOU  (9) 
where KLOC stands for thousand (kilo) lines of source code and A, b are adjustable parameters, which 
depend on the IT system environment. 
In an embedded system, where other hardware, software, regulation and operational procedures are 
already in place, the suggested values for the adjustable parameters are A=3.6 and b= 1.2 [34]. This 
environment corresponds best to the environment of TSO-DSO coordination schemes, but PM estimates 
in a less demanding environment were calculated as well for performing a sensitivity analysis. 
Note that there are more advanced versions of COCOMO and other estimation methods [34], but those 
were not considered to be feasible in the context of the SmartNet project, as they require more expertise 
and effort. Moreover, the simple COCOMO model expresses well the fact that the development efforts 
depend exponentially on application conditions. For example, IT systems for critical infrastructures are 
typically estimated to be much more expensive, as the testing and validation processes require more 
efforts and care. 
However, the SmartNet project was a research project, not a software project, and therefore the 
COCOMO method needed to be adjusted to correct differences between research and real-life 
implementation activities. The final outcome was a hybrid approach utilising both the available data 
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sources and the COCOMO method with necessary adjustments to infer actual real-life implementations 
based on research implementations, as presented in subsection 3.2.3 below. 
3.2.3 A hybrid estimation method 
The simple COCOMO method estimation needed to be adjusted for the comparison of coordination 
schemes, because the SmartNet simulator implementation was not equivalent to a comprehensive IT 
system that includes all functions needed in aggregation, bidding and market clearing. For example, the 
simulator used a large common database for all the data, with unlimited access. In addition, the simulator 
was implemented for research purposes only, without additional efforts on user-friendly interfaces, 
reporting function as requested by regulation or such.  The modifications to the COCOMO estimate and 
their justifications are provided below: 
• The work for a complete IT system was estimated to be four times as large as the SmartNet 
simulator work. This work was further divided into 25% of higher-cost work by senior experts 
and 75% of lower-cost work (by non-experts).  
• The objective of SmartNet was to bring technology from Technology Readiness Level (TRL) [36] 
2 to TRL 4-5. Although this objective has been achieved, TRL is still below the level required for 
commercial applications (TRL 9). Therefore, further analysis and software development will be 
needed to validate candidate coordination schemes before they can be taken into real-life use. It 
was assumed that this additional work requires twice as much the effort of the SmartNet 
simulator, because it must be more detailed (in terms of DSO networks) and it should provide 
information on handling abnormal events either in grids, markets or ICT. Moreover, changing the 
regulation to accommodate a new coordination scheme requires a massive amount of work in 
administrative or legal aspects (that affect ICT costs), which is out of the scope of the SmartNet 
project. Therefore, ICT costs estimates focused on the work required for developing a simulator 
for assessing the functionalities of a new coordination scheme. Additionally, an analysis to gain 
an understanding of abnormal situations was also needed, although those are outside the scope 
of SmartNet. 
• The market clearing process in the common TSO-DSO AS market model (CS D) became critical 
and hence its cost increased. In CS D, the process clears the market for the whole country at both 
TSO and DSO level. A highly fault tolerant and dependable market clearing solution is needed, 
because local market clearing is not performed (i.e. DSO resources are cleared in the centralized 
market). A feasible market clearing solution needs to be obtained for all time steps and 
market/grid conditions. High dependability software costs more due to increased efforts in 
validation and testing [34]. Thus, a criticality cost increase was added to the cost estimate of CS 
D.  
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Figure 3.8 illustrates the work flow of the SmartNet ICT cost estimation. The first step was to estimate 
person-month efforts, based on the number of computer programme code lines in the SmartNet simulator 
by using the simple COCOMO method. Based on an internal consultation within the project consortium, 
the work efforts required for aggregation and market clearing were further split into implementing the 
base-line centralized AS market model (CS A) and the alternative coordination schemes (CS B, CS C, and 
CS D). Moreover, the work efforts were further divided into smaller tasks in order to estimate the effort of 
upgrading the centralized AS market (CS A) into alternative coordination schemes (CS B, CS C and CS D). 
At this point, the adjustments explained above were performed as well. Finally, the cost estimation for the 
base-line (CS A) and the upgrades to the four alternative schemes (CS B, CS C, and CS D) were calculated 
by estimating the costs of person months. 
 
Figure 3.8: Illustration of the hybrid cost estimation method 
3.2.4 Data sources 
Once the research methodology was established, the data to feed the calculations had to be selected. 
However, the required data are seldom publicly available, so a detailed research work had to be carried 
out to find information sources that can be related to the systems needed in coordination schemes. In this 
case, the relationship between some DSO grid management information systems and the grid 
management system was investigated in the common TSO-DSO AS market model (CS D).   
Additionally, communications of smart metering and various cost analyses were related to DER 
communications for discussing the feasibility of assuming the centralized TSO AS markets (CS A) in 2030 
in such a way that DSO level DERs are aggregated to the TSO market. 
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3.2.4.1 SmartNet simulator 
First of all, the data gathered from the SmartNet simulator were considered to estimate the required 
ICT investments, based on the COCOMO method. The simulator was implemented in Python and AMPL 
languages, and CPLEX solver was used to solve complex optimization problems, in order to compare the 
different TSO-DSO coordination schemes.  The simulation models described flexible energy resources at a 
physical level from large units down to domestic white appliances and electric vehicles and separate 
aggregation algorithms were developed for different types of DER units [37]. Therefore, the simulator 
implementation [3] contains all aggregation algorithms (Thermostatically Controlled Loads (TCL), 
conventional generators, storage, CHP, curtailable generation / load and atomic loads) for various types 
of resources and all market clearing algorithms (central market, local market and common market) 
needed in the coordination schemes [2]. 
The simulator used a common database for all the data, which is not the expected procedure for real-
life systems. This implies that the simulator implementation contained fewer interfaces among different 
systems than in real life, so it reduced the amount of coding to some extent. However, the simulator also 
required some data processing to analyse the results.  
However, the SmartNet simulator provided valuable information on estimating work efforts of 
implementing aggregation and market clearing. The COCOMO method was used to relate the SmartNet 
simulator implementation efforts to real-life work effort estimates, and further to ICT costs. For that 
purpose, the numbers of code lines in the aggregation and market clearing components were taken as an 
input. The numbers of code lines were approximately 36 000 and 21 000 for aggregation and market 
clearing components, respectively (calculated on Jan 24, 2019). 
3.2.4.2 Efforts estimated by implementation partners 
Although the SmartNet simulator provided very valuable information, it was built for research 
purposes, so some adjustments were needed in order to estimate real-life systems. As a result, the 
partners who developed the simulator were contacted to provide estimates of real-life implementation. 
The SmartNet aggregation and market clearing components of the simulator were developed by six 
project partners, four of which provided estimates of required person-months for real life 
implementation (to be utilised by commercial aggregators, DSOs, and TSOs) of aggregation and market 
clearing algorithms. It turned out that partners were rather optimistic about the work effort needed. 
However, partners’ inputs provided valuable insights for estimating the work share of the aggregation 
and market clearing developments required: 
• It was assumed that the total work of SmartNet aggregation tasks (excluding DSO 
aggregation) consisted of i) implementing aggregation to bid into the centralized AS markets 
(CS A), i.e. the TSO market and ii) upgrading the aggregation algorithm for offering bids to 
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local markets. The share of the aggregation work done in SmartNet to bid into TSO markets 
was estimated to be 56 %, with the remaining 44 % to allow aggregators to bid into local 
markets. 
• It was considered that the market clearing work  included TSO market clearing (CS A), 
upgrading market clearing for local markets, and DSO aggregation, whose cost shares were 
40 %, 30 %, and 30 %, respectively. 
3.2.4.3 IT system costs in national DSO regulation 
DSOs in Europe are regulated by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). To the best of our 
knowledge, Finland is the only country in which the DSO regulation model includes publicly available 
minimum functional requirements and explicit upper bound costs for general IT systems needed in 
distribution grid operation by the DSOs. According to the Finnish Energy Authority, the IT system cost 
estimation was based on a report by Empower Ltd and an assessment of their field experts in 2010. These 
estimates were updated by the Finnish Energy Authority for the regulation period 2016- 2023. In 
addition, the regulator has made unit cost inquires to DSOs during 2014 and 2015. The IT system 
estimations correspond to “traditional” systems that meet normal customer service requirements and 
fulfil functionalities required by laws and regulations. Investment duration is 10 years for all grid IT 
systems and 20 years for telecommunications in network control, respectively. 
The maximum cost recognized by the Finnish Energy Regulation [38] are presented in Table 3.1: 
Network Information System 
System, standard unit 112 500 € 
Scaling by number of customers + 6.6 € per customer 
Customer Information System 
System, standard unit 75 500 € 
Scaling by number of customers + 9.5 € per customer 
Energy metering for settlement and billing in the distribution network   
  (includes the cost of meter reading systems) 
Energy meter, remotely read, up to 3x63 A 200 € each 
Energy meter, remotely read, over 3x63 A 570 € each 
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Energy meter, locally read, up to 3x63 A12 180 € each 
System for management of metering data and calculating metered electricity market balances 
System, standard unit 138 000€ 
Scaling by energy usage locations + 6.6 € per location 
 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
System, standard unit 301 300€ 
Scaling by substations + 9 800 € per substation 
Scaling by remotely controllable secondary substations and switchgear + 2 200 € each 
Distribution Management System (DMS) 
System, standard unit 21 900 € 
Scaling by other integrated grid systems + 21 900 € per system 
Scaling by substations + 1 100€ per substation 
Scaling by remotely controllable secondary substations and switchgear +  550 € each 
Telecommunications for network control 
Communication network 89 800 € 
Scaling by substations + 5 500 € per substation 
Table 3.1: Maximum cost recognized by the Finnish regulation [38] 
Many cost items were used (due to similarities) as pieces of background information for estimation of 
costs of aggregation (CIS, System for management of metering data and calculating metered electricity 
market balances, SCADA) and last kilometre communications (Billing metering). The cost of Network 
Information Systems (NIS) was considered as a suitable reference to estimate the cost of handling a large 
amount of grid data in the common TSO-DSO market (CS D). The regulation cost model was also used as a 
benchmark and sanity checker in the SmartNet ICT cost estimation. For example, IT system cost estimates 
based on the work efforts provided by researchers were compared to these costs approved by regulators. 
This comparison confirmed that the work efforts estimated by researchers were likely to underestimate 
the ICT costs of coordination schemes, but cost estimates derived by the COCOMO method were more 
realistic. 
                                                                   
12 The number of meters allowed by the authority in this category is very small. 
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3.2.4.4 Information on last kilometre communications 
SmartNet ICT cost analysis gathered information from various smart metering system requirement 
specifications and CBA reports, in order to assess the cost of communications to households with DER 
capability. For example, a good recent overview of smart metering systems and requirements is in 
chapter 3 of [39]. The cost benefit analyses considered in [40] were done prior to roll outs and do not tell 
the actual realised costs and benefits.  In addition, the project received anonymized data on DSOs’ smart 
meter deployment costs in 2016 in Norway. These data referred to 111 DSOs, which represent over 2.9 
million metering locations. Out of these, about 2.3 million locations were households, 0.3 million 
summerhouses or equivalents and 0.3 million industry locations (each industrial site consumes over 100 
MWh annually). Unfortunately, this kind of data concerning existing systems was not available from Italy, 
Spain, or Denmark. The ICT cost estimates do not include any last kilometre data as a direct input. Rather, 
the role of last kilometre data was to help in assessing the feasibility to the working assumptions of the 
ICT cost estimation. 
The following conclusions can be drawn regarding the communications costs of distribution-related 
ancillary services (AS).  
1) The functional requirements of the metering system have a much smaller impact on the costs 
than the installation costs of the meters.  
2) The smart metering systems will not adequately support distributed AS, unless the functional 
requirements for smart meters are amended accordingly. The most important missing capability 
is to adequately and quickly activate AS provided by many small DERs. The capabilities to 
support verification of the responses must also be upgraded. In some vertically integrated 
utilities outside Europe, smart metering systems already support distributed AS.  
3) The smart metering systems have many properties that are needed by distributed AS. These 
include measurements for billing, verification and, to some extent, voltage quality, reasonable 
existing cyber-security requirements, adequate independence from third parties that may 
suddenly stop their service, etc.   
4) Existing communication requirements for smart metering systems, especially in Europe, are 
typically not comparable to the communication requirements for the ancillary services provision 
and, thus, the analysis of costs for smart metering systems does not provide much information 
about the expected communication costs of distributed ancillary services. Some useful general 
observations regarding highly distributed systems can be made. For small distributed end 
devices, the installation and integration costs tend to dominate as functionality in mass produced 
end devices is inexpensive. With relatively modest additional costs, the communication networks 
can be made to support fast control actions. Implementing own communication infrastructures 
for functionalities tends to be relatively expensive compared to implementing a generic common 
infrastructure for all the functionalities needed.  In the distributed systems, integrating many 
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 48  
 
functionalities is often cost efficient compared to doing the same with separate dedicated 
systems and devices.  Dedicated, last-kilometre ICT infrastructure can be too expensive for the 
provision of AS from small flexible DER. 
The analysis of the last kilometre is further described in Appendix III, section 10. 
Last kilometre communication costs were outside the main scope of the SmartNet project and its ICT 
cost comparison.  They are briefly discussed here, because the development of these costs depends very 
much on integration of services and technologies and related regulations. They have a significant impact 
on the minimum size of flexible DER that are feasible to be aggregated in the SmartNet integrated reserve 
markets. The aggregation costs and the last kilometre costs were estimated to be roughly as big as the ICT 
costs included in the comparison. 
3.2.4.5 Summary of ICT cost estimation input sources 
The use of various information sources in the ICT cost estimation is summarised in Table 3.2: 
Input Utilization in cost analysis 
The number of programming code lines 
for aggregations and market clearing 
modules in the SmartNet simulator 
Primary input for estimating work effort in creating 
aggregation and market clearing systems for real 
implementations.  
Consultations to SmartNet partners on 
work efforts for implementing 
aggregation and market clearing 
algorithms that are ready to be used in 
network operations. Input on work efforts 
of various subtasks.  
Partner input allowed splitting the total work effort 
derived from SmartNet simulator implementation into 
subtasks of implementing the base line coordination 
scheme (CS A) and upgrading that to future coordination 
scheme candidates (CS B, CS C and CS D). 
Finnish DSO regulation’s explicit upper 
bound costs for the ICT systems 
commonly needed in distribution grid 
operation. 
The regulation cost model is based on the reported DSO 
costs and expert estimates. In SmartNet, this served as a 
collection of reference systems and a sanity checker in 
estimating costs of the solutions proposed by SmartNet.  
Although there are considerable differences between DSOs 
common IT systems and SmartNet solutions, the 
regulation model may provide lower bound estimates for 
costs in many cases. NIS was used as a reference for 
estimating costs of grid data processing in CS D. 
Real anonymized costs on smart metering 
reported by DSOs in 2016. This included 
communications costs and cost of smart 
meter data processing. The latter category 
may also include other costs.  
The real data illustrates the variability of communications 
and data processing costs. It was reasonable to 
approximate DER communications by smart metering 
communications costs. Thus, this real communication cost 
information provided input for assessing the feasibility of 
the working assumptions of ICT cost estimation. 
Table 3.2: Summary of ICT cost estimation inputs and utilization 
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3.2.5 ICT cost calculation 
Calculating ICT cost estimates began with listing IT systems and upgrades that were needed when the 
base line implementation of the centralized AS market model (CS A) is upgraded to each of alternative 
candidate coordination schemes (CS B, CS C and CS D). The main cost sources are listed in Table 3.3.   
Upgrade from the centralized AS markets (CS A) to local AS markets (CS B) 
Aggregation services for aggregators to submit bids to local markets 
Implementation of local AS markets according to the coordination scheme 
DSO smart aggregation and disaggregation implementation based on parametric optimization 
Upgrade from the centralized AS markets (CS A) to shared balancing responsibility (CS C) 
Aggregation services for aggregators to submit bids to local markets 
Implementation of local AS markets according to the coordination scheme 
Note that the DSO and TSO market information exchanges between the market and Common TSO-DSO 
profile scheduler is assumed to be at low costs and hence included in the general estimate of interface 
costs 
Upgrade from the centralized AS markets (CS A) to a common TSO-DSO market (CS D)  
Aggregation services for aggregators to submit bids to local markets 
Implementation of the TSO-DSO common market 
Interfaces and robust handling of all DSO grid data in market clearing 
Solution to calculate effectively the market clearing optimization problem 
Table 3.3: Main IT system cost sources in estimating the costs of coordination schemes 
Then, as described in Figure 3.8, the numerical COCOMO-estimates of SmartNet simulator work were 
calculated. These general level estimates are provided in Table 3.4, where the SmartNet simulator coding 
was split into sections of coordination scheme, simulation scenarios, implementing transmission or 
distribution networks, DER aggregation, market clearing and emulating the physical electric grids. For the 
ICT cost estimation, the most relevant estimates were the work efforts required to derive costs of 
aggregation and the market clearing IT systems. However, the complete SmartNet simulator work, 
excluding the physical layer, provided information on the effort of testing and verifying the functionality 
of a TSO-DSO coordination scheme with real networks before it was taken into network operations. 
Market clearing and aggregation tasks were split into smaller tasks, as explained in the methodology 
section 3.2.3, in order to calculate the efforts for the above-listed essential upgrades. 
The next step was to calculate the ICT costs, based on the equations provided in Appendix II - ICT costs 
equations. These equations used some variables and a few adjustable parameters, whose meaning and 
values are given in a tabular form in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6. The values of the variables were derived 
from the input data according to the ICT cost estimation methodology. 
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The number of aggregation solution providers and local market service providers were both 
considered to be three in Italy, Spain and Denmark, as the numbers were expected to be small. Moreover, 
values below three would mean either a monopoly or an unhealthy market situation. If the number of 
aggregators or local market service providers increases, the system-level costs for aggregation and local 
markets become large. 
The last step in the calculation of ICT costs was to provide the numerical estimates for national cases, 
which is presented in section 4.1.  The cost estimates of the IT system implementations are presented in 
NPV, assuming that Denmark has 66 DSOs, Italy has 638 DSOs and Spain has 397 DSOs, as shown in Table 
3.6. 
Simulator 
topic 
COCOMO simplest version 
KLOC = kilo lines 
of code 
PM estimated by 
COCOMO in an embedded 
environment, A=3.6 and 
b=1.2 
PM estimated by 
COCOMO in a less 
demanding13 (semi-
detached) environment,  
A=3 and b=1.12 
scenario 27.5 192 123 
network 5.40 27 20 
aggregation 36.0 265 166 
market 21.0 139 91 
physical layer 44.2 339 209 
Table 3.4: Effort estimates derived from SmartNet simulator and COCOMO method. 
 
Name Value Explanation 
highPMCost  25 000€ PM cost of senior specialist work [41] 
lowPMCost 22 000€ PM cost of specialist work derived from the senior specialist 
estimate [41] 
nAggregators  
 
3  Number of aggregation solution providers in Italy, Spain and 
Denmark 
nLocalMarketPlatforms 3 Number of service providers offering local market clearings in 
Italy, Spain, and Denmark 
Table 3.5: Parameters in the ICT cost model 
                                                                   
13 COCOMO estimates for a less demanding environment were calculated only for illustrating sensitivity on the 
usage environment. 
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Name Value Explanation 
CocomoCost  666 × highPMCost Cost of the SmartNet simulator (without physical 
layer implementation) estimated by the COCOMO 
method in an embedded environment. Simulator 
work requires senior specialist level skills. 
SimulatorStudyCost 
 
2 ×CocomoCost Cost of verifying a new TSO-DSO coordination 
scheme before taking it into use. 
marketClearAlgPM  55.6 PM needed for CS A market clearing algorithm 
development, based on COCOMO and partner 
consultations.  
marketClearOtherPM 3 × marketClearAlgPM PM needed for developing market clearing, 
excluding the algorithm development. 
localMarketAlgPM 
 
41.7 PM needed for local market clearing algorithm 
development, based on COCOMO and partner 
consultations. 
localMarketOtherPM 3× localMarketAlgPM PM needed for developing local market clearing, 
excluding the algorithm development. 
DSOaggregAlgPM 
 
41.7 PM needed for DSO aggregation algorithm 
development, based on COCOMO and partner 
consultations. 
DSOaggregOtherPM 3 × DSOaggregAlgPM  
In CS_B only 0.5x 
DSOaggregOtherPM - 
costs is taken14.  
PM needed for developing DSO aggregation, 
excluding the algorithm development. 
aggregAlgPM 
 
148 PM needed for aggregation algorithm development, 
based on COCOMO and partner consultations. 
aggregOtherPM 3 × aggregAlgPM PM needed for aggregation development, excluding 
the algorithm development. 
locAggregAlgPM 
 
116 PM needed in aggregation algorithm development 
for local markets, based on COCOMO and partner 
consultations. 
locAggregOtherPM 3 × locAggregAlgPM PM needed in aggregation development for local 
markets, excluding the algorithm development. 
marketClearRTPM 26 PM needed to solve real time requirements of 
central market clearing in CS D. 
                                                                   
14 This is because locally there is market clearing and DSO aggregation and it can be assumed that data 
management of local market clearing can be used for managing DSO aggregation data with adding only half of the 
costs. 
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DcriticalityCost (marketClearAlgPM× 
marketClearRTPM) 
 highPMCost / 2 
In common TSO-DSO market model, the central 
market clearing becomes critical and its 
implementation cost is increased. This factor 
reflects both criticality and real-time challenges. 
nDSO nDSODenmark = 66;  
nDSOItaly = 638; 
nDSOSpain = 397; 
Number of DSOs. The cost of central market 
clearing in CS D depends of how many DSO grids it 
handles in the optimization process. 
nodesForDSO 50 Typical DSO grid model in market clearing 
algorithm consists of nodesForDSO nodes. 
nodesTSO nodesTSODenmark = 
144; 
nodesTSOItaly = 3x3648; 
nodesTSOSpain = 1493; 
The number of nodes to model TSO grid in market 
clearing of CS D. For Italy, the number of nodes is 
three times the nodes used to model the Northern-
Italy in simulations, while it is the number of nodes 
in the simulation models for Spain and Denmark. 
NISunit 138 000 € Estimated base-line cost for handling grid data in 
the market clearing of CS D. The numerical value is 
the DSO regulation upper bound cost of Network 
Information System’s unit cost. 
NISperNode 6.6 € Scaling factor of the grid handling cost. Numerical 
value is the scaling factor of the DSO regulation 
upper bound cost of Network Information Systems. 
interfaceCost 22 000 € The upper bound cost in the DSO regulation for 
connecting different network management 
systems.  
Table 3.6: Variables in the ICT cost model 
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4 Results 
Before assessing the obtained results in this CBA, it is necessary to summarize the main characteristics 
of the scenarios considered by the simulations. More detailed information on the main scenario setups 
and simulation results are developed in deliverable D4.2 [4], specifically, the characteristics of each 
scenario datasets are detailed. Next paragraphs summarize the data provided in that deliverable, but, for 
a deeper understanding of how the scenarios are created and simulations carried out, a thorough reading 
of the document is recommended.     
Table 4.1 shows the key characteristics of the final scenario datasets, including the number of flexible 
devices as well as the number of network elements.  
Category IT (503) DK (401) SP (301) Comment 
Photovoltaic (PV) 655 323 203 502 59 943  
Wind 31 3 472 1 053  
CHP 1 531 3 922 Large CHP 
Hydro 1 833 0 555 Run or river hydro 
Conventional 1 774 67 596  
Storage 212 717 139 355 200 033 EV and pumped hydro 
Wet 1 236 325 3 206 570 1 847 500 Domestic appliances 
TCL 68 481 74 688 124 539 Domestic heat pumps 
Sheddable load 33 783 3 383 43 501 Street lights 
Nodes (transmission) 3 648 144 1 493 Transmission network 
Nodes (distribution) 2 410 3 388 2 799 Distribution network 
Branches 
(transmission) 
4 230 199 2 231 Transmission network 
Branches 
(distribution) 
2 410 3 387 2 755 Distribution network 
Distribution grids 638 66 397 Primary substations 
Table 4.1: Key characteristics of datasets 
4.1 ICT cost estimates 
The relation between implementation costs and purchase costs is complex, since purchase costs 
depend on politics, markets, and other issues, as explained in section 3.2.1. Based on the approach 
described in section 0, it was assumed that the costs related to most CSs (all except CS D) do not depend 
on the country. 
To illustrate results and give some reference figures we list some estimated unit system costs. The 
coordination scheme consists of multiple such systems and their modifications. For an aggregator, the 
cost model estimates the IT system costs of aggregating flexibilities to the TSO market to be 13.5 M€ and 
the cost of upgrading the aggregation to bid in local markets to be 10.6 M€. The IT system cost of 
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implementing TSO market clearing is estimated to be 5.1 M€. Moreover, the cost of implementing a 
platform service for local market clearings in the local AS market model is estimated to be as high as 11.3 
M€. The DSO aggregation implementation is included in the local AS market model (CS B), which 
increases the complexity of the IT system and, thus, its cost. Note that upgrading aggregation to local 
markets can be more expensive than making the local market clearing service. In general, aggregators will 
have high costs as they require complex IT systems. 
However, the centralized market clearing in CS D handles large amounts of DSO grid data and suffers 
from real-time challenges (the market must be cleared with the appropriate frequency to provide the 
results for providing the services requested by TSOs and DSOs). Therefore, its cost depended on the 
simulation model and on the complexity of the market clearing optimisation, which is affected by the 
amount of grid data and the number of nodes. This yielded different cost estimates for Denmark, Italy and 
Spain. The cost of the commons TSO-DSO market clearing was estimated to be 20.4 M€ and 14.9 M€, and 
7.5 M€ for Denmark, Italy and Spain, respectively. 
In each CS, estimates for higher and lower costs were calculated as cost boundaries, which depended 
on the implementation effectiveness of local aggregation and/or markets. If each aggregation solution 
provider and market clearing service provider implemented their own solution without any additional 
support, the costs would be the highest. However, if there were certain national support to develop 
algorithms for advanced functionalities, such as DSO aggregation, and the results were available for all 
parties, the cost of implementing local market aggregation and market clearing would be lower. At the 
lowest total cost level, it was assumed that general implementations could be achieved with a 50% 
increase to a single implementation cost. 
The cost structure in each coordination scheme is illustrated in Table 4.2 by splitting the costs into 
aggregation and market clearing costs. Recall that estimates for CS B, CS C and CS D were upgrading costs 
from the existing CS A (which are provided for information purposes in the column in grey), meaning that 
the components already present in CS A were assumed to be available also for these coordination 
schemes. Some estimates are provided as lower and upper bounds. This refers to how effectively local 
aggregation and/or market clearing can be implemented, as discussed earlier. It was also assumed that 
upgrading from CS A to any of the alternative schemes requires additional work on simulating how the 
coordination schemes behave in different real-world situations.  
The illustration of aggregation and market clearing costs in Denmark is provided in Figure 4.1, 
followed by the illustration of Italy in Figure 4.2 and Spain in Figure 4.3. The cost of the base line 
centralized AS market implementation (CS A) is illustrated on the left and the additional costs to upgrade 
to candidate coordination schemes (CS B, CS C and CS D) are provided on the right. The coordination 
schemes are denoted as follows: the centralized AS market model (CS A), the local AS market model (CS 
B), the shared balancing responsibility model (CS C), and the common TSO-DSO AS market model (CS D). 
In the figures below, the difference between the high and low estimates of the table are illustrated by 
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lighter colour. The light blue bar illustrates the effectiveness of implementing local markets as explained 
above. 
 
(M€) CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Aggregation cost – For the TSO market 20.2 – 40.4 N/A N/A N/A 
Aggregation cost – For the DSO market N/A 15.8 – 31.7 15.8 – 31.7 N/A 
Aggregation cost – For the common 
TSO-DSO market 
N/A N/A N/A 15.8 – 31.7 
Market clearing cost – TSO market 5.1 N/A N/A N/A 
Market clearing cost – DSO market N/A 16.9 – 33.8 9.2 – 18.3 N/A 
Market clearing cost – Common TSO-
DSO market 
N/A N/A N/A 20.3 (IT) 
14.9 (SP) 
7.5 (DK) 
Validation studies15 N/A 33.3 33.3 33.3 
TOTAL (UPGRADE) COST PER CS 25.2 – 45.5 66.0 – 98.8 58.3 – 83.3 69.4 – 85.3 (IT) 
64.0 – 79.8 (SP) 
56.6 – 72.4 (DK) 
Table 4.2: Summary of main IT cost components in CS A, CS B, CS C and CS D (M€) 
 
                                                                   
15 The test and validation of this type of critical systems may imply more costs than coding them. 
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 56  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Cost estimates of aggregation and market clearing implementations in Denmark.16 
 
Figure 4.2: Cost estimates of aggregation and market clearing implementation in Italy 
                                                                   
16 The costs for coordination schemes B, C and D are the costs for updating the existing CS A to each alternative scheme. It was 
assumed that CS A will be in use by 2030. The cost of CS A is for reference purposes only. This comment applies to Figure 4.2 and 
Figure 4.3 as well. 
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Figure 4.3: Cost estimates of aggregation and market clearing implementations in Spain 
The data presented in the three figures above are provided in a numerical form in Table 4.3. Note that 
the cost of the centralized AS markets (CS A) only covers the cost of implementing IT systems for market 
clearing and aggregation. These costs are taken as the baseline for the rest of the costs, because it was 
assumed that CS A will be in place by 2030, and the aim of this ICT cost assessment is to estimate the 
costs required to upgrade CS A to the other CSs. As a result, the first column is highlighted in grey to 
represent the baseline costs (CS A), while the consecutive columns correspond to the cost required to 
upgrade such baseline to the four alternative TSO-DSO coordination schemes (CS B, CS C and CS D). 
 NPV (M€) 
 CS A CS A  CS B CS A  CS C CS A  CS D 
Low estimates 25.3 66.0 58.3 
69.5 (Italy) 
64.0 (Spain) 
56.6 (Denmark) 
High estimates 45.5 103.0 83.3 
85.2 (Italy) 
79.8 (Spain) 
72.4 (Denmark) 
Table 4.3: Cost estimates of aggregation and market clearing implementations in national scenarios 
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The equivalent annual costs (EAC) can be calculated according to equation (10)17: 
P = 		1 − 1 + V (10) 
where NPV = net present value, r = interest rate18, and n = number of periods. 
The investment ICT cost recovery period was assumed to be 10 years, to coincide with the hold time of 
DSO network management systems in the Finnish DSO regulation model. In order to estimate the interest 
rate for the investment, inflation rates and 10-year bond rates for Denmark, Italy and Spain were used. 
Considering that inflation rates were 0.8%, 1.7% and 1.7%19 and the 10-year bond rates were 0.24%, 
3.13% and 1.47%20 for Denmark, Italy and Spain, a conservative interest estimate of 5% was made. For a 
10-year period, with an interest rate of 5%, the annual costs are presented in Table 4.4. 
Under the scope restrictions and the formulation of the ICT cost estimation problem, the main finding 
was that ICT costs in different market arrangements are almost the same (subject to uncertainties) and 
much lower than the operational costs, as demonstrated in next sections. Therefore, estimated ICT costs 
are not the key elements to be considered in selecting the AS market arrangements and, hence, 
monetarized values are not transformed to a given future target year at this point. 
  
                                                                   
17  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivalent_annual_cost. This formula is equivalent to the Capital Recovery factor 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capital_recovery_factor) 
18 Considering long-term impacts, this term should be really low. 
19 Data for November 2018 taken from: https://tradingeconomics.com/country-list/inflation-rate?continent=europe 
20  Data taken from: https://www.investing.com/rates-bonds/italy-government-bonds?maturity_from=40&maturity_to=310. 
Consultation date: 2018/12/11  
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 59  
 
 
Equivalent Annual Cost (M€) 
10-year investment with 5% interest rate 
 CS A CS A  CS B CS A  CS C CS A  CS D 
Low estimates 3.28 8.55 7.55 
9.00 (Italy) 
8.29 (Spain) 
7.33 (Denmark) 
High estimates 5.89 13.34 10.79 
11.03 (Italy) 
10.33 (Spain) 
9.38 (Denmark) 
Table 4.4: Equivalent Annual costs of ICT investments with a 10-year period and a 5% interest rate. 
 
4.2 Comparison of coordination schemes in Denmark 
4.2.1 Denmark dataset 
The Danish simulated scenario includes Western Denmark as shown in Figure 4.4, which is fed by the 
transmission network part synchronously connected to Continental Europe, but with connections to 
Eastern Denmark as well as neighbouring countries. 
 
Figure 4.4: Danish transmission grid 
In the Danish case, the wind power is of great importance and the main contributor to the imbalances. 
For more details, see D4.2 [4]. 
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For each of the simulated scenario, different days for simulations have been selected in order to 
represent different operating conditions. What make the difference are mainly the power demand, PV and 
wind power availability. Normalised time-series for PV and wind power availability on the selected dates 
for the Danish scenario are shown in Figure 4.5. In addition, the considered number of occurrences of 
each day throughout a whole year is indicated, based on a comparison of the actual renewable generation 
mix in Denmark during 2018. 
Denmark 
Scenario 401 (9 Nov) 
 
No. occurrences/year: 94 
Scenario 402 (5 June) 
 
No. occurrences/year: 221 
Scenario 403 (11 Apr) 
 
No. occurrences/year: 50 
Figure 4.5: Normalised PV and Wind power availability in the Danish scenario 
As it can be deduced from the graphs, the main differences between the selected days are: 
• Day 1 (Scenario 401 - 9 Nov): Low PV generation + High wind generation (over the day). 
• Day 2 (Scenario 402 - 5 June): High PV generation (midday hours) + Wind generation (afternoon). 
• Day 3 (Scenario 3 - 11 Apr): High PV generation (midday hours) + High wind generation 
(afternoon). 
4.2.2 mFRR provision cost 
As described above, three different days were simulated for each country. Table 4.5 to Table 4.7 recall 
the amounts of energy dispatched in each of them (in GWh) and summarise their associated cost (in k€) 
for the four simulated TSO-DSO coordination schemes. In all the cases, the results are divided into 
transmission and distribution, as well as in upward and downward activated mFRR. 
Day 1 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 4.11 1.11 4.10 1.31 4.65 2.83 4.10 1.24 
Down -0.48 -0.96 -0.41 -1.21 -3.13 -1.21 -0.42 -1.14 
Total 4.59 2.07 4.51 2.52 7.78 4.04 4.52 2.38 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 309.76 33.68 336.80 46.96 447.71 192.71 327.81 42.04 
Down -19.50 -10.47 -18.93 -11.94 -0.08 -25.93 -19.32 -12.59 
Total 290.26 23.21 317.87 35.02 447.63 166.78 308.49 29.45 
Table 4.5: mFRR provision costs for the Danish scenario – Day 1 
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Day 2 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 3.31 0.06 3.28 0.09 2.42 1.07 3.28 0.09 
Down -0.34 -0.16 -0.32 -0.18 -1.03 -0.15 -0.32 -0.18 
Total 3.65 0.22 3.60 0.27 3.45 1.22 3.60 0.27 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 237.01 4.79 236.09 7.62 181.77 83.89 236.40 7.69 
Down -19.50 -8.08 -18.94 -8.26 -54.07 -6.71 -18.93 -8.96 
Total 217.51 -3.29 217.15 -0.64 127.7 77.18 217.47 -1.27 
Table 4.6: mFRR provision costs for the Danish scenario – Day 2 
Day 3 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 4.08 0.14 4.06 0.19 3.78 2.20 4.06 0.18 
Down -1.38 -0.72 -1.33 -0.81 -3.42 -0.83 -1.33 -0.79 
Total 5.46 0.86 5.39 1.00 7.20 3.03 5.39 0.97 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 291.89 12.07 305.67 18.63 342.84 176.98 305.46 17.24 
Down -67.69 -18.02 -66.01 -17.94 -36.23 -28.15 -66.78 -19.28 
Total 224.20 -5.95 239.66 0.69 306.61 148.83 238.68 -2.04 
Table 4.7: mFRR provision costs for the Danish scenario – Day 3 
Cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.6 to Figure 4.8. Again, values are provided for 
transmission (red bars) and distribution (purple bars) and for upward (dark colour) and downward 
(light colour) activations.  
 
Figure 4.6: mFRR provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 1 
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Figure 4.7: mFRR provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 2 
 
Figure 4.8: mFRR provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 3 
4.2.3 aFRR provision cost 
As for the case of mFRR provision, activation (in GWh) are obtained from simulation results [4] and 
the related cost (in k€) for each coordination scheme are calculated for the three days. However, there is 
no shared balancing responsibility when dispatching aFRR and the TSO is assumed to be always 
responsible to keep the overall system balance. Therefore, the values are divided into upward and 
downward balancing, but not into transmission and distribution in Table 4.8 to Table 4.10 below. 
These cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.9 to Figure 4.11, distinguishing the values 
for upward (dark colour) and downward (light colour) activations. 
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  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 1 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 0.39 0.38 1.00 0.37 
Down -0.34 -0.35 -0.05 -0.37 
Total 0.73 0.73 1.05 0.74 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 32.81 32.17 84.72 30.51 
Down -0.33 -1.17 -0.17 -1.22 
Total 32.48 31.00 84.55 29.29 
Table 4.8: aFRR provision results for the Danish scenario – Day 1 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 2 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 0.47 0.48 1.00 0.48 
Down -0.48 -0.48 -0.17 -0.48 
Total 0.95 0.96 1.17 0.96 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 42.50 43.02 92.28 43.16 
Down -13.58 -13.40 -4.46 -13.41 
Total 28.92 29.62 87.82 29.75 
Table 4.9: aFRR provision results for the Danish scenario – Day 2 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 3 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 0.40 0.40 0.84 0.39 
Down -0.41 -0.40 -0.14 -0.39 
Total 0.81 0.80 0.98 0.78 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 33.93 34.02 71.87 33.75 
Down -0.92 -2.70 -3.38 -2.61 
Total 33.01 31.32 68.49 31.14 
Table 4.10: aFRR provision results for the Danish scenario – Day 3 
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Figure 4.9: aFRR provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.10: aFRR provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 2 
 
Figure 4.11: aFRR provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 3 
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4.2.4 UM provision cost 
As for the cases of mFRR and aFRR provisions, unwanted measures and related costs are calculated 
starting from the simulation results [4] for each coordination scheme. The values are divided into upward 
and downward balancing, but not into transmission and distribution in Table 4.11 to Table 4.13 below. 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 1 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 0.22 0.21 0.87 0.22 
Down -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 
Total 0.24 0.23 0.87 0.24 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 3.48 3.41 14.64 3.37 
Down 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Total 3.48 3.41 14.64 3.36 
Table 4.11: UM provision results for the Danish scenario – Day 1 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 2 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.06 
Down -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 
Total 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.12 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 1.07 1.07 3.46 1.07 
Down 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.10 
Total 1.17 1.17 3.49 1.17 
Table 4.12: UM provision results for the Danish scenario – Day 2 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 3 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 0.04 0.04 0.75 0.04 
Down -0.17 -0.17 -0.05 -0.17 
Total 0.21 0.21 0.80 0.21 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 0.69 0.67 12.07 0.64 
Down 2.01 2.00 0.56 2.02 
Total 2.70 2.67 12.63 2.66 
Table 4.13: UM provision results for the Danish scenario – Day 3 
These cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.12 to Figure 4.14, distinguishing the values 
for upward (dark colour) and downward (light colour) activations. 
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Figure 4.12: UM provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.13: UM provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 2 
 
Figure 4.14: UM provision cost in the Danish scenario – Day 3 
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4.2.5 Cost results for Denmark 
The daily values for mFRR (section 4.2.2), aFRR (section 4.2.3) and UM (section 4.2.4), together with 
the daily allocation of ICT costs (section 4.1) are shown together in Table 4.14 in order to allow the 
comparison and assessment of the impact that the different day typologies has on the obtained results. 
The daily cost of the ICT for each day is calculated simply by dividing the annualized value by the 365 
days of a year. In Table 4.14, the cheapest CS is highlighted in green and the most expensive one in red, 
while the same results are graphically represented from Figure 4.15 to Figure 4.17. 
 (k€/day) mFRR aFRR UM ICT TOTAL 
Day 1 
CS A 313.47 32.48 3.48 12.56 361.99 
CS B 352.89 31.00 3.41 42.53 429.83 
CS C 614.40 84.55 14.64 37.68 751.27 
CS D 337.94 29.29 3.37 35.45 406.05 
Day 2 
CS A 214.22 28.92 1.17 12.56 256.87 
CS B 216.51 29.61 1.17 42.53 289.82 
CS C 204.88 87.82 3.49 37.68 333.87 
CS D 216.19 29.74 1.17 35.45 282.55 
Day 3 
CS A 218.26 33.01 2.70 12.56 266.53 
CS B 240.35 31.32 2.66 42.53 316.86 
CS C 455.45 68.49 12.63 37.68 574.26 
CS D 236.63 31.14 2.66 35.45 305.88 
Table 4.14: Daily costs (k€/day) for the Danish scenario 
 
Figure 4.15: Daily costs for the Danish scenario – Day 1 
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Figure 4.16: Daily costs for the Danish scenario – Day 2 
 
Figure 4.17: Daily costs for the Danish scenario – Day 3 
Considering the number of occurrences of each day (detailed in section4.2.1), the annual cost Figure 
4.18values for each CS have been calculated and reported in Table 4.15 and Figure 4.18.   
(M€/year) mFRR aFRR UM ICT TOTAL 
CS A 87.72 11.09 0.72 4.59 104.12 
CS B 93.04 11.02 0.71 15.53 120.30 
CS C 125.80 30.78 2.78 13.76 173.12 
CS D 91.38 10.88 0.71 12.94 115.91 
Table 4.15: Annual costs for the Danish scenario 
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Figure 4.18: Annual costs for the Danish scenario 
From the analysis of the obtained results, some conclusions can be observed: 
• The cheapest coordination scheme in Denmark is the CS A, regardless of the type of day. 
Something similar happens with the most expensive coordination scheme, which is always CS C. 
• In general, this behaviour is due to the great amount of mFRR energy managed in each CS in 
comparison with the amount of aFRR. In Day 1 and Day 3, mFRR accounts for 75 % - 85 % of the 
total costs of each CS, while aFRR only justifies about 10 % of it. In the Day 2, though, aFRR makes 
CS C the most expensive coordination scheme since its cost is considerable higher (~90 k€/day) 
than in the rest of CSs (~30 k€/day). In this type of days, the mFRR cost for all coordination 
schemes is very similar, so the most expensive coordination scheme is determined by the aFRR 
activations. 
• In general, the annual results for CS A, CS B and CS D are very similar, the merit order is driven by 
the ICT costs. This is reasonable since the ICT system complexity is higher in CS D and CS B than in 
CS A. 
• The UM costs are negligible in comparison with the rest of costs in all coordination schemes. 
4.2.6 CO2 emissions savings 
The CO2 emission for the Danish scenario in each day are represented from Figure 4.19 to Figure 4.21 . 
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 70  
 
 
Figure 4.19: Daily CO2 emission for the Danish scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.20: Daily CO2 emission for the Danish scenario – Day 2 
 
Figure 4.21: Daily CO2 emission for the Danish scenario – Day 3 
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Figure 4.22 represents the annual CO2 emissions from all conventional and CHP devices at physical 
layer for the Danish scenario. The results show that CS C has the lowest emission in comparison to other 
schemes. However, the difference between coordination schemes is less than 4 %, which is quite low 
(note that the Y axis scale goes from 5 400 up to 6 100 ktons/day).   
 
Figure 4.22: Annual CO2 emission for the Danish scenario 
4.3 Comparison of coordination schemes in Italy 
4.3.1 Italy dataset 
The transmission grid considered in the Italian scenario dataset includes Northern and Central 
Northern parts of Italy (Figure 4.23). The transmission grid data includes information about generators 
(location, power capacity, and type), and information about which nodes are primary substations for 
distribution grids. The data includes 3648 nodes and 638 primary substations. 
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Figure 4.23: Italian transmission grid 
In the Italian case, the main contribution to the imbalances comes from solar power, with some 
contribution also from net demand, and minor ones from wind and run-of-river hydro. For more details, 
see D4.2 [4]. 
For each of the simulated scenarios, different days have been selected in order to simulate the most 
common operating conditions. What make the difference are mainly the power demand, PV and wind 
power availability. Normalised time-series for PV and wind power availability on the selected dates for 
the Italian scenario are shown in Figure 4.24. In addition, the considered number of occurrences of each 
day throughout a whole year is indicated, based on a comparison of the actual renewable generation mix 
in Italy during 2018. 
Italy 
Scenario 503 (1 May) 
 
No. occurrences/year: 121 
Scenario 504 (15 July) 
 
No. occurrences/year: 190 
Scenario 505 (6 Dec) 
No. occurrences/year: 54 
 
Figure 4.24: Normalised PV and Wind power availability in the Italian scenario 
As it can be drawn from the graphs above, the main differences between the selected days are: 
• Day 1 (Scenario 503 - 1 May): High PV generation (midday hours) + Low wind generation (mainly 
in the afternoon). 
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• Day 2 (Scenario 504 - 15 July): High PV generation (midday hours) + High wind generation 
(mainly in the first hours of the day). 
• Day 3 (Scenario 505 - 6 Dec): Very low PV generation (midday hours) + Low and constant wind 
generation (over the day). 
4.3.2 mFRR provision cost 
As described in section 4.3.1, three different days were simulated for each country. Table 4.16 to Table 
4.18 recall the amounts of energy dispatched in each of them (in GWh) and summarise their associated 
cost (in k€) for the four coordination schemes. In all the cases, the results are divided into transmission 
and distribution, as well as in upward and downward activated mFRR. 
Day 1 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 26.60 5.40 29.08 4.26 29.08 2.55 29.17 4.13 
Down -27.35 -0.46 -27.45 -1.80 -27.91 -2.16 -27.43 -1.76 
Total 53.95 5.86 56.53 6.06 56.99 4.71 56.6 5.89 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 2 028 341 2 160 323 2 179 194 2 168 309 
Down -1 757 -11 -1 762 -10 -1 785 -33 -1 761 -14 
Total 271 330 398 313 394 161 407 295 
Table 4.16: mFRR provision costs for the Italian scenario – Day 1 
Day 2 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 26.28 4.81 29.38 2.86 27.40 3.50 29.54 2.64 
Down -21.39 -2.22 -21.46 -3.38 -22.81 -4.27 -21.46 -3.31 
Total 47.67 7.03 50.84 6.24 50.21 7.77 51.00 5.95 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 1 847 227 1 952 183 2 000 218 1 956 170 
Down -1 200 -14 -1 172 -9 -1 168 -61 -1 182 -18 
Total 647 213 780 174 832 157 774 152 
Table 4.17: mFRR provision costs for the Italian scenario – Day 2 
Day 3 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 50.78 3.51 52.01 2.31 53.63 1.11 52.10 2.16 
Down -48.83 -1.36 -48.71 -1.16 -49.29 -0.99 -48.73 -1.02 
Total 99.61 4.87 100.72 3.47 102.92 2.10 100.83 3.18 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 4 362 227 4 475 210 4 604 94 4 447 193 
Down -2 046 43 -2 047 41 -2 213 -44 -2 073 24 
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Total 2 316 270 2 428 251 2 391 50 2 374 217 
Table 4.18: mFRR provision costs for the Italian scenario – Day 3 
Cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.25 to Figure 4.27. Again, values are provided for 
transmission (red bars) and distribution (purple bars) and for upward (dark colour) and downward 
(light colour) activations.  
 
Figure 4.25: mFRR provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.26: mFRR provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.27: mFRR provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 3 
4.3.3 aFRR provision cost 
As for the case of mFRR provision, energy activation volumes (in GWh) are obtained from [4] and their 
related cost (in k€) for each coordination scheme are calculated for the three days. However, there is no 
shared balancing responsibility when dispatching aFRR and the TSO is assumed to be responsible of the 
management of this reserve. Therefore, the values are divided into upward and downward balancing, but 
no distinction is made between transmission and distribution resource (see Table 4.19 to Table 4.21). 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 1 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 3.74 2.14 4.04 2.14 
Down -1.38 -2.14 -1.69 -2.14 
Total 5.12 4.28 5.73 4.28 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 326.72 186.89 349.20 186.74 
Down -55.07 -84.39 -67.52 -83.79 
Total 271.65 102.5 281.68 102.95 
Table 4.19: aFRR provision results for the Italian scenario – Day 1 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 2 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 4.41 1.83 4.28 1.84 
Down -0.99 -1.85 -1.31 -1.84 
Total 5.40 3.68 5.59 3.68 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 353.89 146.05 338.42 147.09 
Down -38.53 -59.17 -49.92 -58.28 
Total 315.36 86.88 288.5 88.81 
Table 4.20: aFRR provision results for the Italian scenario – Day 2 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
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Day 3 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 2.77 1.52 1.81 1.56 
Down -1.03 -1.57 -1.60 -.1.56 
Total 3.80 3.09 3.41 3.12 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 250.63 138.52 165.05 140.82 
Down -41.20 -61.31 -62.33 -61.24 
Total 209.43 77.21 102.72 79.58 
Table 4.21: aFRR provision results for the Italian scenario – Day 3 
These cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.28 to Figure 4.30, distinguishing the values 
for upward (dark colour) and downward (light colour) activations. 
 
Figure 4.28: aFRR provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.29: aFRR provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.30: aFRR provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 3 
4.3.4 UM provision cost 
As for the cases of mFRR and aFRR provisions, unwanted measures and related costs are calculated 
starting from the simulation results [4] for each coordination scheme. The values are divided into upward 
and downward balancing and reported in in Table 4.22 to Table 4.24 below. 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 1 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 0.35 0.24 0.96 0.25 
Down -0.79 -0.08 -0.23 -0.09 
Total 1.14 0.32 1.19 0.34 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 6.75 4.62 17.43 4.73 
Down 0.21 -1.51 -1.52 -1.61 
Total 6.96 3.11 15.91 3.12 
Table 4.22: UM provision results for the Italian scenario – Day 1 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 2 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 1.64 1.25 2.32 1.25 
Down -2.50 -1.40 -1.90 -1.40 
Total 4.14 2.65 4.22 2.65 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 26.71 20.60 34.49 20.62 
Down 16.32 12.26 19.39 12.15 
Total 43.03 32.86 53.88 32.77 
Table 4.23: UM provision results for the Italian scenario – Day 2 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 3 Energy Up 2.31 2.27 2.45 2.33 
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(GWh) Down -3.03 -2.94 -3.35 -3.04 
Total 5.34 5.21 5.80 5.37 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 43.35 41.91 46.30 44.01 
Down 29.33 28.91 32.89 28.87 
Total 72.68 70.82 79.19 72.88 
Table 4.24: UM provision results for the Italian scenario – Day 3 
These cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.31 to Figure 4.33, distinguishing the values 
for upward (dark colour) and downward (light colour) activations. 
 
Figure 4.31: UM provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 1 
 
 
Figure 4.32: UM provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.33: UM provision cost in the Italian scenario – Day 3 
4.3.5 Cost results for Italy 
The daily values for mFRR (section 4.3.2), aFRR (section 4.3.3) and UM (section 4.3.4), together with 
the daily allocation of ICT costs (section 4.1) are shown together in Table 4.25 in order to allow the 
comparison and assessment of the impact that the different day typologies has on the obtained results. 
The daily cost of the ICT for each day is calculated simply dividing the annualized value by the 365 days of 
a year. In Table 4.25, the cheapest CS is highlighted in green and the most expensive one in red, while the 
same results and graphically represented from Figure 4.34 to Figure 4.36. 
 (k€/day) mFRR aFRR UM ICT TOTAL 
Day 1 
CS A 600.74 271.64 6.97 12.56 891.91 
CS B 710.11 102.50 3.11 42.53 858.25 
CS C 554.61 281.69 15.91 37.68 889.89 
CS D 701.68 102.77 3.12 40.00 847.57 
Day 2 
CS A 858.64 315.35 43.03 12.56 1 229.58 
CS B 953.45 86.88 32.87 42.53 1 115.73 
CS C 988.71 288.50 53.88 37.68 1 368.77 
CS D 925.53 88.82 32.77 40.00 1 087.12 
Day 3 
CS A 2 585.47 209.42 72.68 12.56 2 880.13 
CS B 2 679.16 77.21 70.83 42.53 2 869.73 
CS C 2 440.59 102.72 79.19 37.68 2 660.18 
CS D 2 591.09 79.57 72.88 40.00 2 783.54 
Table 4.25: Daily costs (k€/day) for the Italian scenario  
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Figure 4.34: Daily costs for the Italian scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.35: Daily costs for the Italian scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.36: Daily costs for the Italian scenario – Day 3 
Considering the number of occurrences of each day (detailed in section 4.3.1), the annual cost values 
for each CS have been calculated and reported in Table 4.26 and Figure 4.37.   
(M€/year) mFRR aFRR UM ICT TOTAL 
CS A 375.45 104.09 12.94 4.59 497.07 
CS B 411.75 33.08 10.45 15.53 470.81 
CS C 386.76 94.45 16.44 13.76 511.41 
CS D 400.67 33.61 10.54 14.60 459.42 
Table 4.26: Annual costs for the Italian scenario 
 
Figure 4.37: Annual costs for the Italian scenario 
From the analysis of the obtained results, the following conclusions can be observed: 
• The main component of the CBA is the mFRR cost and this cost is very similar in all CSs. 
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• The UM and ICT costs are a small part of the total costs.  
• The main difference between CSs is determined by the aFRR cost.  
• In the considered scenario, the most efficient CSs are CS B and CS D, although the total costs 
obtained for all CSs are very similar. 
•  It is noteworthy the big amount of energy managed by the mFRR in the days type Day 3 (very low 
PV and wind generations) in comparison with the other two types. The low amount of renewable 
generation causes severe congestions at the distribution level, with a consequent impact on the 
activated reserves. 
4.3.6 CO2 emissions savings 
The CO2 emission for the Italian scenario in each day are represented from Figure 4.38 to Figure 4.40.  
 
Figure 4.38: Daily CO2 emission for the Italian scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.39: Daily CO2 emission for the Italian scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.40: Daily CO2 emission for the Italian scenario – Day 3 
Figure 4.41 represents the annual CO2 emissions from all conventional and CHP devices at physical 
layer for the Italian scenario. The results show that CS B has the lowest emission while CS C has the 
highest one. However, the difference between coordination schemes is less than 1 %, which is very low 
(note that the Y axis scale goes from 48 000 up to 49 200 ktons/day).    
 
Figure 4.41: Annual CO2 emission for the Italian scenario 
4.4 Comparison of coordination schemes in Spain 
4.4.1 Spain dataset 
The transmission grid of the Spanish dataset is shown in Figure 4.42. 
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Figure 4.42: Spanish transmission grid 
In this case, net load, wind and PV have similar contributions to the imbalances, while run-of-river 
hydro contributions are one order of magnitude lower. For more details, see D4.3 [4]. 
For each of the simulated scenarios, three different days have been simulated in order to represent the 
most common operating conditions. What make the difference are mainly the power demand, PV and 
wind power availability. Normalised time-series for PV and wind power availability on the selected dates 
for the Spanish scenario are shown in Figure 4.43. In addition, the considered number of occurrences of 
each day throughout a whole year is indicated, based on a comparison of the actual renewable generation 
mix in Spain during 2018.  
Spain 
Scenario 301 (4 June) 
 
No. occurrences/year: 216 
Scenario 302 (4 Oct) 
 
No. occurrences/year: 96 
Scenario 303 (17 Sep) 
No. occurrences/year: 53 
Figure 4.43: Normalised PV and Wind power availability in the Spanish scenario 
As it can be noticed from the graphs above, the main differences between the selected days are: 
• Day 1 (Scenario 301 - 4 June): High PV generation (midday hours) + Low wind generation 
(constant over the day). 
• Day 2 (Scenario 302 - 4 Oct): Low PV generation (midday hours) + High wind generation 
(increasing over the day). 
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• Day 3 (Scenario 303 - 17 Sept): High PV generation (midday hours) + High wind generation 
(decreasing over the day). 
4.4.2 mFRR provision cost 
As described in section 4.4.1, three different days were simulated for each country. Table 4.27 to Table 
4.29 recall the amounts of energy dispatched in each of them (in GWh) and summarise their associated 
cost (in k€) for the four coordination schemes. In all the cases, the results are divided into transmission 
and distribution, as well as in upward and downward activated mFRR. 
Day 1 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 10.10 0.76 10.85 0.85 7.68 3.79 10.92 0.77 
Down -0.35 -0.03 -0.35 -0.88 -0.01 -3.08 -0.35 -0.88 
Total 10.45 0.79 11.20 1.73 7.69 6.87 11.27 1.65 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 504.33 43.17 539.71 48.78 390.93 213.11 543.18 44.03 
Down -16.71 -1.47 -16.85 -4.04 -0.20 -42.46 -16.65 -4.73 
Total 487.62 41.70 522.86 44.74 390.73 170.65 526.53 39.30 
Table 4.27: mFRR provision costs for the Spanish scenario – Day 1 
Day 2 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 14.32 0.87 14.66 1.14 10.60 4.67 14.90 0.87 
Down -0.35 -0.16 -0.34 -0.78 -0.01 -2.85 -0.32 -0.76 
Total 14.67 1.03 15.00 1.92 10.61 7.52 15.22 1.63 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 851.20 56.21 871.25 80.70 634.27 305.72 884.91 56.82 
Down -17.04 -8.71 -16.72 -9.62 -0.10 -49.89 -15.74 -9.15 
Total 834.16 47.5 854.53 71.08 634.17 255.83 869.17 47.67 
Table 4.28: mFRR provision costs for the Spanish scenario – Day 2 
Day 3 
CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx Tx Dx 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 10.56 2.32 11.23 2.54 8.59 4.36 11.46 2.31 
Down -0.18 -0.35 -0.19 -1.24 -0.01 -3.10 -0.19 -1.23 
Total 10.74 2.67 11.42 3.78 8.60 7.46 11.65 3.54 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 597.93 151.96 604.63 167.19 475.16 279.98 615.45 151.11 
Down -10.17 -28.77 -11.10 -30.93 -0.16 -45.59 -11.06 -31.86 
Total 587.76 123.19 684.68 593.53 475.00 234.39 604.39 119.25 
Table 4.29: mFRR provision costs for the Spanish scenario – Day 3 
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 86  
 
Cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.44 to Figure 4.46. Again, values are provided for 
transmission (red bars) and distribution (purple bars) and for upward (dark colour) and downward 
(light colour) activations.  
 
Figure 4.44: mFRR provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.45: mFRR provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.46: mFRR provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 3 
4.4.3 aFRR provision cost 
As for the case of mFRR provision, energy activation volumes (in GWh) are obtained from [4] and their 
related cost (in k€) for each coordination scheme are calculated for the three days. However, there is no 
shared balancing responsibility when dispatching aFRR and the TSO is assumed to be always responsible 
to keep the overall system balance. Therefore, the values are divided into upward and downward 
balancing, but not into transmission and distribution in Table 4.30 to Table 4.32 below. 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 1 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 2.54 1.64 3.36 1.74 
Down -1.15 -1.73 -0.93 -1.74 
Total 3.69 3.37 4.29 3.48 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 162.99 106.02 216.17 111.92 
Down -18.13 -25.82 -14.86 -25.89 
Total 144.86 80.20 201.31 86.03 
Table 4.30: aFRR provision results for the Spanish scenario – Day 1 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 2 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 2.79 2.15 3.99 2.05 
Down -1.54 -1.82 -0.83 -2.05 
Total 4.33 3.97 4.82 4.10 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 208.53 159.18 300.03 152.36 
Down -12.99 -15.33 -7.61 -16.92 
Total 195.54 143.85 292.42 135.44 
Table 4.31: aFRR provision results for the Spanish scenario – Day 2 
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 88  
 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 3 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 2.57 1.86 3.87 1.90 
Down -1.53 -1.82 -0.89 -1.90 
Total 4.10 3.68 4.76 3.80 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 209.68 149.46 326.89 151.25 
Down -20.98 -25.43 -9.17 -27.43 
Total 188.70 124.03 317.72 123.82 
Table 4.32: aFRR provision results for the Spanish scenario – Day 3 
These cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.47 to Figure 4.49, distinguishing the values 
for upward (dark colour) and downward (light colour) activations. 
 
Figure 4.47: aFRR provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.48: aFRR provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.49: aFRR provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 3 
4.4.4 UM provision cost 
As for the cases of mFRR and aFRR provisions, unwanted measures and related costs are calculated 
starting from the simulation results [4] for each coordination scheme. The values are divided into upward 
and downward balancing, but not into transmission and distribution in Table 4.33 to Table 4.35 below. 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 1 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.31 
Down -0.66 -0.17 -0.15 -0.27 
Total 0.96 0.49 0.48 0.58 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 4.45 4.77 5.06 4.55 
Down 0.83 0.26 0.21 0.40 
Total 5.28 5.03 5.27 4.95 
Table 4.33: UM provision results for the Spanish scenario – Day 1 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 2 
Energy 
(GWh) 
Up 2.78 2.82 2.82 2.86 
Down -3.89 -3.61 -3.21 -3.32 
Total 6.67 6.43 6.03 6.18 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 59.81 60.70 57.86 61.20 
Down 7.11 6.75 6.29 6.30 
Total 66.92 67.45 64.15 67.50 
Table 4.34: UM provision results for the Spanish scenario – Day 2 
  CS A CS B CS C CS D 
Day 3 Energy Up 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.92 
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(GWh) Down -1.07 -0.61 -0.54 -0.58 
Total 1.97 1.53 1.50 1.50 
Cost 
(k€) 
Up 20.19 20.69 22.80 20.88 
Down 3.20 3.06 2.99 2.35 
Total 23.39 23.75 25.79 23.23 
Table 4.35: UM provision results for the Spanish scenario – Day 3 
These cost values are graphically represented in Figure 4.50 to Figure 4.52, distinguishing the values 
for upward (dark colour) and downward (light colour) activations. 
 
Figure 4.50: UM provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.51: UM provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.52: UM provision cost in the Spanish scenario – Day 3 
4.4.5 Cost results for Spain 
The daily values for mFRR (section 4.4.2), aFRR (section 4.4.3) and UM (section 4.4.4), together with 
the daily allocation of ICT costs (section 4.1) are shown together  in Table 4.36 in order to allow the 
comparison and assessment of the impact that the different day typologies has on the obtained results. 
The daily cost of the ICT for each day is calculated simply dividing the annualized value by the 365 days of 
a year. In Table 4.36, the cheapest CS is highlighted in green and the most expensive one in red, while the 
same results are graphically represented from Figure 4.53 to Figure 4.55. 
 (k€/day) mFRR aFRR UM ICT TOTAL 
Day1 
CS A 529.32 144.86 5.28 12.56 692.02 
CS B 567.60 80.20 5.02 42.53 695.35 
CS C 561.59 201.31 5.27 37.68 805.85 
CS D 565.83 86.03 4.94 38.07 694.87 
Day2 
CS A 881.66 195.54 66.93 12.56 1 156.69 
CS B 925.61 143.85 67.45 42.53 1 179.44 
CS C 890.00 292.43 64.15 37.68 1 284.27 
CS D 916.85 135.44 67.49 38.07 1 157.85 
Day3 
CS A 680.95 188.69 23.39 12.56 905.59 
CS B 729.79 124.03 23.75 42.53 920.1 
CS C 709.39 317.73 25.79 37.68 1 090.59 
CS D 723.64 123.82 23.23 38.07 908.76 
Table 4.36: Daily costs (k€/day) for the Spanish scenario 
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Figure 4.53: Daily costs for the Spanish scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.54: Daily costs for the Spanish scenario – Day 2 
 
Figure 4.55: Daily costs for the Spanish scenario – Day 3 
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Considering the number of occurrences of each day (detailed in section 4.4.1), the annual cost values 
for each CS have been calculated and reported in Table 4.37 and Figure 4.56. 
(M€/year) mFRR aFRR UM ICT TOTAL 
CS A 235.06 60.06 8.81 4.59 308.52 
CS B 250.14 37.71 8.82 15.53 312.20 
CS C 244.34 88.40 8.66 13.76 355.16 
CS D 248.59 38.15 8.78 13.90 309.42 
Table 4.37: Annual costs for the Spanish scenario 
 
Figure 4.56: Annual costs for the Spanish scenario 
From the analysis of the obtained results, the following conclusions can be observed: 
• CS A, CS B and CS D are very similar and the cheapest coordination schemes, for all the considered 
day typologies. The most expensive one is CS C. 
• In general, the annual costs of the UM are negligible in comparison with the rest of costs. However, 
when there is poor PV generation (Day 2), the UM cost is a bit higher than in the other day 
typologies. 
• The ICT costs are almost negligible if compared to the mFRR cost. 
• Being the total costs of CS A, CS B and CS D practically equal and the mFRR costs very similar in all 
coordination schemes (around 240 M€/year), the difference between these coordination schemes 
is determined by aFRR, UM and ICT cost figures. 
• mFRR cost accounts for the larger share in total costs, but its influence is a bit lower than in 
Denmark (e.g. mFRR contribution to total cost in CS C is about 65÷70% in the three days).  
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• aFRR is making CS C as the most expensive coordination scheme, demonstrating the 
ineffectiveness of the simulated scenario in allowing a separated management of the balancing 
services. 
4.4.6 CO2 emissions savings 
The CO2 emission for the Spanish scenario in each day are represented from Figure 4.57 to Figure 
4.59.  
 
Figure 4.57: Daily CO2 emission for the Spanish scenario – Day 1 
 
Figure 4.58: Daily CO2 emission for the Spanish scenario – Day 2 
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Figure 4.59: Daily CO2 emission for the Spanish scenario – Day 3 
Figure 4.60 represents the annual CO2 emissions from all conventional and CHP devices at physical 
layer for the Spanish scenario. The results show that CS C has the highest emissions in comparison to CS 
A, CS B and CS D, which have very similar results. However, the difference between coordination schemes 
is less than 7 %, which is quite low (note that the Y axis scale goes from 7 000 up to 8 800 ktons/day). 
 
Figure 4.60: Annual CO2 emissions in the Spanish scenario 
4.5 Discussion of results 
From the obtained results (which are reported in sections 4.2.5, 4.3.5 and 4.4.5 for Denmark, Italy and 
Spain respectively) some general conclusions can be summarized as follows:  
1) The effectiveness of the TSO-DSO coordination schemes depends on the level of services 
requested by the DSO: 
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o In case of few congestions at distribution level (forecasting errors are comparable to the 
possibility of having congestions in distribution grid), CS A has higher economic 
performance with respect to CS B and CS D. This is the case of Denmark, where the 
uncertain contribution of wind power (mostly located at transmission level) is higher 
than the contribution from PV (at distribution level). Therefore, forecasting errors are 
expected to be higher, while the congestions at distribution level are likely to be less 
common. 
o When distribution congestions are significant (and predictable), the adoption of CS B or 
CS D results to be beneficial. This is the case of Italy, where generation located in 
distribution grids, such as PV, contributes more to the electricity supply and, hence, 
congestions are expected to happen more frequently. 
o In any case, the most relevant cost component is mFRR in all the cases, while UM and ICT 
costs only account for a small share. Moreover, results discourage the investigation of 
new methods for dispatching aFRR, because higher complexity would result in higher IT 
costs. 
2) The implementation of two-step markets (CS B and CS C) is generally less efficient than 
optimising in a single step (CS D): 
o Regarding CS B, the results are pretty similar to the ones returned by CS D, although 
slightly more expensive in the scenarios simulated. This is something to be expected 
because CS D obtains an overall optimum, while CS B solves distribution and 
transmission services separately. 
o On the contrary, CS C is clearly the least efficient CS in all the countries. In addition to 
optimising in two steps, CS C introduces an additional constraint by fixing the active 
power exchange on the TSO-DSO interconnection, which further decreases the solution 
efficiency.  
o Both CS B and CS C may suffer from scarcity and/or illiquidity of resources, which would 
further decrease their efficiency.  
o However, in rare circumstances (i.e. severe congestions at transmission level) the 
selection of two-step market architectures can be more beneficial than other schemes, as 
market separation potentially prevents the spreading of high nodal prices among 
distribution and transmission systems. 
3) Under the scope restrictions and the formulation of the ICT cost estimation problem, the main 
finding was that the technological costs in upgrading market architectures from CS A to CS B, CS 
C, or CS D are almost the same (subject to uncertainties) and much lower than operation costs. 
Variation between countries is minor. 
4) In addition to these general conclusions, some country-specific deductions can be extracted: 
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o For the specific case of Italy, in which there are big congestions at distribution level, the 
upgrade from CS A to CS B/D is convenient and not jeopardized by ICT costs. 
o In Spain, with average congestions at distribution level, the ICT costs are comparable to 
the benefits brought by adopting CS B/D rather than maintaining CS A. 
o In Denmark, with low congestions at distribution level and high forecasting errors, the 
implementation of DSO-inclusive CSs failed.  
5) The aggregators will bear a large portion of ICT costs (communications with DERs, aggregation 
software, etc.). Therefore, the related cost analysis indicates that the aggregator’s IT systems will 
be the most expensive ones. Additionally, it must be taken into account that the problem with the 
last kilometre DER communications was assumed to be solved, since that is part of the base line 
of the centralized AS market (CS A). However, it may be possible that DER 
communication/activation costs turn out to be too large for a profitable aggregation business, 
but this issue is applicable to all CSs. 
6) Regarding the CO2 emissions, the main conclusions achieved by the analysis are: 
o Italy is characterized by large CO2 emissions if compared to other countries (one order of 
magnitude higher), because Denmark has small demand and mostly renewable energy 
mixes, and the energy mix in Spain is predominantly carbon-free (nuclear and large 
portions of renewables). 
o All CSs features similar emissions, being the difference less than 7%. The mFRR 
activations are small if compared to the total energy demand. In the specific case of CS C, 
the sub-optimal mFRR activations drive to more visible impacts on CO2, except when 
forecasting errors are comparable to the probability of having congestions in 
distribution (Denmark), as CS C becomes more efficient, also in terms of CO2 emissions.  
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5 Business-level analysis 
The efficiency of the different TSO-DSO coordination schemes was assessed through the CBA 
described in previous chapters. However, CSs must also allow the involved actors to have a profitable 
business case, that is, CSs must lead to an appropriate allocation of costs and benefits among them. 
Therefore, a business-level analysis (also called “micro-level analysis”) was needed to assess the 
economic impact of the different CSs for all the relevant actors. 
As the reader will discover when reading this chapter, the complexity of a business-level analysis is 
out of the scope of the economic assessment performed with the project SmartNet. However, due to its 
relevance when making regulatory decisions, this chapter is intended to provide guidance on how to 
conduct this kind of analysis. 
Based on the experience of the partners in the project, the e3value methodology [42] was selected as 
the most suitable approach to perform the economic analysis of the SmartNet coordination schemes. The 
two main reasons were that it presents the whole picture of the business case and that it focuses on the 
concept of economic value, which allows an easy comparison of different arrangements, country 
regulations, scenarios, etc. Additionally, the e3value is not intended to identify a new business idea, but it 
aims at clarifying and evaluating such idea more thoroughly. Therefore, the e3value can be very useful 
when going a step forward, i.e. when the business case has been identified and a specific analysis of its 
profitability is required. 
The business-level analysis is composed of several main steps to determine, at the end of the process, 
whether coordination schemes are economically attractive for all actors, i.e. whether the benefits seen by 
each of them outweigh their costs. The following topics will be developed through the next sections: 
1. Definition and representation of the value models.  
When developing a business idea, it must be taken into account that each entity involved should be 
able to make profit or, at least, increase positively its economic results. This must be clear, since no 
stakeholder is willing to adopt new products or services if their added value is not obvious. The aim 
of this analysis is to present the whole picture, so, it will not only focus on the actors who want to 
provide a new service, but also on the rest of the parties they need to fulfil such business.  
Two of the main characteristics of the e3value methodology are that it is a graphical approach and 
that it focuses on the economic value. Therefore, the representation of the business idea takes the 
shape of a value model. A value model represents a number of actors who exchange objects of 
economic value with each other. The value models include all actors that participate in the business 
and who must collaborate with each other, so that all of them benefit. These actors are directly or 
indirectly connected, so, the required relationships can result in a dense network.    
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In this case, each coordination scheme was represented as a value model. All actors must contribute 
to the success of the business, regardless of their size, strength or role. This means that they must 
establish relationships and exchange value objects which are of value for them. The value model is a 
bi-dimensional representation of the value exchanges between the different actors, so, it is quite 
simple to draw what is offered to whom and what is requested for it in return. 
It is worthwhile to indicate that an exchange between actors is included in the graphic 
representation only if there is a recurrent payment associated to it. If there is a cost, but only a 
one-time payment, the issue will be considered in the subsequent investment analysis, but not in the 
graphics. 
2. Identification of the relationships between actors. 
When comparing the value models for the different coordination schemes, it must be taken into 
account that they refer to the same type of service, but which is provided in different ways. 
Therefore, most of the actors and their relationships are common to all of them. As a result, it is 
important to highlight the differences among them, because those differences were the ones which 
resulted in different behaviour for each coordination scheme. 
3. Theoretical formulas definition. 
Once the exchanges are identified, the next step is to quantify them via simple formulas, which 
represent the relationships between the actors and which need to be fed with the appropriate data. 
Most of the times, the formulas which represent the money flows between actors, are a 
multiplication between a price and an energy volume. 
The formulation developed in this step aimed to provide an appropriate tool to calculate the numeric 
results if all the required data had been available, in as much detail as it is required by these 
formulas. However, due to the results and the level of detail obtained from the SmartNet simulations, 
these formulas had to be adjusted to adapt them to the available data. 
4. Formulation adjustments 
As indicated above, from the theoretical formulation (optimal case) some adjustments may be 
necessary. The formulation was updated, according to the results obtained by the SmartNet 
simulation environment and the data format (e. g. time-step, disaggregation level of the results, 
detail level of the input-data, etc.) used there. 
5. Actor’s cash-flow calculation. 
The cash-flows are calculated by the addition of money in-flows and the subtraction of money out-
flows. Although the settlement period in most European countries is one hour, this period will be 
reduced in the future, as established in Article 53 of the Guideline on Electricity Balancing [43]. In 
the specific case of SmartNet, the time-step was established in 15 minutes, so the annual cash-flow 
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should be calculated as the sum of the 15-minute values, i.e. 4 periods of 15 min in each hour and 8, 
760 hours per year. 
6. CBA, including investments, for each actor. 
Once annual cash-flows are obtained, an investment profitability analysis must be performed for 
those actors who need to make a specific investment for the deployment of each coordination 
scheme. In the SmartNet analysis, only specific ICT costs should be assessed, since they were 
expected to be the only new investment required for the operating of the coordination schemes. 
In this last step, a comparison between the calculated annual cash flows and the annualization of the 
required investment for each actor must be performed in order to determine the most attractive 
coordination scheme for each of them. 
All these steps are described in detail in this document, after describing both the e3value methodology 
(section 5.1) and the specific description of participants in the SmartNet coordination schemes (section 
5.2). The creation of the value models is described in section 5.3, while the relationships between the 
actors and the formulas to be used are presented in Appendix IV – Business-level analysis formulation. 
5.1 e
3
 value methodology 
e3value is a conceptual modelling approach aimed at facilitating the statement, communication and 
understanding of the value proposition of an innovative business idea. In addition, it is also designed to 
allow for a rigorous evaluation of its economic feasibility. As a third goal, it also intends to build the 
bridge between the expression of the business idea and the identification of the required supporting 
information systems, in order to avoid the usual thinking of ICTs as an expense only, rather than as a tool 
to create value for customers and the company itself. 
All the stakeholders involved in a business idea must be able to make profit or to increase their 
economic utility, and all of them must have a common understanding of the value proposition.   
Two of the main characteristics of e3value are that it is a graphical approach and that it focuses on the 
economic value. Therefore, the representation of the business idea takes the shape of a value model. A 
value model represents a number of actors who exchange objects of economic value with each other, i.e. it 
represents what objects of economic value are exchanged by whom. In fact, it represents what is 
offered to whom and what is requested for it in return (in the economic sense). 
The main concepts to express the model are: 
• Actor: An actor is perceived by its environment as an independent economic (and often also legal) 
entity. Economically independent means that it is profitable after a reasonable period of time 
(when referring to companies) or that it increases its economic utility (when referring to end 
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customers). In a sound and sustainable business model each actor should be capable of making 
profit or increasing its utility. 
• Value Activity: Actors perform value activities in order to increase their profit or economic utility. 
Therefore, the execution of a value activity must yield profit for, at least, one actor. In addition, 
each value activity must be completely assignable to an actor. 
• Value Object: Actors exchange value objects, which are services, products, money, or even 
consumer experiences. The important point here is that a value object is of value for one or more 
actors. 
• Value Port: An actor uses a value port to show to its environment that it wants to provide or 
request value objects. The concept of ports allows of abstracting away from the internal business 
processes and focusing only on how external actors and other components of the business model 
can be ‘plugged in’. 
• Value Offering: A value offering models what an actor offers or requests from its environment. The 
closely related concept ‘value interface’ (see below) models an offering to the actor’s environment 
and the reciprocal incoming offering, while the value offering models a set of equally directed value 
ports exchanging value objects. It is used to model e.g. bundling: the situation that some objects are 
of value for an actor only when they are offered in combination. 
• Value Interface: Actors have one or more value interfaces, grouping individual value offerings. A 
value interface shows the value object that an actor is willing to exchange for another value object 
via its ports. The exchange of value objects cannot be divided at the level of the value interface. 
• Value Exchange: A value exchange is used to connect two value ports with each other. It represents 
one or more potential trades of value objects between value ports. 
• Market Segment: The market segment shows a set of actors that, for all of their value interfaces, 
give the same economic value to objects. 
The concepts above can be used to model value exchanges between actors or market segments, but do 
not give the idea of which value activities or value exchanges must take place, so that some other value 
activities or value exchanges can also take place. In other words, they do not represent the order in which 
value exchanges must take place. To that end, some other concepts are used: 
• Scenario path: A scenario path consists of one or more segments, related by connection elements, 
and both start and stop stimuli. A path indicates via which value interfaces objects of value must be 
exchanged, as a result of a start stimulus, or as a result of exchanges via other value interfaces. 
• Stimulus: A scenario path starts with a start stimulus, which represents a consumer’s need. The 
last segment(s) of a scenario path is connected to a stop stimulus. A stop stimulus indicates that the 
scenario path ends. 
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• Segment: A scenario path has one or more segments. Segments are used to relate value interfaces 
with each other (e.g. via connection elements) to show that an exchange on one value interface 
causes an exchange on another value interface. 
• Connection: Connections are used to relate individual segments. Each fork splits a scenario path 
into two or more sub-paths, while each join collapses sub-paths into a single path. In AND 
forks/joins, all incoming and outgoing paths have the same number of occurrences, while in OR 
forks (joins) the number of occurrences of the incoming (outgoing) path equals the addition of the 
number of occurrences of the outgoing (incoming) sub-paths. An implosion (AND connection with 
only one incoming and one outgoing port) shows a change in the number of occurrences within a 
sub-path. 
Table 5.1 shows the graphical representation of the main e3value concepts. 
Concept Graph Concept Graph 
Actor 
 
Market segment 
 
Value port 
 
Value interface 
 
Value object 
 
Value exchange 
 
Start stimulus 
 
End stimulus 
 
Segment 
 
Implosion  
AND fork/join  OR fork/join  
Table 5.1: Graphical representation of main e3value concepts 
The goal of the e3value is to evaluate a business idea, and discover a business scenario, which consists 
of the value model and the scenario path, which is feasible for every stakeholder. Therefore, e3value 
assumes that business developers already have a business idea in mind and, thus, it aims at clarifying and 
evaluating such idea more thoroughly. 
In order to create the business scenario, a number of sequentially-executed steps are needed. The 
result of each step is an input for the following step, and the outcome of the whole process is a business 
model, including a graphical representation and the corresponding financial profitability sheets, which 
facilitate the sensitivity analysis of the business case. 
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1. Step 1 – Business idea description: Write down a short business case description to express the 
business idea. The value model is a representation of the real world and, hence, such a 
representation cannot include all the objects of the real world, but the basic rule is to include all 
involved actors and activities in the value model process. 
2. Step 2 – Goal selection: The first consideration to be taken when modelling the business is 
specifying all the goals that stakeholders want to satisfy with that business, even if they may be in 
conflict with the goals of another stakeholder(s). 
3. Step 3 – Technology selection: Once the goals are identified, the next step is to select an 
appropriate technology to achieve both operational (short-term) and strategic (long-term) goals.  
4. Step 4 – Value activity selection: In this step, value activities to be included in the model are 
selected.  
5. Step 5 – Value interface selection: In this step all value interfaces necessary to model the business 
case are selected from a library of interfaces [42], where general and optional interfaces are 
provided for each activity.  
6. Step 6 – Ports connection: The value interfaces must be connected to obtain a connected value 
model. 
7. Step 7 – Actor selection: Each activity should be performed by an actor, but this is not a strict one 
to one relation. Some actors perform more than one activity, and in some cases an activity should 
be divided over two actors. 
8. Step 8 – Scenario path identification: A scenario path is used to explain cause-effect relationships 
by travelling over paths through a system. Scenario paths allow to count the number of value 
exchanges in a given time-period, which is very important to perform the profitability analysis. 
9. Step 9 – Information system model construction: Once a correct value model has been constructed, 
the information system needed to support such a model must be addressed. This step is performed 
only when the expenses to maintain such an information system are substantial; otherwise they 
will be included as O&M costs. 
10. Step 10 – Base-line profitability sheets calculation: The evaluation of a business model focuses on 
the question whether it is feasible from an economic point of view, and whether a scenario is 
profitable for each actor involved in the value model. The impact of the business model in the 
different actors is assessed by creating profitability sheets for each actor involved, where economic 
value is assigned to objects delivered and received. 
11. Step 11 – Sensitivity analysis: Since it is not possible to predict the future, the important result of 
the analysis is not the numbers on profitability themselves, but the reasons behind them. 
Therefore, a sensitivity analysis is very useful to check the robustness of the results obtained when 
different assumptions are taken. 
12. Step 12 – Investment analysis: After a scenario is chosen, a detailed analysis of financial aspects 
must be made. There are several standard criteria for investment analysis (e.g. NPV and IRR). 
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For a more detailed explanation, see e3value website (http://e3value.few.vu.nl/) and [42]. 
5.2 Description of participants 
The definition of actor in e3value, i.e. an independent economic (and often also legal) entity, cannot be 
completely translated into actors in the power system. Many times, real actors in power systems perform 
more than one role, which are translated as “actors” in value models. For example, an electricity supplier 
may perform the roles of retailer, aggregator and Balancing Responsible Party (BRP) at the same time. 
Therefore, participants described here are linked to archetypical roles in power systems (e. g. one role for 
retailer, another one for aggregator and a third one for BRP). 
This section includes a brief description of the participants represented graphically in the e3value 
models (section 5.3). 
Consumers (entities purchasing electricity for powering their own loads) can buy electricity directly in 
the market or through a retailer/aggregator. Likewise, producers can sell electricity directly or through 
an aggregator. If consumers or producers trade directly in the market, they are called “Direct” and, if not, 
they are called “Non-direct”. In order to be consistent with the assumptions in the simulations, consumers 
connected at transmission level are considered to be “Direct”. 
Moreover, consumers can provide flexibility or not (it is assumed that DER producers will always 
provide flexibility). If they do, they are called “Active” and, if not, they are called “Passive”. Therefore, 
active consumers can change their consumption patterns if properly incentivised, while passive 
consumers do not change their baseline consumption. Although all consumers connected at transmission 
are direct, not all of them are active and, equally, some direct active consumers are connected at 
distribution level. 
The different types of consumers are presented in Table 5.2 below. 
Actors Description 
Non-direct passive 
consumers 
– These consumers are connected at distribution level. 
– They are Passive, so they determine their consumption entirely with respect to 
their own needs, even if they may use Time of Use (ToU) tariffs. 
– They are Non-direct, so they acquire their electricity through a retailer. 
Non-direct active 
consumers 
– These consumers are connected at distribution level. 
– They are Active, so they participate in active demand activities providing flexibility 
through their aggregator. 
– They are Non-direct, so they acquire their electricity through an aggregator. 
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 105  
 
Actors Description 
Direct passive 
consumers 
– These consumers are connected at transmission level. 
– They are Passive, so they determine their consumption entirely with respect to 
their own needs, even if they may use ToU tariffs. 
– They are Direct, so they acquire their electricity directly in the wholesale market. 
Direct active 
consumers- 
distribution 
– These consumers are connected at distribution level. 
– They are Active, so they participate in active demand activities providing flexibility 
through their aggregator. 
– They are Direct, so they acquire their electricity directly in the wholesale market.  
Direct active 
consumers- 
transmission 
– These consumers are connected at transmission level. 
– They are Active, so they participate in active demand activities providing flexibility 
through their aggregator. 
– They are Direct, so they acquire their electricity directly in the wholesale market. 
Table 5.2: Description of participants - Types of consumers 
The rest of the participants presented in the e3value models are detailed in Table 5.3 below. 
Actors Description 
Retailers of non-
direct passive 
consumers 
The main commercial activity of retailers is the wholesale purchase of electricity and 
the subsequent resale to their customers (non-direct passive consumers). In this 
model, retailers are not willing to buy any active demand service. 
Aggregators of 
non-direct active 
consumers 
These aggregators buy the wholesale electricity for their customers (non-direct 
active consumers) and, additionally, manage the active demand services provided by 
them. Aggregators act as intermediaries between several active consumers and other 
players in the system, by aggregating each consumer’s demand flexibility and 
offering it to other players (e. g. DSO, TSO) through the corresponding market. 
Central producers Producers with generator(s) connected to the high-voltage transmission grid. 
Direct DER 
Producers 
They manage their own needs and participation in the different markets, i.e. sale of 
electricity in the wholesale market, management of their imbalances through the 
corresponding BRP, balancing provision taking part in balancing markets, etc. 
These DER producers are assumed to be connected at distribution level. 
Non-direct DER 
producers 
They contract an aggregator for the management of all their activities. 
These DER producers are assumed to be connected at distribution level. 
Aggregators of 
non-direct DER 
producers 
These aggregators sell the wholesale electricity of their customers (non-direct DER 
producers) and, additionally, manage the rest of their activities, e. g. participation in 
the wholesale market, payment of Transmission and Distribution (T&D) fees, 
participation in balancing markets, etc. Aggregators act as intermediaries between 
non-direct DER producers and other players in the system, by aggregating 
production and flexibility and offering it to other players. 
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Actors Description 
Wholesale market 
operator 
The market operator is responsible for wholesale electricity trade and it will be the 
sole counterparty for all market transactions, so, it receives offers and bids and clears 
the market. Therefore, market participants do not trade with each other, but through 
the market platform organized/managed by the market operator. 
DSO 
The DSO, as defined by 2009/72/EC, is a natural or legal person responsible for 
operating, maintaining, and – if necessary – developing the distribution system in a 
given area, and – where applicable – its interconnections with other systems. The 
DSO as a regulated entity is subject to unbundling requirements. In the long term, the 
DSO ensures the ability of the distribution system to meet future demand for the 
distribution of electricity or gas. The DSO is responsible for the connection of grid 
users at the distribution level and for the connection of the DSOs within the TSO area 
of responsibility (control area). 
TSO 
The TSO, as defined by 2009/72/EC, is a natural or legal person responsible for 
operating, maintaining, and – if necessary – developing the transmission system in a 
given area, and – where applicable, its interconnections with other systems. The TSO 
as a regulated entity is subject to unbundling requirements. It is the responsibility of 
the TSO to safeguard the normal operation of the electric power system. In the long 
term, the TSO ensures the ability of the system to meet future demand for the 
transmission of electricity. Moreover, the TSO is responsible for connecting grid 
users at the transmission level and for connecting all DSOs within the TSO control 
area.” 
Rest of the system 
Other regulated entities who take part in the electricity system and receive a 
payment for this. Since the process to solve all these payments is quite complex and 
does not provide further details for the business case under analysis, they have all 
been included under this black box. 
Table 5.3: Description of participants – Other participants 
However, all market participants must be assigned to BRP (they can be their own BRP). BRPs are 
responsible for keeping the scheduled program (as a result of market trade) in real-time and, if they 
cannot, they will face the imbalances assigned by the TSO. If the producers represented by the BRP 
generate more electricity than scheduled (or if consumers demand less), the BRP is assigned an upward 
imbalance and, thus, will receive that amount at a lower price than the day-ahead market price (being the 
difference between both prices the imbalance cost). On the contrary, if BRP’s producers generate less (or 
if consumers demand more), the TSO will charge a downward imbalance and the BRP will pay a price 
which is higher than the day-ahead price (again, being the difference the imbalance cost). More details 
can be found in section 11.2.6. The different types of BRP are described in Table 5.4 below. 
Actors Description 
BRP: Direct 
passive consumers 
This BRP has a balancing contract with the direct passive consumers for the 
management of the imbalances caused by them.  
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Actors Description 
BRP: Retailers of 
non-direct passive 
consumers 
This BRP has a balancing contract with the retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
for the management of the imbalances caused by them. 
BRP: Central 
producers 
This BRP has a balancing contract with the central producers for the management of 
the imbalances caused by them. 
BRP: Direct active 
consumers-
transmission 
This BRP has a balancing contract with the direct active consumers-transmission for 
the management of the imbalances caused by them. 
BRP: Direct active 
consumers-
distribution 
This BRP has a balancing contract with the direct active consumers-distribution for 
the management of the imbalances caused by them. 
BRP: Aggregators 
of non-direct 
active consumers 
This BRP has a balancing contract with the aggregators of non-direct active 
consumers for the management of the imbalances caused by them. 
BRP: Direct DER 
producers 
This BRP has a balancing contract with the direct DER producers for the management 
of the imbalances caused by them. 
BRP: Aggregators 
of non-direct DER 
producers 
This BRP has a balancing contract with the aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
for the management of the imbalances caused by them. 
Table 5.4: Description of participants - BRPs 
In addition to these roles which appear in all coordination schemes, the management of the SmartNet 
market requires different roles in each coordination scheme: 
Role Description 
Coordination 
scheme (CS) 
Balancing Market 
Operator 
The TSO manages the instantaneous imbalances (that BRPs are not 
able to control), by making use of balancing energy supplied by the 
providers to the balancing market21. The balancing costs are 
transferred to the BRPs. The BRPs, in turn, charge the costs of their 
imbalances to the actors that have a balancing contract with them 
(consumers, producers, retailers).  
CS A 
CS B 
CS C 
Local Market 
Operator 
There is a separate local market, which is managed by the DSO.  
Resources from the distribution grid can only be offered to the TSO 
via the local market and after the DSO has selected resources 
needed to solve local congestions. The DSO aggregates and 
transfers bids to the balancing market, operated by the TSO. The 
DSO assures that only bids respecting the DSO grid constraints can 
take part in the balancing market. 
CS B 
                                                                   
21 The market clearing algorithm aims not only to procure balancing, but also to avoid congestions in real-time. 
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There is a separate local market, which is managed by the DSO.  
Flexibility for both congestion management and balancing of the 
distribution grid needs to be contracted in this local market. 
Resources from the distribution grid cannot be offered to the TSO 
grid and vice versa. 
CS C 
Common 
Balancing Market 
Operator 
There is a common market for both the TSO and the DSO with 
flexibility from resources connected at transmission and 
distribution levels. The TSO and the DSO are both responsible for 
the organization and operation of the market. The DSO constraints 
are integrated in the market clearing process.  
CS D 
Table 5.5: Description of participants - SmartNet market managers 
5.3 Creation of the value models 
Next sections present and explain the value models for each coordination scheme (detailed 
explanation of each coordination scheme can be found in Deliverable 1.3 [1]). As previously mentioned, 
these models represent the money exchanges between the different stakeholders (and not other 
exchanges of information etc. which are not linked to an economic exchange).  
Although the value models presented here take the Spanish regulation as a basis, it was considered 
that they represent the likely situation in 2030 in the three countries under analysis (Italy, Denmark22 
and Spain). 
For the sake of clarity, each subsection has been written aiming to provide a complete overview of the 
specific coordination scheme, in such a way that each section can be read independently. For that reason, 
some information may be repeated. In all CSs, there are two main paths for the money flows: the 
traditional electricity supply path (path 1) and the path for providing AS (path 2). Path 1 is common to all 
the CSs, so it is only described in CS A, but it also appears in the rest of CSs. 
5.3.1 Coordination scheme A 
In this coordination scheme, the TSO contracts ancillary services (AS) directly with DER owners 
connected to the distribution grid. The DSO can procure and use resources to solve local grid issues, but 
the procurement takes place in other timeframes (different from near real time, e.g. long-term ahead) 
than the centralized AS market. Resources in distribution are subject to DSO pre-qualification to be 
allowed to bid into the centralized AS market [5]. 
Figure 5.1 has been extracted from D1.3 [1]. It illustrates the role played by relevant stakeholders and, 
additionally, it shows a high-level view of the market architecture and interactions among players. 
                                                                   
22 The only significant difference detected is the payment for market access, based on a fixed subscription rate in Denmark. 
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Figure 5.1: Centralized AS market model 
The value model for CS A is presented in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Value model of CS A 
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The money flows in the value model take two main paths, which are described below.  
Path 1- Traditional electricity supply path (Dark blue, fuchsia, light green and red exchanges) 
Consumers demand electricity, so they will pay for it to their respective providers. The retail price was 
assumed to be an “all-inclusive” price, made up of different components, so consumers receive just one 
invoice with all the different components of the price detailed in such invoice. For clarity reasons the 
electricity demand has been divided into two terms: 
- Fuchsia start stimuli: It represents the contracted power term (kW), i.e. the size of the connection 
to the grid. Consumers need a connection to the grid and will pay (on a monthly basis) for the size 
of the connection to the grid. 
- Dark blue start stimuli: It represents the energy demand term (kWh). Consumers require 
electricity to satisfy their needs and will pay for it.  They may obtain such electricity from: 
o Retailers, in the case of the non-direct passive consumers 
o Aggregators, in the case of non-direct active consumers. 
o Their own participation in the wholesale electricity market, in the case of the direct 
passive consumers, direct active consumers-transmission and direct active consumers-
distribution. 
Electricity itself refers to the actual electricity consumption (dark blue exchanges). Retailers and 
aggregators buy the electricity for their non-direct consumers in the electricity market, while the direct 
consumers participate themselves in the wholesale market. In this case, for simplicity reasons, it has been 
assumed that the wholesale market operator is the sole counterparty for all market transactions: market 
participants do not trade with each other, but through the wholesale market operator, so, somehow, it is 
as if the market operator sells electricity to the retailers, aggregators and direct consumers (blue marine 
exchanges) and buys it from the central producers (cyan exchanges), from the direct DER-Producers and 
from the aggregators representing the non-direct DER producers (blue exchanges) who, in turn, will pay 
for this electricity to the corresponding DER producer (light blue exchanges).  
Three different payments for the access to the network and participation in the wholesale electricity 
market were assumed to exist: 
- Grid access (T&D fees). The payment will be based on the T&D fees (this fee includes: 
transmission and distribution costs, retribution for the NRA and other regulated payments.). The 
price is regulated. For consumers this fee includes a power term and an energy term. In the case of 
producers, they pay for energy produced (only energy term). 
- System access: All participants in the power system must contribute to the System Operator’s 
remuneration. The price is regulated. For consumers/retailers this payment is based on the 
traded amount in the wholesale market, while producers must pay according to their available 
capacity.  
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- Market access: All participants in the wholesale electricity market must contribute to the Market 
Operator’s remuneration. The price is regulated. For consumers/retailers this payment is based 
on the traded amount in the wholesale market, while producers must pay according to their 
available capacity. 
Retailers and aggregators, on behalf of consumers, buy grid access from the DSO23. With that purpose, 
they collect T&D fees from consumers, which are included in the power and energy terms of the retail 
electricity price, and transfer them to the DSO. Likewise, direct consumers must pay for grid access 
directly to the DSO, based on their contracted type of tariff.  Additionally, all producers also have to pay 
the grid access to the DSO for the energy actually produced. Central producers and direct DER producers 
will pay directly to the DSO, while non-direct DER producers will make this payment through their 
aggregators (light green exchanges). 
The T&D fees collected by the DSO are composed of three main items, whose shares in the total fee are 
defined by the NRA: DSO remuneration, TSO remuneration (pink exchanges and end stimulus) and other 
system charges to be paid to the “Rest of the system” (brown exchanges and end stimulus). 
It must be noted that, in addition to the other system charges included in the T&D fees, the 
government will also receive the taxes payment collected by retailers from consumers, such as Value 
Added Tax (VAT). But, as the objective of the current analysis is not the assessment of profitability for the 
“Rest of the system”, such as the government, these charges are not included in the analysis. As this 
approach is taken in all the coordination schemes, it does not affect to the CBA analysis. 
Additionally, retailers, aggregators, direct consumers, central producers and direct DER producers 
must pay for the costs incurred by the regulated actors in charge of the economic and technical 
management of the system, i.e. the market operator and the system operator. As a result, they will pay for 
market access to the wholesale market operator and for system access to the TSO (red start stimuli, 
exchanges and end stimuli). In the case of central producers, direct DER producers and aggregators 
representing the non-direct DER producers, the amounts to be paid depend on the available power, while 
the retailers, direct consumers and aggregators representing the non-direct active consumers, will pay 
depending on the amount they traded in the market. 
In all coordination schemes, it has been represented that part of the system access fees collected by 
the TSO is transferred to the DSO (dark red exchanges)24.  
It is important to highlight the amounts of energy used in the different payments: consumers pay for 
real electricity consumption; the T&D fees are also based on real consumption, but wholesale electricity, 
                                                                   
23 For simplicity reasons, in these graphs the grid access is always paid to the DSO and then, the corresponding part is 
transferred to the TSO (High Voltage (HV) grid access). In reality, DSOs and TSOs collect the access fees from consumers and 
producers connected to their grids. 
24 Currently, this payment from TSO to DSO, does not happen, since DSOs are not operating the system. It is expected that the 
situation represented here will be the standard case in 2030. 
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market access and system access are based on the traded amount. Producers pay T&D fees based on their 
real production, but market and system access payments depend on their available capacity. 
Path 2 – Provision of balancing and congestion management (Yellow and light blue exchanges) 
Retailers, aggregators of non-direct active consumers and direct consumers buy electricity, but the 
amount they purchase will not always match the amount actually consumed, since imbalances in real-
time may arise25. In the same manner, the production schedule foreseen by the producers do not match 
exactly with the energy that they finally can produce. This difference is the imbalance that needs to be 
solved (yellow exchanges).  
The TSO is responsible for keeping the balance between production and consumption in its control 
area and, thus, it has established a balancing mechanism in order to cope with imbalances. With that 
purpose, the balancing market operator opens the balancing market. The market clearing algorithm aims 
not only to procure balancing, but also to avoid congestions in real-time. For that reason, the represented 
exchanges include both ancillary services: real-time congestion management (RTCM) and the balancing 
for TSO (light blue exchanges). Then, the balancing market operator receives bids from potential 
providers of ancillary services.  
In this model, it was considered that the bids submitted to the balancing market for the provision of 
these ancillary services (balancing for TSO + RTCM) come from: 
i) central producers (purple exchanges), 
ii) direct active consumers–transmission (purple exchanges), 
iii) direct active consumers–distribution (ochre exchanges), 
iv) direct DER producers (ochre exchanges), 
v) aggregators of non-direct active consumers (ochre exchanges), who, in turn, acquire the flexibility 
from their consumers (green exchanges), and 
vi) aggregators of non-direct DER producers (ochre exchanges), who, in turn, acquire the flexibility 
from their DER producers (green exchanges). 
However, the costs involved in the use of these ancillary services are not borne by the TSO but 
transferred to the actors who have caused the imbalances. In these models, the imbalance management 
role is performed by the Balancing Responsible Parties (BRP), who, in turn, will transfer the 
corresponding penalties to the actor causing the imbalance (yellow exchanges). 
In this coordination scheme, non-direct active consumers and non-direct DER producers, both 
connected at distribution level, can participate in the balancing market through their respective 
                                                                   
25 Even without forecasting errors, these amounts are not the same, because retailers must cope with the expected losses along 
the system (in other countries, it is the DSO who must procure the energy it uses to cover energy losses in its system). 
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aggregators. The aggregators acquire the flexibility and submit the corresponding bids in the balancing 
market on behalf of them. 
5.3.2 Coordination scheme B 
In this coordination scheme, the TSO can contract DER only indirectly. First, the DSO, via a local 
market, may procure resources for solving local problems and, then, an aggregation of the remaining 
resources is transferred to the TSO AS market [5]. 
Figure 5.3 has been extracted from D1.3 [1]. It illustrates the role played by relevant stakeholders and, 
additionally, it shows a high-level view of the market architecture and interactions among players. 
 
Figure 5.3: Local AS market model 
The value model for CS B is presented in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4: Value model of CS B0 
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The money flows in the value model take two main paths: path 1 (as described in section 5.3.1) and 
path 2 described below.  
Path 2 – Provision of balancing and congestion management (Yellow and light blue exchanges) 
Retailers, aggregators of non-direct active consumers and direct consumers buy electricity, but the 
amount they purchase will not always match the amount actually consumed, since imbalances in real-
time may arise26. In the same manner, the production schedule foreseen by the producers do not match 
exactly with the energy that they finally can produce. This difference is the imbalance that needs to be 
solved (yellow exchanges).  
This coordination scheme includes the operation of a local market by the DSO for the resolution of its 
own congestions. The DSO communicates its requirements to manage congestions (violet start stimulus) 
to the local market operator (violet exchanges).  The local market operator will use the bids submitted by: 
i) direct active consumers-distribution (black exchanges), 
ii) direct DER producers (black exchanges), 
iii) aggregators of non-direct active consumers (black exchanges), who, in turn, acquire the flexibility 
from their consumers (green exchanges) and 
iv) aggregators of non-direct DER producers (black exchanges), who, in turn, acquire the flexibility 
from their DER producers (green exchanges). 
Once the congestions from the DSO have been solved, the local market operator aggregates the 
remaining bids coming from these providers and transfers this aggregated flexibility to the balancing 
market operated by the TSO (ochre exchanges). The aggregators of non-direct active consumers and 
aggregators of non-direct DER producers, once again, will acquire the flexibility from their customer, the 
non-direct DER producers and the non-direct active consumers (green exchanges). The DSO has priority 
to use the flexibility from the local grid. The DSO sends an aggregated bid to the balancing market, making 
sure that only bids respecting the DSO grid constraints can take part in this market. 
The TSO is responsible for keeping the balance between production and consumption in its control 
area and, thus, it has established a balancing mechanism in order to ensure the balance of its grid and to 
cope with imbalances. With that purpose, the balancing market operator opens the balancing market. The 
market clearing algorithm aims not only to procure balancing, but also to avoid congestions in real-time. 
For that reason, the represented exchanges include both RTCM and the balancing for TSO (light blue 
exchanges). The balancing market operator will use the resources offered by the central producers and 
direct active consumers-transmission in the balancing market (purple exchanges) and the bids coming 
from the local market (ochre exchanges).   
                                                                   
26 Even without forecasting errors, these amounts are not the same, because retailers must cope with the expected losses along 
the system (in other countries, it is the DSO who must procure the energy it uses to cover energy losses in its system). 
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However, the costs involved in the use of these services are not borne by the TSO but transferred to 
the actors who have caused the imbalances. In these models, the imbalance management role is 
performed by the BRP, who, in turn, will transfer the corresponding penalization to the actor causing the 
imbalance (yellow exchanges). 
5.3.3 Coordination scheme C 
In this coordination scheme, there is a shared balancing responsibility. The TSO transfers the 
balancing responsibility from the distribution grid to the DSO. The DSO has to respect a pre-defined 
schedule and uses local DER (obtained via a local market) to fulfil its balancing responsibilities. The pre-
defined schedule is based on the nominations of the BRPs, possibly in combination with historical 
forecasts at each HV/MV interconnection point [5]. 
Figure 5.5, which has been extracted from D1.3 [1], illustrates the role played by relevant stakeholders 
and, additionally, it shows a high-level view of the market architecture and interactions among players. 
 
Figure 5.5: Shared balancing responsibility model 
The value model for CS C is presented in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Value model of CS C 
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The money flows in the value model take two main paths: path 1 (as described in section 5.3.1) and 
path 2 described below.  
Path 2 – Provision of balancing and congestion management (Yellow and light blue exchanges) 
Retailers, aggregators of non-direct active consumers and direct consumers buy electricity, but the 
amount they purchase will not always match the amount actually consumed, since imbalances in real-
time may arise27. In the same manner, the production schedule foreseen by the producers do not match 
exactly with the energy that they finally can produce. This difference is the imbalance that needs to be 
solved. In this coordination scheme, the imbalances are disaggregated into imbalances at distribution 
level (orange exchanges) and imbalances at transmission level (brown exchanges).  
In this coordination scheme, the TSO transfers the balancing responsibility partially to the DSO, by 
means of a setpoint agreed between TSO and DSO, in such a way that there is a local market managed by 
the DSO, for resources connected to the distribution grid, and a balancing market managed by the TSO, for 
resources connected to the transmission grid. 
The DSO communicates to the local market operator (violet exchanges) its own requirements for 
solving congestions (violet start stimulus) and, additionally, the balancing needs to cover imbalances 
occurring at distribution level (orange exchanges) caused by BRPs representing: 
i) retailers of non-direct passive consumers, 
ii) aggregators of non-direct active consumers, 
iii) aggregators of non-direct DER producers, 
iv) direct active consumers-distribution and 
v) direct DER producers.  
This necessity of balancing and congestion management for the distribution grid will be solved by 
means of the bids submitted by: 
i) direct active consumers-distribution (black exchanges), 
ii)  direct DER producers (black exchanges), 
iii) aggregators of non-direct active consumers (black exchanges), who, in turn, acquire the flexibility 
from their customers (green exchanges) and 
iv) aggregators of non-direct DER producers (black exchanges), who, in turn, acquire the flexibility 
from their DER producers (green exchanges).  
The TSO is responsible for keeping the balance between production and consumption in its control 
area and has therefore established a balancing mechanism in order to ensure the balance of its grid and to 
                                                                   
27 Even without forecasting errors, these amounts are not the same, because retailers must cope with the expected losses along 
the system (in other countries, it is the DSO who must procure the energy it uses to cover energy losses in its system). 
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cope with imbalances. In this case, the TSO must solve the imbalances caused at transmission level 
(brown exchanges) by: 
i) central producers, 
ii) direct passive consumers and 
iii) direct active consumers-transmission. 
Additionally, the TSO must also avoid congestions in real-time. With those purposes, the balancing 
market operator opens the balancing market (light blue exchanges) which can make use of the bids 
submitted by the central producers and the direct active consumers-transmission (purple exchanges). 
5.3.4 Coordination scheme D 
In this coordination scheme, there is a common AS market for TSOs and DSOs. TSOs and DSOs contract 
DER in the common flexibility market. The main goal is the minimization of total procurement costs of 
flexibilities contracted by TSO and DSO [5]. The common market uses flexibilities from resources 
connected at transmission and distribution level to solve both TSO and DSO needs. Consequently, both 
TSO and DSO are responsible for the organization and operation of the market. DSO constraints are 
integrated in the market clearing process. 
Figure 5.7, which has been extracted from D1.3 [1], illustrates the role played by relevant stakeholders 
and, additionally, it shows a high-level view of the market architecture and interactions among players. 
Out of the two alternatives considered in D1.3, centralized/decentralized variants, only the centralized 
variant is considered in this business-level approach. 
 
Figure 5.7: Common TSO-DSO AS market model 
The value model for CS D is shown in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8: Value model of CS D 
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The money flows in the value model take two main paths: path 1 (as described in section 5.3.1) and 
path 2 described below.  
Path 2 – Provision of balancing and congestion management (Yellow and light blue exchanges) 
Retailers, aggregators of non-direct active consumers and direct consumers buy electricity, but the 
amount they purchase will not always match the amount actually consumed, since imbalances in real-
time may arise28. In the same manner, the production schedule foreseen by the producers do not match 
exactly with the energy that they finally can produce. This difference is the imbalance that needs to be 
solved. In this coordination scheme, the imbalances are disaggregated into imbalances at distribution 
level (orange exchanges) and imbalances at transmission level (brown exchanges).  
This coordination scheme promotes a common flexibility market for DSOs and TSO. The procurement 
of resources made under this coordination scheme has as main goal to minimize total procurement cost 
of flexibility. There is a common market for TSO and DSO with resources connected to transmission and 
distribution level. The TSO and the DSO are both responsible for the organization and operation of the 
market. In this case, all constraints are integrated in a single process that includes both transmission and 
distribution grid constraints. The DSO and TSO attend the common balancing market to solve congestions 
and to balance the system, respectively. Actions to solve issues at distribution level are presented as 
violet start stimulus and exchanges, while actions at transmission level are represented as light blue 
exchanges. The clearing process will consider the submitted bids from: 
i) central producers (purple exchanges), 
ii) direct active consumers-transmission (purple exchanges), 
iii) direct DER producers (ochre exchanges), 
iv) direct active consumers-distribution (ochre exchanges), 
v) aggregators of non-direct active consumers (ochre exchanges), who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their consumers (green exchanges) and 
vi) aggregators of non-direct DER producers (ochre exchanges), who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their DER producers (green exchanges). 
The costs involved in the use of these services are not borne by the TSO and DSO but transferred, 
through the corresponding BRP, to the actors who have caused the imbalances.  
5.3.5 Main differences in the value models 
The main differences in the value models come from the provision of balancing and the management 
of congestions (path2). As summary, Table 5.6 indicates which these differences are, especially those 
                                                                   
28 Even without forecasting errors, these amounts are not the same, because retailers must cope with the expected losses along 
the system (in other countries, it is the DSO who must procure the energy it uses to cover energy losses in its system). 
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regarding type of service required, who causes the imbalances to be solved by each market and the 
available providers. 
CS A 
Balancing market 
Services Resolution of imbalances caused by Providers 
Balancing for 
TSO 
RTCM 
All participants; i) retailers of non-direct 
passive   consumers, ii) aggregators of 
non-direct active consumers, iii) 
aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers, iv) direct active consumers-
distribution, v) direct DER producers, 
vi) central producers, vii) direct passive 
consumers, viii) direct active 
consumers-transmission 
i) central producers (transmission) 
ii) direct active consumers–transmission 
iii) direct active consumers–distribution 
iv) direct DER producers 
v) aggregators of non-direct active 
consumers, who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their consumers 
vi) aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers, who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their DER producers 
CS B 
Local market 
Services Resolution of imbalances caused by Providers 
CM at 
distribution level 
n.a. 
i) direct active consumers-distribution 
ii) direct DER producers 
iii) aggregators of non-direct active 
consumers, who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their consumers 
iv) aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers, who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their DER producers. 
Balancing market 
Services Resolution of imbalances caused by Providers 
Balancing for 
TSO 
RTCM 
All participants; i) retailers of non-direct 
passive   consumers, ii) aggregators of 
non-direct active consumers, iii) 
aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers, iv) direct active consumers-
distribution, v) direct DER producers, 
vi) central producers, vii) direct passive 
consumers, viii) direct active 
consumers-transmission 
i) central producers (transmission) 
ii) direct active consumers-transmission 
iii) local market operator: aggregated bid 
respecting the DSO grid constraints 
CS C 
Local market 
Services Resolution of imbalances caused by Providers 
Balancing for 
DSO 
CM at 
distribution 
i) retailers of non-direct passive   
consumers 
ii) aggregators of non-direct active 
consumers 
iii) aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers 
iv) direct active consumers-distribution 
v) direct DER producers 
i) direct active consumers-distribution 
ii) direct DER producers 
iii) aggregators of non-direct active 
consumers, who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their customers 
iv) aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers, who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their DER producers 
Balancing market 
Services Resolution of imbalances caused by Providers 
Balancing for 
TSO 
RTCM 
i) central producers, 
ii) direct passive consumers 
iii) direct active consumers-transmission 
i) central producers (transmission) 
ii) direct active consumers-transmission 
CS D Common balancing market 
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Services Resolution of imbalances caused by Providers 
Balancing + CM  
at system level 
All participants; i) retailers of non-direct 
passive   consumers, ii) aggregators of 
non-direct active consumers, iii) 
aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers, iv) direct active consumers-
distribution, v) direct DER producers, 
vi) central producers, vii) direct passive 
consumers, viii) direct active 
consumers-transmission 
i) central producers (transmission) 
ii) direct active consumers-transmission 
iii) direct DER producers 
iv) direct active consumers-distribution 
v) aggregators of non-direct active 
consumers, who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their consumers 
vi) aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers, who, in turn, acquire the 
flexibility from their DER producers 
Table 5.6: Summary of differences between coordination schemes 
5.4 Criteria for a successful business-level analysis 
The SmartNet project assesses the efficiency of the different TSO-DSO coordination schemes through 
the CBA described and calculated in previous chapters. However, CSs must also allow the involved actors 
to have a profitable business case, that is, CSs must lead to an appropriate allocation of costs and benefits 
among them. Therefore, a business-level analysis is needed to assess the economic impact of the different 
CSs for all the relevant actors. 
The business-level analysis is composed of several main steps to determine, at the end of the process, 
whether coordination schemes are economically attractive for all actors, i.e. whether the benefits seen by 
each of them outweigh their costs. Throughout this chapter 5, the steps to be followed when developing 
this type of analysis have been detailed; from the initial theoretical analysis with the definition of the 
methodology to be used, definition of participants and creation of value models up to the definition of the 
specific formulas to be calculated (which are presented in detail in Appendix IV – Business-level analysis 
formulation). Based on the graphical models developed for the coordination schemes (Figure 5.2, Figure 
5.4, Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.8) and the formulas detailed for each value exchange, the annual flows of 
funds for all the actors can be calculated. These flows can then be used as an input to deduce each actor’s 
annual cash flow, by considering all other expenses they would need for launching the business model 
(e.g. ICT costs) too. Once the annual cash flows are obtained, the profitability of the investments that each 
actor needs to perform, if any, has to be checked.   
Many of the specific data and financial parameters to be used in these calculations are difficult to 
estimate, for two main reasons: 
i) The deployment of the proposed coordination schemes implies regulatory changes which are not 
defined yet and which may take from few to several years. Therefore, some of the values to be 
included in the business-level must be estimated in the medium- to long-term, which implies a 
considerable inclusion of inherent uncertainty on the long-term forecast. 
ii) For the business-level economic analysis, the annual cash flows must be calculated. The obtained 
results from the SmartNet simulations can be considered representative for the system as a 
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whole, but the results obtained with the number of time step simulated are less likely to be 
representative of the exchanges among the actors over a complete year. 
Consequently, the business-level analysis developed in this deliverable only includes the identification 
of relationships, the formulas to be applied and the type of data to be used. Explicitly, these issues are 
developed in detail in the Appendix IV – Business-level analysis formulation. Section 11.1 presents the 
actors who are relevant for the different coordination schemes and the relationships between them, 
section 11.2 shows the formulas to be used in the business-level analysis to calculate the numeric results 
when all the data are available as detailed as required by these formulas and, finally, section 11.3 details 
specific issues regarding each coordination scheme. 
Nevertheless, several theoretical boundary conditions (minimum set of economic parameters) are 
detailed in order to establish the issues which may strengthen or threaten the deployment of the 
proposed coordination scheme. 
Specifically, in the case of the DSO, in order to determine under which circumstances the use of a local 
market may represent an improvement, it is necessary to perform a comparison between the DSO’s 
current cash flow and the one obtained when each coordination scheme is deployed. In addition, the costs 
to be taken into account in each coordination scheme include; (i) the investment in network elements and 
in ICTs for the development of each CS and (ii) the flexibility acquisition by the DSOs.  
Taking the Spanish case as a basis, the law 24/2013 [46] and the Royal Decree 1048/2013 [47] 
establish the criteria of remuneration to the investment to be perceived by the DSOs: 
1) The methodologies for the remuneration of the distribution activities are established by the 
regulator, on the basis of the required costs to build, operate and maintain the associated 
infrastructure, according to the criterion of minimum cost for the system. 
2) The remuneration to the investment is perceived for the assets in service and which have not 
been amortized yet. 
3) The methodology to remunerate the distribution activity includes economic incentives, both 
positive and negative, for the improvement of the supply quality, for reducing losses and for 
decreasing fraud. 
4) The established remuneration parameters are in force for 6 years. 
5) There is a maximum limit to the amount of eligible investment costs. The retribution is calculated 
via formulas that allow for achieving efficiency gains both in the construction of infrastructures 
and in the operation and maintenance of networks. 
6) The rate of return payable from the electric system is linked to the return of the Spanish ten-year 
bond increased by an appropriate differential. This differential is 200 points for investments 
performed after January 2014 according to [46]. 
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Once the DSO’s cash flow in the specific coordination scheme and the remuneration to the investment 
to be perceived is known, two considerations must be fulfilled simultaneously; 
1) On one hand, from the system perspective, it must be fulfilled that the cost for the system is 
reduced by the deployment of the specific CS. 
66W'>	7<W67'9G6	QG	XOYZ < W76	'66W'>	7<W67'9G6	QG	XO 
2) On the contrary, from the DSO perspective, its final result should be improved with the 
deployment of a new coordination scheme. 
By assessing these two conditions for each coordination scheme, the minimum value of return to be 
perceived by the DSO for acquisition of flexibility can be calculated. Therefore, although the annual 
remuneration for the DSO should be reduced (from the system perspective) such reduction must be lower 
than the cost reduction for the DSO (the operational cost of procuring flexibility must be lower than the 
annuitized cost of the capital cost for reinforcing the grid). 
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6 Conclusions 
In view of the obtained outcomes during the project, and taking into account the scenarios analysed 
within it, the adoption of CS C results to be the least efficient CS in all the countries and, therefore, 
technical reasons could advise to continue centralizing balancing responsibility to TSOs. However, 
depending on the impact of the congestions at distribution level, the congestion management 
responsibility could be shared between TSOs and DSOs, as it has already been addressed by the Clean 
Energy for All Europeans package [48]: 
• Traditional TSO-centric schemes could stay optimal if distribution networks do not show 
significant congestions, which is likely in the very near-future scenarios where the distribution 
grid planning continues affected by the fit-and-forget reinforcements policy. However, in the 
future, this regulatory trend may be modified, so that the DSOs’ remuneration will give more 
importance to their investments in intelligence (OPEX) rather than on investments in grid 
elements (CAPEX). Then, a more advanced coordination between TSO-DSO, like the proposed CS B 
or CS D, should be deployed for a more efficient management of the system. 
• More advanced centralized schemes incorporating distribution constraints show higher economic 
performances, but their performance could be undermined by big forecasting errors. Hence, it is 
of paramount importance to improve the forecasting techniques, to increase the market clearing 
frequency and to shift the gate closure as much as possible towards real-time.   
• The two-step optimization process implies that the decentralized schemes are less efficient than 
single-step processes. Scarcity of liquidity and potential impact of local market power (not 
investigated in SmartNet), along with extra constraints introduced to avoid counteracting actions 
between local congestion market and balancing market (e.g. increasing the system imbalance 
while solving local congestions), negatively affect economic efficiency of decentralized schemes. 
The effect of these inefficiencies is especially important in CS C, which is further affected by 
additional rigidities (i.e. fixed power flow at the TSO-DSO electrical interface). 
• The local congestion markets should have a “reasonable” size and guarantee a free competition by 
enough actors, in order to prevent scarcity of liquidity and the power exercise by the local 
markets. This may create the need for small DSOs to pool-up to ensure the required market size. 
As a summary of the main findings by the CBA developed in the SmartNet project, in a more than likely 
scenario in which the fit-and-forget reinforcement remuneration approach is abandoned and the 
forecasting errors are more accurately calculated (on the one hand by the improvement in the forecasting 
techniques and, on the other hand, by shifting the gate closure closer to real-time), CS D could be the most 
efficient of the coordination schemes proposed. However, due to complexity reasons, the network 
observability cannot be pushed till single low-voltage nodes and, hence, it will be necessary to determine, 
for each specific case and country, the observability level to be deployed, taking into account that 
increasing the observability of distribution grids implies new important investments by the system.  
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Once the most advisable CS at system-level is selected, a business-level analysis is needed to assess the 
economic impact of the different CSs for all the relevant actors in order to guarantee that all the involved 
participants have a profitable business case. The appropriate allocation of costs and benefits among the 
actors is of utmost importance when selecting the CS, since this issue may strengthen or threaten the 
deployment of the proposed CS. 
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8 Appendix I - Consultation  
This section presents the consultation document [49], as it was made available to stakeholders. 
1.  Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the different schemes 
With the results obtained from the simulations, one of the main goals is the elaboration of a CBA 
methodology for the analysis of TSO-DSO interaction schemes29 and the assessment of the best TSO-DSO 
interaction for each national case. With that purpose, next steps will be followed: 
1) Development of a CBA procedure: 
• State of the art of metrics for CBA. 
• Selection of SmartNet metrics. 
2) Macro-level CBA (at system level): 
• Calculation of values for metrics with the data input from the simulations. 
• Once the metrics have a value, that value needs to be monetised. 
• Cost calculation of the required information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
• Evaluation of every coordination scheme in all countries. 
3) Micro-level CBA (at business case level): 
• Identification of the value chain. 
• Allocation of costs and benefits per stakeholder. 
• Sensitivity analysis. 
The objective of the micro-level analysis is to define a business scenario which allows all the involved 
actors to have a profitable business case. Therefore, it aims at properly allocating costs and benefits to the 
different stakeholders. Since the details for the micro-level analysis are not sufficiently developed for a 
consultation yet, this consultation is oriented to help guide the process to perform the macro-level CBA. 
1.1 CBA methodology – Literature review 
Several methodologies have been reviewed in order to determine their applicability to the SmartNet 
analysis. The analysis included: 
• Electric Power Research Institute method (available at: 
https://www.epri.com/#/pages/product/000000000001020342/) 
• Joint Research Centre methodology (available at: 
https://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/ses/files/documents/guidelines_for_conducting_a_cost-
benefit_analysis_of_smart_grid_projects.pdf) 
                                                                   
29  Basics for coordination schemes and market design are available at: http://smartnet-project.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/2-SmartNet-PowerTech-20170619-TSO-DSO-CS-Six-V2.pptx and http://smartnet-project.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/3-20170619_SmartNet-G.Leclercq-Presentation-VF.pptx. 
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• International Smart Grid Action Network method (available at: http://www.sasgi.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2.21_ISGAN_Annex3_-Issue2.0_28Sept2011.pdf) 
• Pacific Northwest National Laboratory method (available at: 
http://epe.pnnl.gov/capabilities/cba.stm) 
• U.S. Department Of Energy/Federal Energy Regulatory Commission method (available at: 
http://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/SynapseReport.2013-02.LBL_.DR-Cost-
Effectiveness.11-106A.pdf) 
• REALISEGRID project (available at: http://realisegrid.rse-
web.it/content/files/File/Publications%20and%20results/Deliverable_REALISEGRID_3.3.1.pdf) 
• e-Highway 2050 project (available at: http://www.gridinnovation-on-line.eu/Articles/Library/E-
Highway-2050-A-New-Multi-Criteria-Cost-Benefit-Methodology-To-Compare-New-Transmission-
Investments.kl) 
The analysis of further CBA methods continues in parallel to this consultation. 
 
1.2 Macro level CBA analysis 
The evaluation of different investment alternatives needs to define: 
• A set of criteria (metrics). They need to be complete, non-overlapping, applicable, system-oriented, 
simple, reproducible, documentable, realistic and objective. 
• A set of weights that establish the importance of those metrics.  
The definition of metrics is a very critical issue, but the assignment of weights to them is even more 
critical and controversial. 
Two approaches exist for the assessment of the alternatives: 
1) The multi-criteria analysis approach consists in; defining a set of criteria for classifying alternative 
investment variants, providing quantitative indicators to quantify the selected criteria, converting 
indicators into one only utility value (possibly a-dimensional), performing a weighed linear 
combination of utility values (weights incorporate the importance of the different criteria). 
2) The cost-benefit analysis approach. It tries to reduce the problem complexity by converting all 
indicators into a monetary unit (no need to assign weights as such, but just converting all the metrics 
into money). In SmartNet, we opted for this approach, since it allows a more straightforward 
comparison between the different alternatives and, for some metrics, the monetisation process (CBA) 
is more objective than assigning subjective weights (multi-criteria). 
In the macro analysis each coordination scheme will be assessed for Denmark, Italy and Spain and the 
results compared against a baseline. The definition of this baseline is one of the questions included in this 
consultation. Metrics will be elaborated and applied for comparing the TSO-DSO interaction schemes for 
each national case and, as result, the different schemes will be independently scored for each country. 
Then, the most convenient architecture, different for each national case, will be highlighted. 
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Figure 8.1 shows the macro analysis synthesis, in which it can be seen that the ICT costs related to the 
coordination schemes will be managed separately from the rest of the costs directly linked to the 
coordination schemes deployment. The procedure for the ICT costs estimation is detailed in section 1.3. 
 
Figure 8.1: Macro analysis synthesis 
In general, the metrics may be divided into three categories30: 
1) Core elements: Typical CBA ingredients, e.g. lifecycle costs, overall system social welfare, CO2 
emissions, system reliability, etc. 
2) Experimental items: Innovative items or elements difficult to assess, e.g. extra costs due to 
distribution investments, extra costs due to market power, socio-environmental costs of new lines, 
etc. 
3) Sensitivity factors: Extra elements to enrich decision maker’s knowledge, e.g. social welfare split, 
renewable energy sources (RES) curtailment costs, etc. 
The main proposed metrics to quantify the costs and benefits of the different SmartNet coordination 
schemes are: 
a. Enhanced provision of ancillary services: The TSO-DSO coordination schemes investigated in 
SmartNet are aimed at increasing the competitiveness of ancillary service provision, by extending 
their related markets to distribution energy resources (DER), i.e. where the centre of mass of 
power flexibility is expected to be in a near future. In particular, SmartNet simulations will be 
focused on the real-time market devoted to the activation of the flexible DER for the energy 
balance of the system (manual Frequency Restoration Reserve –mFRR– and Replacement 
Reserve –RR– depending on the country) taking into account also the network limitations 
                                                                    
30  As defined in http://www.e-
highway2050.eu/fileadmin/documents/Results/D6.1_A_comprehensive_long_term_benefit_cost_assessment.pdf  
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 139  
 
(congestion management). The proposed metric to evaluate this aspect is balancing cost31, which 
can be monetised by multiplying the cleared balancing cost and the activated volume.. 
b. Cost attributable to network limitations: The real-time market simulated in SmartNet takes 
into account complete network models and it guarantees that the final activations are selected in 
order to avoid (voltage and loading) congestions and to keep energy losses limited. Depending on 
the TSO-DSO coordination scheme, the market effectiveness in taking into account network 
limitations is expected to be different and, consequently, the activated resources as well (with a 
direct impact on the cleared balancing price). Network operators are carefully considering the 
occurrence/severity of congestions and losses in order to evaluate grid refurbishment actions 
which, in turn, are inversely proportional to the effectiveness of the market in solving undesired 
situations. This effectiveness can be evaluated by comparing the cleared balancing price of the 
following two situations: 
• Real situation, in which the entire physics of the network (losses, transmission capacity) is 
simulated. 
• Ideal situation (busbar simulation), in which electricity network is simulated disregarding 
the physics and with zero losses. 
It is immediate to deduce that the price difference between these two situations corresponds to 
the cost attributable to congestion management and to network losses compensation (an 
intermediate situation could be performing a copperplate simulation, where the electricity 
networks have infinite transmission capacity, but network losses are taken into account, so that 
only the cost of congestion management could be derived from the price difference). This 
difference also directly returns a monetary value and it is a valuable indicator for the profitability 
evaluation of refurbishment investments32. 
c. Reduction of unwanted measures adopted by network operators in order to solve 
congestions: As anticipated above, the real-time market simulated in SmartNet includes the 
network models and limits. Depending on the TSO-DSO coordination scheme, this model is 
limited to transmission network or extended to distribution too. In addition, the market 
architecture impacts on the ability of the market operator in predicting network congestions and 
to consequently activate the right resources to avoid them. Having considered that the simulated 
coordination schemes are expected to solve congestions with different effectiveness, network 
operators will inevitably deal with some critical situations (unexpected congestions) to be 
immediately solved with dedicated (unwanted) measures, such as: 
                                                                   
31 We think that social welfare is not a suitable metrics because there could be cases when an arbitrage between bids could get a 
better social welfare but we have instead only to minimize the cost to activate resources to solve congestion and imbalance 
(optimizing social welfare is the aim of the previous energy markets). 
32 A detailed analysis should consider the situation after each grid refurbishment investment, so that the economically sound 
refurbishments would be identified (there may be some bottlenecks which only appear in very extreme situations and, hence, 
whose removal would not be economically efficient), but it is not the aim of this analysis to be so detailed. 
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• Immediate curtailment of load/generation. 
• Blocking of activation signals. 
• Inhibition of bidding of non-prequalified resources. 
Even in this case, the monetization of the unwanted measures can be easily performed. In 
particular, since these actions inevitably cause an imbalance in the system, a good indicator can 
be represented by the consequent imbalance price. However, when it does not represent the 
price to activate curtailment, the compulsory limitation of flexibility can be evaluated according 
to the associated resource costs. 
d. Reduced network losses: Because of the non-ideal behaviour of network components, energy 
losses are an unavoidable element of power systems and it may have a significant impact on the 
management of both transmission and distribution grids. Taking into account the market 
architectures investigated within SmartNet, there is a concrete potential of reducing energy 
losses by approaching supply and demand of ancillary services. The proposed CBA will compare 
the effects of each TSO-DSO coordination scheme on the energy losses by processing the 
simulation results. Their associated cost can be calculated by integrating them with the energy 
price profile (resulting from the market). Thanks to this integration, the CBA will also consider 
the coordination scheme ability of selecting the optimal energy paths depending on the current 
price of energy. 
e. Emissions savings: A more efficient cooperation between TSOs and DSOs, together with the 
integration of network/resources models in the market clearing algorithms, is expected to be 
beneficial in the optimal management of available flexibility, including the one provided by low-
carbon generation technologies (which are gradually replacing conventional plants with higher 
carbon emissions). Generation dispatch and unit commitment model is used for calculation of 
emissions savings in each coordination scheme compared to the reference scheme. Standard 
emission rates for each generation technology will be taken into account. 
The monetization of CO2 costs is based on forecasted CO2 prices for electricity in the studied 
horizon. The price can be derived from official sources such as the International Energy Agency. 
 
1.3 ICT costs  
The term ICT cost comprises the communications and information technologies, including the software 
for the market clearing process. Only those ICT costs that are directly related to the implementation of a 
coordination scheme will be considered. The main goals of this estimation are: 
• To discover differences between coordination schemes in terms of ICT. 
• To analyse requirements of ICT systems (market arrangement system and bidding system), the 
amount of communication, and its requirements in the coordination scheme.  
• To estimate the ICT costs (in 2030) in each national case and coordination scheme. 
For the definition of the ICT costs the following steps will be carried out: 
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1) Functionalities definition (e. g. data handling, security, reliability, etc.). Comparison of the 
coordination schemes in terms of functionalities in its ICT systems. 
2) Convert each ICT system in a coordination scheme into a current cost. Estimation of ICT system cost 
development from current costs to year 2030.   
 
This ICT estimation involves large uncertainties on technology and cost development since the details of 
year 2030 are currently unknown. The main focus of the analysis will be on issues that can make 
differences between coordination schemes. 
The systems and communications not directly related to coordination schemes are left outside the scope 
of this analysis, and the use of existing communication for low capacity traffic will be assumed to be free. 
 
Questions 
Baseline 
1. What scenario should be considered as baseline for the SmartNet analysis? Should we stick to the 
two options below, or would you suggest another one? 
a) Option 1: Only resources connected to transmission level can provide ancillary services. 
b) Option 2: Coordination scheme A, in which resources connected to distribution level can provide 
ancillary services (when certain preconditions are met). This is the current situation in Denmark 
and in Spain, and it will also probably be the case in Italy in the near future. 
2. If option 1 is selected, can we ensure that the resources connected to transmission network will be 
enough to provide all the ancillary services required by the system? If not, what actions should be 
taken? How would the congestions at distribution level be solved? 
3. If option 2 is selected, some costs/benefits may not be adequately addressed and not easily 
compared. For instance, let’s assume that the costs of implementing a control system for 
coordination scheme A is 100 and the costs of implementing a control system for coordination 
scheme B is 130. Since these control systems are not scalable, it is not immediate to state that 
passing from A to B would cost 30 but, in principle, it can be any value between 30 and 130. Do you 
have experience with this kind of issues? 
 
Metrics 
The following metrics have been preselected for the analysis (see short description in the accompanying 
document). Please, answer the questions for each of them. 
4. Enhanced provision of ancillary services. 
4.1 Is this metric suitable for the analysis in SmartNet? 
4.2 Do you agree with the proposed monetization method? 
4.3 Would you propose another monetization method for this metric? 
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4.4 Should we consider marginal price or pay-as-bid? 
4.5 Do you agree with our statement about social welfare? 
5. Cost attributable to network limitations 
5.1 Is this metric suitable for the analysis in SmartNet? 
5.2 Do you agree with the proposed monetization method? 
5.3 Would you propose another monetization method for this metric? 
5.4 Should we divide the costs of congestion management and losses (copperplate), or have both 
costs together (busbar)? How would you propose to avoid overlapping with “Reduced 
network losses” (see question 7 below)? 
6. Reduction of unwanted measures adopted by network operators in order to solve congestions. 
6.1 Is this metric suitable for the analysis in SmartNet? 
6.2 Which monetization method do you prefer: imbalance price or flexibility cost? 
6.3 Would you propose another monetization method for this metric? 
6.4 What kind of prices should be used; average price (in which periods), marginal price, etc. 
7. Reduced network losses. 
7.1 Is this metric suitable for the analysis in SmartNet? 
7.2 Do you agree with the proposed monetization method? 
7.3 Would you propose another monetization method for this metric? 
7.4 What kind of prices should be used; average price (in which periods), marginal price, etc. 
8. Emission savings. 
8.1 Is this metric suitable for the analysis in SmartNet? 
8.2 Do you agree with the proposed monetization method? 
8.3 Would you propose another monetization method for this metric? 
8.4 What kind of prices should be used; average price (in which periods), marginal price, etc. 
9. Some indicators have been intentionally selected in order to be partially overlapping. For instance, 
the ‘cost attributable to network limitations’ considers both losses and congestion management, 
while losses are specifically addressed in ‘reduced network losses’. We are confident that, by 
processing both the indicators, it is possible to discriminate the cost of congestion management. The 
latter, otherwise, would not be easily extractable from the simulation results, since it is processed 
internally by balancing market clearing algorithm. Do you detect any overlapping or possible 
combinations between these metrics that can be eventually avoided? If so, which one(s) do you 
consider to be the most relevant(s)? Why?  
 
ICT costs 
10. Do you have any experience in the ICT costs monetization? If so, please explain. 
11. Should the DSOs invest in their own ICTs or, on the contrary, should they outsource this service to a 
third party? 
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12. What are the most relevant issues when a DSO changes its ICT solution from one technology to 
another? In what situations will such technology changes occur? (Consider both communications 
and data systems.) 
13. Please estimate the share of ICT costs in energy network/service investments a) currently and b) in 
2030. (Consider both CAPEX and OPEX.) 
14. Any critical aspect to be considered in the ICT costs? 
15. Should the DSOs have redundant systems? Which ones? 
 
Summary 
1. Overview of respondents  
A consultation was organized with the aim to support the decision-making process for the system-wide 
cost-benefit analysis. In particular, the metrics to be considered, their monetization methods and the 
relevant ICT costs were the main attention points for the consultation. 
Respondents could provide answers via the website or by email for a period of 2 months and a half (4 
August 2017-17 October 2017). Three answers were received in total, but all of them were incomplete. 
Therefore, the conclusions in this report may have been extracted from only one or two answers in some 
cases. The answers came from 3 different countries. Figure 8.2 gives an overview of the respondants per 
country.  
 
 
Figure 8.2: Overview participants per country 
The background of the respondents was mostly from the consulting sector (2), being the third respondent 
the R&D centre of a TSO.  
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2. Main feedback from respondents  
The consultation asked specific questions related to the baseline to be considered, the different indicators 
that may be included in the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and the relevant costs of the information and 
communication technology (ICT). A summary of the answers is presented in the sections below. 
1.1 Baseline 
Although not clearly stated by respondents (no one responded directly to the question about the option 
they prefer), the answers to the potential problems in each option showed a preference for considering 
Coordination Scheme A as the baseline for the CBA, rather than the case in which only the resources 
connected at transmission can provide ancillary services. The main reason for this is that the increased 
contribution by distributed energy resources (DER) in the future will result in higher balancing needs and 
in the decommissioning of several traditional power plants. Therefore, the balancing resources at 
transmission level only may not be enough to guarantee the required stability for the system. 
 
However, there is no answer to how to consider, in the system-level CBA, the cost synergies33 between 
coordination schemes if Coordination Scheme A is taken as the baseline. 
1.2 Metrics 
In general, respondents agree with the proposed metrics and monetization methods, except for 
“Reduction of unwanted measures adopted by network operators in order to solve congestions”, which is 
rejected by two respondents. This metric is further discussed below. 
 
When asked about potential overlapping between them, respondents did not know what to answer, 
although one of them identified a likely interdependence of prices for the different indicators. 
 
Although respondents would not propose different monetization methods, they proposed different 
approaches for the analysis in some indicators: 
• In “Enhanced provision of ancillary services”, one respondent states that it would be interesting 
to evaluate the impact of coordination schemes in the provision of reactive power / voltage 
control services or other ancillary services. They also state that it would be important to assess 
the improvements in the liquidity of balancing markets (“higher liquidity means that if a part of 
aggregators cannot participate in balancing markets, the prices will still not vary significantly 
because there is still additional supply from DER at lower prices”). As a final remark, one of the 
                                                                   
33 For instance, let’s assume that the costs of implementing a control system for coordination scheme A is 100 and the costs of 
implementing a control system for coordination scheme B is 130. Since these control systems are not scalable, it is not immediate to 
state that passing from A to B would cost 30 but, in principle, it can be any value between 30 and 130. 
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respondents highlighted the need to explain very well why we are not considering “social 
welfare”, because regulators tend to be in favour of maximizing it. 
• In “Reduction of unwanted measures adopted by network operators in order to solve 
congestions”, one respondent requests to avoid unwanted measures through a market for 
specific grid services. They also propose that, instead of blocking activation signals, network 
operators should provide in advance grid state information to flexibility providers. 
• In “Reduced network losses”, respondents prefer to split the costs of congestion management 
and losses, for greater transparency and for having additional information. In addition, one 
respondent proposes to use long-term prices (at least one month or even one year), because the 
losses can be statistically well forecasted. 
 
Regarding the pricing for the services, there is wide variability among answers and among metrics: 
• For “Enhanced provision of ancillary services”, pay-as-bid is the preferred option, although it is 
also mentioned the interest of performing a comparison between this method and marginal 
pricing. 
• For “Reduced network losses”, two respondents prefer average price and another one marginal 
price. 
• For “Emissions savings”, average price is preferred. 
 
The major discrepancy is for the metric “Reduction of unwanted measures adopted by network operators 
in order to solve congestions”, which is rejected by two respondents. The main reason for this seems to be 
that the consultation document did not clearly explain how the SmartNet market works, because they 
think that these unwanted measures should be avoided by means of a market approach (which is the case 
of SmartNet). Regarding the monetization method, one answer prefers flexibility cost (the cost of the 
resource(s) affected), another one the average imbalance price and the third one the free market, 
although a flexibility cost with a random premium could be used for simulation purposes. 
1.3 ICT costs 
Based on one of the answers, the ICT costs to be included (both in capital and operational expenditures) 
are: 
• SCADA: 
o Main control centre software, licenses, etc. for SCADA, Energy Management System 
(EMS) and Distribution Management System (DMS). 
o Operator Training Simulator (OTS), either in-house or outsourced. 
o Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and local substation hardware. 
o Telecommunication systems between substation RTUs and distribution control centre. 
o Front-end at control centre. 
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• Operational planning applications: 
o Network applications. 
o Market applications - system services. 
o Forecast applications. 
o Regional coordinator (which can be outsourced). 
• Metering cost (if needed): 
o Meters, either at consumers’ or producers’ facilities. 
o Telecommunications (dial up). 
o Database. 
o Applications. 
• Other costs: 
o Building (€/m2). 
o Staff in ICT team for maintaining the database and applications. 
o Staff in ICT team for development of new applications. 
o Uninterrupted Power Supply. 
In general, there is a preference for outsourcing ICT services, especially as the importance of DER grows. 
One critical point is cyber-security and, thus, although ICT may be outsourced, DSOs must be really aware 
of this challenge. 
When changing from one ICT solution to another, the most important issues of concern are the lack of 
interoperability between ageing and new systems, the need to ensure continuity of supply and security 
concerns. However, if ICT service is outsourced, the DSO only needs to care about the service received 
and not about the underlying technology. 
One respondent expects cyber-security and interoperability to be the most critical aspects to be 
considered in ICT cost, another respondent thinks that ICT systems are easier and cheaper to adapt than 
the traditional DSO business (ICT systems are more flexible than power systems) and the third one thinks 
that, due to the difference of characteristics of DSO core business and ICT, it is better to outsource this 
service. However, only one provides an estimate of ICT costs when compared to the overall energy 
network/service investments: 25 % today and 60 % in 2030. 
Regarding redundant systems, the three answers are different. One respondent thinks that “ICTs that 
ensure communication with TSOs and other energy market entities must be uninterruptable to not 
compromise security of supply and ensure adequate quality of service to energy consumers”, another one 
thinks that redundancy is only required for the transition phase if there is a major ICT system change and 
the third one thinks that outsourcing allows the DSO to forget about it (even if the subcontractor will need 
to have redundant systems to ensure the continuity of supply of the ICT service).
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9 Appendix II - ICT costs equations 
The equations for ICT cost estimates in terms of parameters and variables are given below: 
Low estimates:  
 
Low	cost	of	CS	A = marketClearAlgPM × 	highPMCost + marketClearOtherPM	 × 	lowPMCost	
																																								+0.5	nAggregators	
× aggregAlgPM	 × 	highPMCost	 + 	aggregOtherPM × 	lowPMCost 
Low	update	cost	from	CS	A	to	CS	B
= 0.5	nAggregators × locAggregAlgPM × highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM
× lowPMCost + marketClearAlgPM × highPMCost + marketClearOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ localMarketAlgPM × highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ DSOaggregAlgPM × highPMCost + 0.5 × DSOaggregOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ SimulatorStudyCost 
Low	update	cost	from	CS	A	to	CS	C
= 0.5	nAggregators × locAggregAlgPM × highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM
× lowPMCost + marketClearAlgPM × highPMCost + marketClearOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ localMarketAlgPM × highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ SimulatorStudyCost	 
High estimates:  
High	cost	of	CS	A = marketClearAlgPM × 	highPMCost + marketClearOtherPM	 × 	lowPMCost																							
+ nAggregators × aggregAlgPM	 × 	highPMCost	 + 	aggregOtherPM × 	lowPMCost 
High	update	cost	from	CS	A	to	CS	B
= nAggregators × locAggregAlgPM × highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ nLocalMarketPlatforms × marketClearAlgPM × highPMCost + marketClearOtherPM
× lowPMCost + localMarketAlgPM × highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ DSOaggregAlgPM × highPMCost + DSOaggregOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ SimulatorStudyCost 
High	update	cost	from	CS	A	to	CS	C
= nAggregators × locAggregAlgPM × highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM × lowPMCost
+ nLocalMarketPlatforms × marketClearAlgPM × highPMCost + marketClearOtherPM
× lowPMCost + localMarketAlgPM × highPMCost + SimulatorStudyCost	 
 
Cost estimates of CS D:  
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DTSODSODependentCost znDSO, nodesForDSO, nodesForTSO,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost~
= NISunit + nDSOnodesForDSO + nodesForTSO × 	NISperNode + interfaceCost	
× nDSO + 1	 
D	MarketClearItaly
= DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM × highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM
× lowPMCost + marketClearRealTime	 × highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSOItaly, nodesForDSO, nodesTSOItaly,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~ 
DMarketClearSpain				
= DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM	 × highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM	
× lowPMCostmarketClearRealTime	 × highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSOSpain, nodesForDSO, nodesTSOSpain,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~ 
DMarketClearDenmark			
= DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM	 × highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM	
× lowPMCost + marketClearRealTime	 × highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSODenmark, nodesForDSO, nodesTSODenmark,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~ 
DItalyLow	
= 0.5	nAggregators	 × locAggregAlgPM	 × 	highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM	 × 	lowPMCost
+ DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM × 	highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM	
× 	lowPMCost + marketClearRealTime	 × 	highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSOItaly, nodesForDSO, nodesTSOItaly,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~
+ SimulatorStudyCost 
DSpainLow	
= 0.5	nAggregators	 × locAggregAlgPM	 × 	highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM	 × 	lowPMCost
+ DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM × 	highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM	
× 	lowPMCost + marketClearRealTime	 × 	highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSOSpain, nodesForDSO, nodesTSOSpain,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~
+ SimulatorStudyCost 
DDenmarkLow	
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= 0.5	nAggregators	 × locAggregAlgPM	 × 	highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM	 × 	lowPMCost
+ DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM × 	highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM	
× 	lowPMCost + marketClearRealTime	 × 	highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSODenmark, nodesForDSO, nodesTSODenmark,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~
+ SimulatorStudyCost 
 
DItalyHigh	
= nAggregators	 × locAggregAlgPM	 × 	highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM	 × 	lowPMCost
+ DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM × 	highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM	
× 	lowPMCost + marketClearRealTime	 × 	highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSOItaly, nodesForDSO, nodesTSOItaly,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~
+ SimulatorStudyCost 
DSpainHigh	
= nAggregators	 × locAggregAlgPM	 × 	highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM	 × 	lowPMCost
+ DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM × 	highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM	
× 	lowPMCost + marketClearRealTime	 × 	highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSOSpain, nodesForDSO, nodesTSOSpain,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~
+ SimulatorStudyCost 
DDenmarkHigh	
= nAggregators	 × locAggregAlgPM	 × 	highPMCost + locAggregOtherPM	 × 	lowPMCost
+ DcriticalityCost + localMarketAlgPM × 	highPMCost + localMarketOtherPM	
× 	lowPMCost + marketClearRealTime	 × 	highPMCost
+ DTSODSODependentCost znDSODenmark, nodesForDSO, nodesTSODenmark,NISunit, NISperNode, interfaceCost ~
+ SimulatorStudyCost 
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10 Appendix III – Potential of smart meters to support the 
provision of distributed ancillary services 
10.1 Introduction 
SmartNet ICT cost analysis (section 0) gathered information from various smart metering system 
requirement specifications and CBA reports, in order to assess the cost of communications to households 
with DER capability. The SmartNet ICT cost estimates do not include any last kilometre costs, because 
they are nearly independent on the coordination scheme and also highly uncertain as shown below. In the 
worst case they can be even higher than the other ICT costs and thus a possible significant cost barrier for 
the provision of AS using very small DERs. The information on last kilometre costs was also an important 
input   for assessing the feasibility of the working assumptions of the ICT cost estimation 
According to the cost analysis, a last kilometre communication system with small DERs dedicated to 
ancillary services only tends to become too expensive compared to the benefit of the ancillary services. 
There are low-latency, one-way multicasting technologies and services which can be used for demand 
respond in some areas. Some of them are based on radio broadcasts and some use power lines as the 
communication channel and they are briefly discussed in this document in a separate section on the topic. 
These technologies have adequate performance for the ancillary services considered but they are not 
readily ubiquitously available. They also need a receiver and thus an expensive site visit if separately 
implemented. Thus, there is a need to study the possibility to use those communication infrastructures 
that will be available for some other reasons. The SmartNet project focuses on FRR type ancillary 
services. These require high availability and low latency multicasting of control commands to the energy 
resources that provide the flexibility.  (These are functional performance requirements and do not define 
in any way how and on which communication stack layer the required low latency multicasting 
performance is to be implemented.) The aggregator may find synergies with other building, energy and 
DG management, and security applications that need low latency and high availability remote 
controllability. That may enable sharing the investment.  
In addition, smart meters have potential to provide a cost-efficient solution, because nearly every 
relevant customer connection in Europe is going to be equipped with them. EU Directive 2009/72/EC 
[50] is the EU legislative on the Third Internal Market Package which stipulates all EU member states 
equip 80% of their consumers with smart meters by 2020 to assist the active participation of consumers 
in the electricity and gas supply markets. Some other EU documents such as the EC Recommendation no. 
148/2012 [51] also promote smart metering. A review of the rollout situation in 2015 or 2016 is in [52],  
but both [52] and a recent demand response-oriented report [53] ignore that the transmission of time 
critical control signals is important in DR in general and especially when using them for ancillary services. 
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Thus, they do not help in assessing to what extent the smart metering systems communication 
capabilities support and will support distributed ancillary services.   
If the communication for ancillary services is integrated in the smart metering systems, additional 
installation costs can be avoided, and the communication capability stays over the lifetime of the 
metering system. The costs of site visits are biggest individual cost item so avoiding them enables cheaper 
service. For the smart metering cost benefit case, it is very important to include real-time communication 
from the meter to the customers’ systems via a standardized interface that is, in modern requirements 
and implementations, a one-way interface to some standard communication bus. Thus, every reasonable 
smart meter and related functional requirement set nowadays includes the interface readily and there is 
no need to add it for the provision of ancillary services.  
This annex analyses 1) the possibility to include multicasting fast control commands in the smart 
metering system requirements and 2) the suitability of the future smart meters in metering for 
verification and settlement of the DERs responses for the SmartNet ancillary services. 
As described in next sections, 1) Fast control command communication capabilities to support 
distributed ancillary services are not included in most of the next generation smart metering functional 
requirements existing or under development in Europe and thus they will not be implemented in the 
smart metering systems, although many rather cost efficient possible technical solutions exist and 2) The 
suitability of the future smart meters in metering for verification and settlement of the DER responses for 
the SmartNet ancillary services was found to be easily made adequate, especially, if included in the 
metering requirements.  
10.2 Control signal broadcasting technologies 
Many technologies can be used for broadcasting control signals from the DSO or TSO to DERs. All these 
technologies have reasonably adequate performance for multicasting control signals to DERs in ancillary 
service provision. Implementation details may set some performance limitations. Many (but not all) of the 
technologies are able to communicate directly from the central location to a receiver integrated in the 
DER, but the receivers have typically been integrated to certain types of smart meters that distribute the 
control signals via local, real-time communication to DER.  
The main limitation of these technologies is that another complementing communication network is 
needed for two-way communication and for transferring large amounts of data. Three main technologies 
are used for this purpose: 
1. Radio broadcasting for multicasting and broadcasting control signals: The use of control systems 
based on radio broadcasting is quite common. In several countries in central Europe radio ripple 
control systems [54] are in use. In the UK, the BBC Radio 4 Longwave Radio tele switch [55] is used, 
although stopping the service is planned by 2020, because it is assumed that smart meters can 
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replace the functionality. However, in the smart meter requirements of UK there are no requirements 
regarding the latencies of control signals so the still existing capability to broadcast control signals 
for ancillary services will most likely disappear.  
2. Power line communication for multicasting and broadcasting control signals: Various narrow band 
power line communication technologies have been used for the purpose. Brief descriptions and 
references to more detailed information can be found in an overview of different power line 
communication technologies [56]. In addition, also more power line communication technologies are 
being developed and piloted for DR signal broadcasting. Even multicasting from the central TSO 
location directly to controllable household appliances has been piloted. The most common 
power-line-based control signal communication technology is the power line ripple control, which 
has been used and is still in use in many countries around the world (the first versions were 
developed during the Second World War). 
3. New technologies for control signal communications: The above examples are mainly such existing 
systems for fast load control signal communications that are already being phased out or replaced by 
other technologies. Current and future communications technologies that are applicable for Smart 
Grid needs are described in SmartNet Deliverable D3.2 [57], more specifically, in chapter 7 on 
enabling technologies. The requirements for control signal communications are defined in terms of 
criticality, latency, availability, resilience, power autonomy, typical data volume, minimum bandwidth 
and cost. Depending on their implementation, future technologies, such as 5G, are anticipated to meet 
these requirements even better than the earlier mentioned multicasting and broadcasting. They can 
also enable new services and functionalities that benefit ancillary services and Smart Grids.    
10.3 Reviews of European functional requirements of smart metering  
A rough comparison of planned functional requirements can be found in the report [40].  When 
looking it for comparable reference systems in the cost analysis, it was observed that only in some 
countries, namely the Netherlands, UK and Germany, the smart metering system requirements include 
capability to send load control commands. In NL and UK, they do not set any performance requirements 
but only define technical implementations (see [58] and [59], for example). Thus, it is not easy to see how 
close the performance will be to the level needed by the markets defined within SmartNet.  The 
specification of the Netherlands is such that, together with a suitable configuration, it may nearly or even 
adequately meet the time-critical communication needs of SmartNet. The cost of using GPRS may also 
become relatively high when the technology is widely substituted by newer technologies.  Further 
analysis is needed before clear conclusions can be reached.  
The cost-benefit analysis [40] (in pp. 33 -34) states that controlling low-voltage devices, such as heat 
pumps, electrical vehicles and other controlled energy applications, provides no additional benefit, as the 
net present value decreases slightly. The main reason is that the increase in telecommunication cost 
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cannot be compensated by the additional benefit. However, the report recommends including them in the 
mandatory smart metering installations, because it considers the controllability of such devices 
important for the future decentralized energy supply systems. For the minimum requirements of the 
telecommunication infrastructure, it mentions in particular that control signals must be sent and received 
at least every 15 minutes. 
In most of the countries in EU, the smart metering systems are not at all adequate for SmartNet 
control signal communication needs. This can also be seen from a review of the smart metering 
requirements in 8 countries comprising Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Italy and Estonia. The review was included in a recent study of the requirements of next 
generation smart metering systems for Finland reported in Finnish by Pöyry Consulting [60], that almost 
completely lacks transparency regarding the references and other sources of information. It does not 
recommend any load control capabilities. This is surprising, because in a small cost-benefit analysis, it 
finds (in spite of overly high-cost estimates of local control interface) that the inclusion of load control 
functionalities in the smart meter requirements is profitable. It also found that the alternative home-
automation-based approaches that have adequate performance still in most small houses tend to be too 
expensive compared to the benefits, if the smart metering systems include the load control interfaces. 
Thus, there seems to be an unexplainable conflict of interest that, in some countries, may prevent the 
inclusion of the needed control interfaces in the requirements for smart meters. 
The Dutch Smart Meter Requirements [58] defines adequate and standardized interfaces for external 
service providers for sending control commands to appliances in the customers’ premises. In the Dutch 
metering network, GPRS is used. The GPRS Companion Standard to Dutch Smart Meter Requirements [59] 
defines the requirements for the GPRS communication for the Dutch smart meters. In this case, the data 
connection has priority, which is good for activating ancillary services, on the contrary to normal GPRS 
networks, where speech has priority over a data connection and, hence, are not acceptable when 
activating ancillary services.  It is notable that functional performance requirements are not defined.  
A recent dissertation [39] includes a good review and summary of the situation regarding smart 
metering requirements and rollout plans around the world. It compares the functional requirements and 
guidelines for smart metering systems presented by different national and international authorities, such 
as EC, ERGEG, SMCG and the Swedish Ei. The review covers almost the whole world, with the notable 
omissions of the situation, requirements and plans in New Zealand and Australia (Australia is in some 
respects clearly ahead Europe). The dissertation finds that, for example, most requirement include the 
possibility to switch remotely the power supply on and off and to limit power remotely and that the 
requirement to support demand response commands is included in 12 EU states (including also Sweden) 
and ERGEG.  Another interesting observation here is that the dissertation studies by simulations how the 
data communication and other latencies of control activation can be reduced in order to meet the TSO 
requirement of 15-minute activation time. The simulation is based on a smart metering system in 
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Gothenburg that has a ZigBee-based last kilometre communication system.  The result is that switching 
the power supply off in all the meters can be done in 6 minutes by adding more meter data collection 
units (MDCUs) so that each MDCU has 50 meters at maximum. That was considered adequate for the 
purpose and allowing enough time for planning the switching. Nowadays, each MDCU has 144 meters at 
maximum and the simulated time to switch off all the meters is 20 minutes, being 14 minutes the time to 
switch off 90% of the meters. 
Also, in many other existing smart metering technologies and systems the control communication 
performance can be improved by adding more MDCUs.  The cost of improving the performance is rather 
similar to the Gothenburg case simulated in [39] and even after the improvements, the activation times 
may be somewhat too long for fast ancillary services.  New communication technologies have potential to 
provide better control communication performance with smaller costs. 
10.4 Costs of smart metering  
The smart metering cost benefit analysis study [40] provides useful information on the components of 
the smart metering system costs. In addition, the project SmartNet received anonymized information on 
the smart metering costs in Norway and the regulatory information on costs is available from Finland. It 
is good to notice that typically it is taken into account by subtracting that the old meters need to be 
changed or taken to calibration anyhow. Unfortunately, cost data from Denmark, Italy or Spain was not 
available.  
SmartNet ICT cost analysis received from Norway anonymized data on DSOs’ Smart Meter deployment 
costs on 2016. These 111 DSOs represent over 2.9 million metering locations, out of which about 2.3 
million locations are households, 0.322 million summerhouses or equivalents, and 0.3 million industry 
locations (site annual consumption over 100 MWh). 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the variation of the reported total costs per Advanced Metering System (AMS) 
and the share of communications and other costs. The category “other costs” contains mainly the costs of 
IT-systems needed for processing smart metering data.   
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Figure 10.1: Histogram model for total costs and the share of ICT costs.  
As an initial approximation, the share of communication and other costs is estimated to be around 
30% (mean value of the share is 32.7%, but “other” category contains also non-IT-system costs).  This can 
be split between communications and “other”, with proportions 14% and 16%, by studying the mean 
values of communication costs and “other” costs, after removing 5% of the lowest and highest values. 
Therefore, by using the weighted total cost average EUR 385 per metering location, the share of 
telecommunications would be EUR 54 and the share of data collection system would be EUR 62. Typically, 
the lifetime of a smart metering investment is 10-15 years. 
In the cost benefit analysis study [40], cost averages per metering point are given for 12 countries, 
which are given in Euros in Table 10.1. 
GB NL RO BE-BR BE-FL BE-WL CZ DE HU LT PT SK 
281.65 240.28 97.73 527.92 569.30 685.82 436.46 492.12 242.42 163.27 116.51 171.15 
Table 10.1: Cost average per metering point in different countries 
Some explanations can be found by studying the analyses and the requirements closer.  In Germany, 
the costs are higher due to different requirements for the implementation details of the ICT and cyber-
security architecture requirements. It would be much more cost efficient to specify functional 
requirements; not how to implement them. In Belgium and in the Czech Republic, the costs are high 
because the costs of the meters have been estimated to be very high when compared to the requirements. 
Both the age of the studies and the estimated high installation costs may be the mains reason for this. The 
report states that experience from the large-scale rollouts from Italy and Spain shows costs per meter 
that are closer to the ones in Portugal than the ones in Belgium.  In Finland, the Energy Market Authority 
allows EUR 200 per meter for the lifetime 10-20 years in its regulation model.  That is rather close to the 
actual costs in Finland in large-scale rollouts. 
In the Netherlands and in Great Britain, electricity-metering systems are required to support gas 
metering, which may slightly increase the costs. Since the analysis, the required functionalities have 
become more common and the costs lower.  Now smart 3x64A meters meeting the functional 
requirements of most of the countries in the cost benefit reports are commonly available for EUR 70 
when bought individually and they are much cheaper when bought in very large quantities.  Thus, the 
costs of the meters and their interfaces and internal processing are less than 25 % of the total cost of an 
installed smart metering system. Data communication solutions are not expensive either, but that is 
because low-priority and long-latency communication is used.  Thus, it does not tell anything about the 
costs of communication needed for the control signals of ancillary services. 
There are many possible reasons that can explain why the costs in Norway are higher than in Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Finland: the national differences in work costs, difficult 
geographical conditions that increase the communication system costs, difficult access to install the 
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meters, not using the alternative costs of not making the investment as a reference, increase of the costs 
due to approaching regulatory deadlines, etc.  
In Finland, the regulating authority has defined in the regulation model the upper cost for smart 
metering systems per metering point that can be included in the distribution tariffs of the customers. 
Such upper limit tends to act as a target cost for DSOs, but real costs are higher in many cases. For 
example, many rural DSOs see support to low-voltage distribution automation so profitable that they are 
willing to make the small additional investment to a system that better supports that functionality. Poor 
timing or implementation of the investment also increases the costs. 
From the smart metering cost analyses, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding the costs of 
distribution of ancillary services: 
1) The metering system functional requirements have much smaller impact on the costs than the 
installation costs of the meters. 2) The smart metering systems will not support distributed AS unless the 
functional requirements for smart meters are amended accordingly. 3) Existing smart metering system 
communication requirements are not comparable to the communication requirements of ancillary 
services and thus the smart metering system cost analyses do not provide much information about 
estimating the communication costs of distributed ancillary services. 4) For our purposes, the best 
individual overview is in [39] but also the other sources help to get a more complete picture.  
10.5 Adequacy of the smart metering requirements from the ancillary service 
point of view  
From ancillary service point of view, it would be necessary to have roughly such requirements as 
maximum latencies shall not exceed 1 minute and minimum aggregated availability shall be at least 
99.9% of the time in a year for 90% of the controlled sites.  When controlling small flexible resources, it is 
not important to reach nearly every site nearly always. More important is to focus the requirements to 
the availability and latency of the aggregated responses. It is also important that the messages include 
activation times, because too much delayed commands must never be allowed to cause any responses. 
If the smart metering systems were required to have low latency, high availability multicast of small 
group control signals that would likely cause only rather modest cost increases compared to the potential 
benefits. Several technologies are suitable for the purpose, and there is a long experience on some of 
them. For example, in Finland before 1997 power line ripple control systems were controlling the loads in 
very many electricity utilities and they were able to transmit simultaneously sent control signals within 3 
seconds to all meters. For typical ancillary services, even 10-30 second latencies could be sufficiently 
short. These power line-based communication systems controlled large amounts of houses that had more 
or less storage heating. In central Europe, there is a radio ripple control system with similar capabilities 
in use, but due to the costs, it is not applied to small customers. These are just examples. The 
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communication technologies have advanced much during the last 20 years, so it can be expected that the 
costs of large-scale implementation with the new technologies could be less expensive than then. For 
example, the 5G network technologies seem to support the needed functionalities and are being studied 
in control and protection applications that also require efficient multicasts and with even much smaller 
latencies. Increasingly the DSOs start to need the possibilities to remotely control first the type B DER and 
with time also smaller ones. Thus, the DSOs gradually start to need such a communication system. 
Therefore, it is recommended that the smart metering system requirements will be analysed and 
reconsidered regarding the low latency group control capabilities as well as the capabilities of the 
potential communication technologies in the future. It would be a surprise, if the result of the analysis 
turns out that technical development was not proceeding in this respect. 
10.6 Conclusions 
The following conclusions can be drawn regarding the communication costs of distribution ancillary 
services. 
1. The functional requirements of the metering system have a much smaller impact on the costs than 
the installation costs of the meters. 
2. The smart metering systems will not adequately support distributed AS, unless the functional 
requirements for smart meters are amended accordingly. The most important missing capability is to 
adequately and quickly activate AS which are provided by many small flexible DERs. Also, the 
capabilities to support verification of the responses must be upgraded. In some vertically integrated 
utilities outside Europe, smart metering systems already support distributed AS. 
3. The smart metering systems have many properties that are needed by distributed AS. These include 
measurements for billing, verification and, to some extent, voltage quality, reasonable existing cyber-
security requirements, adequate independence from such third parties that may suddenly stop their 
service, etc. 
4. Existing communication requirements for smart metering systems, especially in Europe, are typically 
not comparable to the communication requirements for the ancillary services provision and, thus, the 
analysis of costs for smart metering systems does not provide much information about the expected 
communication costs of distributed ancillary services. Some useful general observations regarding 
highly distributed systems can be made. For small, distributed end devices, the installation and 
integration costs tend to dominate, as functionality in mass-produced end devices is inexpensive. 
With relatively modest additional costs, the communication networks can be made to support fast 
control actions. Implementing own communication infrastructures for functionalities tends to be 
relatively expensive compared to implementing a generic common infrastructure for all the 
functionalities needed. In the distributed systems, integrating many functionalities is often cost-
efficient, when compared to doing the same with separate dedicated systems and devices.  Dedicated 
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last-kilometre ICT infrastructure can be too expensive for the provision of AS from small flexible 
DERs. 
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11 Appendix IV – Business-level analysis formulation 
11.1 Relationships between actors 
Next tables (Table 11.1, Table 11.3, Table 11.5 and Table 11.7) present the actors who are relevant for 
the different coordination schemes and the relationships between them. These relationships are easily 
drawn from the e3value models, that is, the value model of each coordination scheme (Figure 5.2, Figure 
5.4, Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.8). Due to format restrictions, the relationships (what is exchanged between 
two actors) are indicated with a number. Therefore, following those tables, an extra table has been 
included to explain the meaning of each number (Table 11.2, Table 11.4, Table 11.6 and Table 11.8). The 
concepts explained in these tables are the same as those ones represented graphically in the value 
models.  
For clarity purposes, in the tables corresponding to coordination schemes B, C, and D, new financial 
exchanges, in comparison with coordination scheme A, are highlighted in green. Likewise, in the 
explanatory tables of the exchanges, a shaded cell means that the exchange is the same as an exchange 
already performed in CS A. 
The cash-flows for the different actors are obtained by adding all the terms in their respective 
column and subtracting all the terms in their respective row. As an example, equation (11) shows the 
cash flow for the actor Non-direct DER producers (the superscript of the addends indicates who performs 
the payment):   
66W'>	?'HℎQ>G"	C	/$.		.C/*.
= 'N<76	QG	7>7?9?9N.-C. + 'N<76	QG	Q>79=9>9N.-C.
− 9L	'??7HHC	/$.		.C/*. − XNH7<	'??7HHC	/$.		.C/*.
−R'A7	'??7HHC	/$.		.C/*.  
(11) 
Each relationship detailed in these table results in a formula which is described in sections 11.2 and 
11.3. 
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DSO                       12 13 
TSO             11         14   
Table 11.1: Exchanges performed in CS A 
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No. What Who To whom 
1 
Retail 
electricity 
Non-direct passive consumers Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Non-direct active consumers Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
2 
Power 
connection 
Non-direct passive consumers Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Non-direct active consumers Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
3 
Wholesale 
market 
access 
Direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Distribution Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Transmission Wholesale market operator 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Wholesale market operator 
Central producers Wholesale market operator 
Direct DER producers Wholesale market operator 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Wholesale market operator 
4 
Wholesale 
electricity 
Direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Distribution Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Transmission Wholesale market operator 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Wholesale market operator 
Wholesale market operator Central producers 
Wholesale market operator Direct DER producers 
Wholesale market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
5 
System 
access 
Direct passive consumers TSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution TSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission TSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers TSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers TSO 
Central producers TSO 
Direct DER producers TSO 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers TSO 
6 
Grid Access 
Power term 
Direct passive consumers DSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission DSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
7 
Grid Access 
Energy term 
Direct passive consumers DSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission DSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
Central producers DSO 
Direct DER producers DSO 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers DSO 
8 Imbalances 
Direct passive consumers BRP: Direct passive consumers 
Direct active consumers-Distribution BRP: Direct active consumers-Distribution 
Direct active consumers-Transmission BRP: Direct active consumers-Transmission 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers BRP: Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
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No. What Who To whom 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers BRP: Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Central producers BRP: Central producers 
Direct DER producers BRP: Direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers BRP: Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
BRP: Direct passive consumers TSO 
BRP: Retailers of non-direct passive consumers TSO 
BRP: Direct active consumers-Distribution TSO 
BRP: Direct active consumers-Transmission TSO 
BRP: Aggregators of non-direct active consumers TSO 
BRP: Central producers TSO 
BRP: Direct DER producers TSO 
BRP: Aggregators of non-direct DER producers TSO 
9 Flexibility 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Non-direct active consumers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
10 
Payment for 
electricity 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
11 
Ancillary 
services 
for TSO34 
Balancing market operator Direct active consumers-Distribution 
Balancing market operator Direct active consumers-Transmission 
Balancing market operator Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Balancing market operator Central producers 
Balancing market operator Direct DER producers 
Balancing market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
TSO Balancing market operator 
12 
HV grid 
access 
DSO TSO 
13 Obligations DSO Rest of the system 
14 
System 
access_ 
DSO part 
TSO DSO 
Table 11.2: Information on exchanges performed in CS A 
  
                                                                   
34 The term ancillary services includes the balancing and the real-time congestion management. 
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Table 11.3: Exchanges performed in CS B 
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15 15 15 15 
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BRP: Direct passive consumers                        8  
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DSO             15           12 13 
TSO              11         14   
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No. What Who To whom 
1 
Retail 
electricity 
Non-direct passive consumers Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Non-direct active consumers Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
2 
Power 
connection 
Non-direct passive consumers Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Non-direct active consumers Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
3 
Wholesale 
market 
access 
Direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Distribution Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Transmission Wholesale market operator 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Wholesale market operator 
Central producers Wholesale market operator 
Direct DER producers Wholesale market operator 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Wholesale market operator 
4 
Wholesale 
electricity 
Direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Distribution Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Transmission Wholesale market operator 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Wholesale market operator 
Wholesale market operator Central producers 
Wholesale market operator Direct DER producers 
Wholesale market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
5 
System 
access 
Direct passive consumers TSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution TSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission TSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers TSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers TSO 
Central producers TSO 
Direct DER producers TSO 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers TSO 
6 
Grid Access 
Power term 
Direct passive consumers DSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission DSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
7 
Grid Access 
Energy term 
Direct passive consumers DSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission DSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
Central producers DSO 
Direct DER producers DSO 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers DSO 
8 Imbalances 
Direct passive consumers BRP: Direct passive consumers 
Direct active consumers-Distribution BRP: Direct active consumers-Distribution 
Direct active consumers-Transmission BRP: Direct active consumers-Transmission 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers BRP: Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
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No. What Who To whom 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers BRP: Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Central producers BRP: Central producers 
Direct DER producers BRP: Direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers BRP: Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
BRP: Direct passive consumers TSO 
BRP: Retailers of non-direct passive consumers TSO 
BRP: Direct active consumers-Distribution TSO 
BRP: Direct active consumers-Transmission TSO 
BRP: Aggregators of non-direct active consumers TSO 
BRP: Central producers TSO 
BRP: Direct DER producers TSO 
BRP: Aggregators of non-direct DER producers TSO 
9 Flexibility 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Non-direct active consumers 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Non-direct active consumers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
10 
Payment for 
electricity 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
11 
Ancillary 
services 
for TSO35 
TSO Balancing market operator 
Local market operator Direct active consumers-Distribution 
Local market operator Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Local market operator Direct DER producers 
Local market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Balancing market operator Central producers 
Balancing market operator Direct active consumers-Transmission 
Balancing market operator Local market operator 
12 
HV grid 
access 
DSO TSO 
13 Obligations DSO Rest of the system 
14 
System 
access_ 
DSO part 
TSO DSO 
15 
Congestion 
management 
for DSO 
DSO Local market operator 
Local market operator Direct active consumers-Distribution 
Local market operator Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Local market operator Direct DER producers 
Local market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Table 11.4: Information on exchanges performed in CS B  
 
  
                                                                   
35 The term ancillary services includes the balancing and the real-time congestion management. 
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Table 11.5: Exchanges performed in CS C  
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No. What Who To whom 
1 
Retail 
electricity 
Non-direct passive consumers Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Non-direct active consumers Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
2 
Power 
connection 
Non-direct passive consumers Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Non-direct active consumers Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
3 
Wholesale 
market 
access 
Direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Distribution Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Transmission Wholesale market operator 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Wholesale market operator 
Central producers Wholesale market operator 
Direct DER producers Wholesale market operator 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Wholesale market operator 
4 
Wholesale 
electricity 
Direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Distribution Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Transmission Wholesale market operator 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Wholesale market operator 
Wholesale market operator Central producers 
Wholesale market operator Direct DER producers 
Wholesale market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
5 
System 
access 
Direct passive consumers TSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution TSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission TSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers TSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers TSO 
Central producers TSO 
Direct DER producers TSO 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers TSO 
6 
Grid Access 
Power term 
Direct passive consumers DSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission DSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
7 
Grid Access 
Energy term 
Direct passive consumers DSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission DSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
Central producers DSO 
Direct DER producers DSO 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers DSO 
9 Flexibility 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Non-direct active consumers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
10 
Payment for 
electricity 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
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No. What Who To whom 
11 
Ancillary 
services 
for TSO36 
Balancing market operator Central producers 
Balancing market operator Direct active consumers-Transmission 
TSO Balancing market operator 
12 
HV grid 
access 
DSO TSO 
13 Obligations DSO Rest of the system 
14 
System 
access_ 
DSO part 
TSO DSO 
16 
Transmission 
imbalances 
Direct passive consumers BRP: Direct passive consumers 
Direct active consumers-Transmission BRP: Direct active consumers-Transmission 
Central producers BRP: Central producers 
BRP: Direct passive consumers TSO 
BRP: Direct active consumers-Transmission TSO 
BRP: Central producers TSO 
17 
Distribution 
imbalances 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers BRP: Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers BRP: Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers BRP: Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Direct DER producers BRP: Direct DER producers 
Direct active consumers-Distribution BRP: Direct active consumers-Distribution 
BRP: Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
BRP: Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
BRP: Aggregators of non-direct DER producers DSO 
BRP: Direct DER producers DSO 
BRP: Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
18 
Ancillary 
services 
for DSO37 
DSO Local market operator 
Local market operator Direct active consumers 
Local market operator Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Local market operator Direct DER producers 
Local market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Table 11.6: Information on exchanges performed in CS C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                   
36 The term ancillary services for TSO includes the balancing for TSO and the real-time congestion management. 
37 The term ancillary services for DSO includes the balancing for DSO and the congestion management for DSO. 
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Table 11.7: Exchanges performed in CS D 
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No. What Who To whom 
1 
Retail 
electricity 
Non-direct passive consumers Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Non-direct active consumers Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
2 
Power 
connection 
Non-direct passive consumers Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
Non-direct active consumers Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
3 
Wholesale 
market 
access 
Direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Distribution Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Transmission Wholesale market operator 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Wholesale market operator 
Central producers Wholesale market operator 
Direct DER producers Wholesale market operator 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Wholesale market operator 
4 
Wholesale 
electricity 
Direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Distribution Wholesale market operator 
Direct active consumers-Transmission Wholesale market operator 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers Wholesale market operator 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Wholesale market operator 
Wholesale market operator Central producers 
Wholesale market operator Direct DER producers 
Wholesale market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
5 
System 
access 
Direct passive consumers TSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution TSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission TSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers TSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers TSO 
Central producers TSO 
Direct DER producers TSO 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers TSO 
6 
Grid Access 
Power term 
Direct passive consumers DSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission DSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
7 
Grid Access 
Energy term 
Direct passive consumers DSO 
Direct active consumers-Distribution DSO 
Direct active consumers-Transmission DSO 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers DSO 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers DSO 
Central producers DSO 
Direct DER producers DSO 
Non-direct DER producers Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers DSO 
8 Imbalances 
Direct passive consumers BRP: Direct passive consumers 
Direct active consumers-Distribution BRP: Direct active consumers-Distribution 
Direct active consumers-Transmission BRP: Direct active consumers-Transmission 
Retailers of non-direct passive consumers BRP: Retailers of non-direct passive consumers 
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No. What Who To whom 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers BRP: Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Central producers BRP: Central producers 
Direct DER producers BRP: Direct DER producers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers BRP: Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
BRP: Direct passive consumers TSO 
BRP: Retailers of non-direct passive consumers TSO 
BRP: Direct active consumers-Distribution TSO 
BRP: Direct active consumers-Transmission TSO 
BRP: Aggregators of non-direct active consumers TSO 
BRP: Central producers TSO 
BRP: Direct DER producers TSO 
BRP: Aggregators of non-direct DER producers TSO 
9 Flexibility 
Aggregators of non-direct active consumers Non-direct active consumers 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
10 
Payment for 
electricity 
Aggregators of non-direct DER producers Non-direct DER producers 
11 
Ancillary 
services 
for TSO38 
TSO Common balancing market operator 
12 
HV grid 
access 
DSO TSO 
13 Obligations DSO Rest of the system 
14 
System 
access_ 
DSO part 
TSO DSO 
15 
Congestion 
management 
for DSO 
DSO Common balancing market operator 
19 
Ancillary 
services for 
TSO & DSO39 
Common balancing market operator Direct active consumers-Distribution 
Common balancing market operator Direct active consumers-Transmission 
Common balancing market operator Aggregators of non-direct active consumers 
Common balancing market operator Central producers 
Common balancing market operator Direct DER producers 
Common balancing market operator Aggregators of non-direct DER producers 
Table 11.8: Information on exchanges performed in CS D 
 
 
 
  
                                                                   
38 The term ancillary services for TSO includes the balancing for TSO and the real-time congestion management. 
39 The term ancillary services for TSO & DSO includes the real-time congestion management and balancing for TSO and the 
congestion management for DSO. 
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11.2 General formulas 
Next sub-sections show the formulas to be used in the business-level analysis. As described in the 
introduction to section 5.3, it was considered that the likely situation in 2030 will be similar in the three 
countries under analysis (Italy, Denmark40 and Spain). Therefore, although the current regulatory 
conditions in Spain were taken as a basis for this section, they are assumed to be applicable to the other 
two countries as well. In case future conditions are not in line with the formulas described here, enough 
details are provided so that the reader can adapt the formulas to the specific conditions he/she wants to 
describe. 
As it was previously mentioned, the formulation developed in this step aims to provide an appropriate 
tool to calculate the numeric results when all the data are available as detailed as required by these 
formulas.  
The formulas included in this section are applicable in all coordination schemes. Specific issues 
regarding each coordination scheme are detailed in section 11.3.  
Since several subscripts are used, Table 11.9 summarizes all of them. 
Letter Description 
a=1, . . . A Number of active consumers 
b=1, . . . B Number of actors buying in the wholesale market 
d=1, . . . D Number of Non-direct DER Producers having a contract with the same aggregator 
i=1, . . . n Number of periods of a ToU tariff  
j=1, . . . J Number of actors selling in the wholesale market 
m Month 
p=1, . . . P Number of flexibility services providers in the balancing market/local market 
q=1, . . . Q Number of parties creating imbalances in the system 
r=1, . . . R Number of Non-direct DER Producers 
t=1, . . . T Number of periods in a whole year 
y Annual value 
Table 11.9: Subscript meaning 
                                                                   
40 The only significant difference detected is the payment for market access, based on a fixed subscription rate in Denmark. 
  
Copyright 2016 SmartNet      Page 173  
 
11.2.1 Retail electricity 
The income that a retailer obtains for the electricity sale depends on two concepts: 
- Power connection41: Each consumer pays a fixed tariff per kW and year. Considering the general 
case of a n-period ToU tariff, the contracted power and the power term price per period that can 
be different, the payment for the contracted power on an annual basis (subscript y) is calculated 
as: 
	G"7	?G667?9G6€ =G6'?7L	G"7$ 	A  ∗ 79GL	'9QQ$ 	€/A 

$
 (12) 
- Electricity: The retail price of that electricity (which can be different in different hours of the day) 
and the energy demanded by the customers will determine the earnings for the retailer.    
)7'9>	7>7?9?9N 	€ 	= (96'>	7>7?9?9N	L7<'6L


A ℎ ∗ )7'9>	9?7 	€/A ℎ (13) 
In this case, consumers pay for both concepts to their retailers and the active consumers acquire the 
electricity through an aggregator. The tariffs to be applied will depend on the specific arrangements 
agreed between the parties. 
11.2.2 Wholesale electricity 
Regarding the electricity acquisition, it is assumed that electricity is bought by the retailers, 
aggregators, direct passive consumers and direct active consumers through the day-ahead market. The 
payment received by the wholesale market operator for the electricity is transferred to the central 
producers, direct DER producers and aggregators of non-direct DER producers depending on the energy 
traded and the price agreed as a result of the day-ahead market clearing. Therefore, the total cost for the 
buyers of the wholesale electricity depends on the day-ahead market price and on the energy traded 
(based on the expected demand). So, the annual payment from each actor b buying in the wholesale 
market is: 
'N<76	QG	"ℎG>7H'>7	7>7?9?9N,U	€
=P>7?9?9N	'L7L,U	R ℎ ∗


'N	'ℎ7'L	<'A7	F9?7 	€/R ℎ (14) 
                                                                   
41 The contracted power term is a money flow because somebody is willing to pay for this power connection and there is a 
recurrent payment linked to it. 
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As indicated above, this payment received by the wholesale market operator will be transferred to the 
electricity sellers depending on the energy traded in the market by each of them, in such a way that the 
payment from the wholesale market operator to each actor j selling in the wholesales market is: 
'N<76	QG	"ℎG>7H'>7	7>7?9?9N,% 	€
= 	P>7?9?9N	'L7L,%	R ℎ ∗ 'N	'ℎ7'L	<'A7	F9?7


€/R ℎ (15) 
In the case of aggregators of non-direct DER producers, the aggregators transfer the payment received 
for the wholesale electricity to the d non-direct DER producers, with which they have a contract, 
according to the energy traded for each of them and the prices agreed between the parties. As a general 
case, it was considered that the agreed price (electricity price) could be different to the day-ahead market 
price, so, for each specific aggregator the following formula would be applicable:  
'N<76	QG	7>7?9?9N€
= 	P>7?9?9N	'L7L,/	R ℎ ∗	



/
P>7?9?9N	F9?7 	€/R ℎ (16) 
11.2.3 Market access 
All participants in the wholesale electricity market must contribute to the Market Operator’s 
retribution. The price is regulated.  
In the case of central producers, direct DER producers and non-direct DER producers (through their 
aggregators) the payment is based on the available power of each installation and it is calculated on a 
monthly basis. The availability term for each technology and the price are set by the NRA. 
R'A7	'??7HH	GLW?7H 	€
=  I6H'>>7L	FG"7	R  ∗ :'9>'=9>9N	7<	%


∗ R'A7	'??7HH	Q77	€/R 	F7	<G6ℎ	 
(17) 
Direct consumers, retailers and aggregators, as retailers of active consumers, have to pay a market 
access fee for buying electricity in the market. The amount to be paid depends on the energy traded for 
each hour. The price is set by the NRA for each MWh traded in the market.  
R'A7	'??7HH	WN7H 	€ 	
=P>7?9?9N	'L7L 	R ℎ ∗	


R'A7	'??7HH	Q77	€/R ℎ (18) 
11.2.4 System access 
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All participants in the electrical system have to contribute to the System Operator’s retribution, 
according to a regulated price set by the NRA. 
Specifically, central producers, direct DER producers and non-direct DER producers (through their 
aggregators) pay depending on the available power of each installation and it is calculated on a monthly 
basis. The availability term for each technology and the price are set by the NRA. 
XNH7<	'??7HH	GLW?7H€
=  I6H'>>7L	FG"7	R  ∗ :'9>'=9>9N	7<	%


∗ XNH7<	'??7HH	Q77	€/R 	F7	<G6ℎ	 
(19) 
Direct consumers, retailers and aggregators, as retailers of active consumers, also have to pay a 
system access fee for the finance of the electricity system and the system operator’s retribution. In this 
case, the amount to be paid by these buyers of electricity is based on the traded amount in the wholesale 
market. The price is set by the NRA for each MWh traded.  
XNH7<	'??7HH	WN7H 	€
= P>7?9?9N	'L7L 	R ℎ ∗	


XNH7<	'??7HH	Q77	€/R ℎ	 (20) 
Although this is not the current real situation in Spain, in the graphical models it has been considered 
that the system access fees collected by the TSO could be shared with the DSO (System access DSO part): 
XNH7<	'??7HH	XO	F'	€
= XNH7<	'??7HH	GLW?7H€ + XNH7<	'??7HH	WN7H 	€
∗ %	XO	F' 
(21) 
11.2.5 Grid access 
In general, in the EU Member States, the electricity supply is made up of the cost of electricity 
generation, the cost of electricity transmission and distribution, other costs of the electricity system and 
taxes.  
The grid access is regulated by the NRA, who fixes the prices for T&D fees. For the different types of 
consumers this fee was assumed to include a power term and an energy term: 
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- Grid access_power term: For a n-period ToU tariff the total annual cost must be calculated 
multiplying the price of each period i in €/kW/year (T&D PowerTerm Price) by the contracted 
power42 in kW. 
9L	'??7HH	G"7	7<€ = G6'?7L	G"7$ 	A  ∗ &_	9?7$ 	€/A 

$
 (22) 
- Grid access_energy term: The cost depends on the price of that fee, which can be a ToU tariff 
(T&D_EnergyTerm Price), and on the energy demanded. 
9L	'??7HH	P678N	7<€
= (96'>	7>7?9?9N	L7<'6L$,

$


A ℎ ∗ &_P	9?7$,	€/A ℎ	 (23) 
Equation (22) and (23) will be applicable to; i) direct passive consumers, ii) direct active consumers, iii) 
retailers of non-direct passive consumers and iv) aggregators of non-direct active consumers. Although in 
some countries the consumer may receive different bills from the retailer and from the DSO, in most of 
the cases, when the electricity is acquired through a retailer, the retailer sells electricity to consumers and 
pays for T&D fees to the DSO.  
Likewise, central producers, direct DER producers and non-direct DER producers, through their 
aggregators, must pay the grid access. It was assumed that they must pay for each MWh fed into the 
grid43, according to a price set by the NRA.  
9L	'??7HH	FGLW?7H 	€
= )7'>	7>7?9?9N	8767'9G6 	R ℎ ∗ &	GLW?7H	Q77	€/R ℎ


 
(24) 
The money obtained through T&D fees is used to pay for transmission, distribution, and other costs, 
which may include the retribution for the NRA, subsidies for renewables, etc. Therefore, the T&D fees 
collected by the DSO must be shared among several parties. As an example, the whole amount of T&D fees 
collected in Spain in 2017 was distributed as indicated below [44]:  
- DSO part (DSOpart): 30.37% of the T&D fees collected during 2016 were paid to DSOs. 
- TSO part (TSOpart): 10.03% were paid to the TSO. This transference is indicated as High voltage 
grid access in the graphical models. 
- Other electric regulated actors part (Otherspart): The rest of the T&D fees, 59.60%, is shared 
among other regulated actors. This concept is indicated as Obligations in the graphical models. 
                                                                   
42 In Spain the tariffs type 3.1 (3 periods) and type 6 (6 periods) allow contracting different power for each period. These tariffs 
are for connection voltages > 1 kV. 
43 Real generation. This includes the expected losses, although it will be the retailers who must cope with the expected losses 
along the system. 
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Therefore, from the whole amount transferred to the DSO (equation (22) + (23) + (24)) for the payment 
of T&D fees, the DSO should keep its corresponding part (equation (25)) and transfer the remaining 
quantity to the TSO for the HV grid access (equation (26)) and to the rest of the system for the payment of 
the obligations (equation (27)): 
&	Q77H	XO	F' 	
= 9H	'??7HH_G"77<	€ + 9L	'??7HH_P678N7<€
+ 9L	'??7HH_GLW?7H 	€ ∗ XO+-.% 
(25) 
 
98ℎ		G>'87	89L	'??7HH
= 9H	'??7HH_G"77<	€ + 9L	'??7HH_P678N7<€
+ 9L	'??7HH_GLW?7H€ ∗ XO+-.% 
(26) 
 
O=>98'9G6H 	= 9H	'??7HH_G"77<	€ + 9L	'??7HH_P678N7<€
+ 9L	'??7HH_GLW?7H€ ∗ Oℎ7H+-.% (27) 
This part transferred to the other regulated actors, equation (27), will have to be shared among them 
according to the criteria fixed by the NRA.  
11.2.6 Balancing 
Electricity balancing is one of the key roles of the TSO, who needs to act in order to ensure that the 
generation coming from producers is equal to the energy demanded by consumers in real time.   
In general, the TSO can open the balancing market to manage the arisen balancing necessities coming 
both from production (central producers, direct DER producers, aggregators of non-direct DER 
producers) or consumption side (direct passive consumers, direct active consumers, retailers of non-
direct passive consumers, aggregators of non-direct active consumers). So, the amount of energy to be 
balanced by the TSO through the balancing market will be: 
'>'6?968	7678N,ZR ℎ = 	'>'6?968,Z


R ℎ
= I<='>'6?7H	GLW?9G6 	R ℎ


+ I<='>'6?7H	G6HW<F9G6 R ℎ 
(28) 
Additionally, the TSO needs to solve the real-time congestions. The addition of the balancing for TSO 
and real-time congestion management is named ancillary services in Figure 5.2. Therefore, the payment 
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from the TSO for these ancillary services will be the multiplication of the amount of energy by the 
SmartNet balancing price.  
The definition of this price is detailed in the SmartNet deliverable D2.2 [2]. As a summary, the inputs 
to the clearing and pricing algorithm are the forecasted injection at the different nodes of the network 
prior the activation decisions, the available flexibility bids and the transmission and distribution network 
models. Then the market optimization decides which bids are activated. The market associates a specific 
price for upward and downward flexibility for each node at transmission or distribution level, using the 
approach of distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP). For more information see section 2.3 and 
5.4 of Deliverable D2.2 [2] : 
'N<76	QG	'6?9>>'N	H7:9?7H,Z€
= '>'6?968,Z + )R,Z


R ℎ +
∗ X<'7	='>'6?968	F9?7 	€/R ℎ 
(29) 
The balancing market operator clears the market44 and, as result, the balancing necessities are 
allocated between the participants in the balancing market; i) central producers, ii) direct DER producers, 
iii) aggregators of non-direct DER producers, iv) direct active consumers-distribution, v) direct active 
consumers-transmission and vi) aggregators of non-direct active consumers, depending on the price 
offered by each of them. The sign convention used here is in line with D2.1 [37] and with the agreements 
reached in the project to create the future European mFRR platform [45]: balancing providers should bid 
a positive price for upward balancing when they want to be remunerated for an increase in their 
generation output (or a decrease in their consumption) and a positive price for downward balancing 
when they would be willing to pay to be able to reduce their output (or increase consumption). If they are 
willing to pay to increase output (or reduce consumption) or if they want to be remunerated to reduce 
output (or increase consumption), they should bid a negative price instead. 
So, the payment made by the TSO for ancillary services to the balancing market operator is shared 
between the P flexibility services providers mentioned above, in such a way that each provider p will be 
remunerated based on the energy provided and the balancing price: 
'N<76	QG	'6?9>>'N	H7:9?7H,Z€ 	
= '>'6?968	7678N,+


R ℎ ∗ X<'7	='>'6?968	F9?7

+
€
/R ℎ 
(30) 
                                                                   
44 The market clearing algorithm aims not only to procure balancing, but also to avoid congestions in real-time. 
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According to this formula, the amount to be paid by the balancing market operator is positive when 
the provision is upward balancing (positive balancing energy), and it is negative if the provision is 
downward balancing (negative balancing energy) and, hence, the providers must pay for it to the 
balancing market operator.  This is not a penalty, but a sign agreement. When a bid submitted by a 
producer is matched in the day-ahead market, the producer receives the day ahead market price for the 
traded energy. After that, in the balancing market, the producer can submit a bid for downward energy. If 
that bid is matched the producer will pay to the balancing market at a price that is lower than the day-
ahead market price. So, the benefit comes from (Day-ahead market price-Downward energy price) * 
Energy traded in the balancing market. 
From equation (30) the payment that each provider receives for the provision of ancillary services can 
be drawn. 
It was assumed that the imbalance price is calculated in such a way that the TSO does not earn or lose 
money for doing the balancing, so, the price to be paid or received will depend on the total imbalance of 
the system. The imbalance price is calculated based on the balancing energy, and its associated price, 
used in each time step to cope with the imbalances. For the calculation of the imbalance price, the total 
balancing cost is shared among the parties creating the imbalances according to their share in the 
creation of the total imbalance.  
The ancillary services cost in each time step is allocated among the q parties which created the 
imbalances in the system in that specific time, so: 
'N<76	QG	'6?9>>'N	H7:9?7H,Z€
= I<='>'6?7	7678N,




R ℎ ∗ I<='>'6?7	F9?7 	€/R ℎ (31) 
Again, the funds can flow in both directions: if the imbalance is negative (more electricity 
consumption/less electricity generation than expected, so, there is a necessity of increase the 
production), balancing will be positive (upward balancing energy is required) and, thus, the money will 
flow from the party causing the imbalance to the TSO, through the corresponding BRPs, and then from 
TSO to the balancing market operator. On the contrary, if the imbalance is positive (lower electricity 
consumption/more electricity generation than expected, so, there is a necessity of decrease the 
production), balancing will be negative (downward balancing energy is required) and the money will flow 
on the contrary way, i.e. from the balancing market operator to the TSO and from the TSO to the party 
causing the imbalance, through the corresponding BRPs. Every time step, the imbalance price to be 
applied will be based on the sign of the whole system imbalance, in order to disincentive the aggravation 
of the system imbalance: 
- When the imbalance has the same sign as the whole system imbalance, the imbalance is 
aggravating the whole system imbalance. Therefore, the imbalance price to be applied will be 
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related to the average price of the balancing energy activated at that time-step, including all 
balancing means (i. e. SmartNet balancing and aFRR).  
- On the contrary, when an imbalance is in the opposite direction to the system imbalance, that 
imbalance is softening the whole system imbalance and it will be economically valued at the day-
ahead market price.    
In summary, a dual-price system for imbalances was considered: the one who generates more (or 
consumes less) is remunerated for such excess, but the price is not higher than the day-ahead price: 
the BRP who involuntarily reduces system imbalance (because the system is short) receives the day-
ahead price and the BRP who increases system imbalance (because it is long) receives a price which is 
lower. On the contrary, the BRP who produces less (or consumes more) must pay for the difference: if 
it involuntarily reduces system imbalance (because the system is long), it pays day-ahead price, but if 
it increases system imbalance (because the system is short), the BRP pays a price which is higher than 
day-ahead price 
In summary, each time step equation (32) must be fulfilled:  
6?9>>'N	H7:9?7H	?GH€
= 	 I<='>'6?7	7LW?7R ℎ ∗ 'N'ℎ7'LF9?7€/R ℎ
+ I<='>'6?7	?7'GR ℎ ∗ I<='>'6?7	F9?7€/R ℎ 
(32) 
It has been considered that the management of the energy imbalances is performed by external 
parties, so, a separate role of BRP has been graphically represented for each actor creating imbalances. 
The BRP only manages the imbalances appearing within the balancing group it is responsible for. The 
payment for imbalances will be made through these entities and, depending on the contractual agreement 
between both parties, the penalties might be transferred to the party causing the imbalance. 
Finally, the aggregators acquire the flexibility from both the non-direct active consumers and the non-
direct DER producers for the submission of bids in the balancing market. The flexibility acquisition in 
each time step will follow equation (33) in which the subscript r indicates the different types of existing 
non-direct DER producers and the subscript a indicates the different types of non-direct active 
consumers. 
8878'7L	Q>79=9>9N 	R ℎ =(>79=9>9N,.

.
R ℎ +(>79=9>9N,-

-
R ℎ (33) 
The total aggregated flexibility for a whole year will be the sum of equation (33) for the T periods. 
8878'7L	Q>79=9>9N 	R ℎ =8878'7L	Q>79=9>9NR ℎ


 (34) 
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The payments for this flexibility will depend on the particular agreements between the parties. For 
example, the aggregation service could be remunerated by means of the payment of an annual 
subscription fee, agreed between the involved parties, in such a manner that the remuneration for the 
aggregator is:  
8878'9G6	H7:9?7€ = XW=H?9F9G6	Q77€ (35) 
Likewise, the BRP’s remuneration could be based on annual subscription fees paid by its customers. 
 
11.3 CS-Specific formulas 
In addition to the general formulas described in the previous section and which apply to all CSs, each 
CS has specific formulas, which are described in next subsections.  
11.3.1 Coordination scheme B 
In this case, the DSO opens the local market in order to solve its own congestions and it will pay for 
this service to the local market operator: 
'N<76	QG	G687H9G6	R'6'87<76	€
= G687H9G6	<'6'87<76


R ℎ
∗ G687H9G6	<'6'87<76	F9?7 	€/R ℎ 
(36) 
The local market operator allocates this necessity between the available flexibility providers at 
distribution level: 
i) direct DER producers, 
ii) aggregators of non-direct DER producers, 
iii) direct active consumers-distribution and 
iv) aggregators of non-direct active consumers. 
Each provider will be remunerated according to the energy traded and the congestion management 
price and, in the case of the aggregators, they will have to, in turn, acquire flexibility from the active 
consumers and the DER producers. 
Once the local market has solved the congestions coming from the DSO, the non-used flexibility bids in 
this local market will compete against the bids by central producers and active consumers-transmission 
to satisfy the balancing and the real-time congestions necessities (named ancillary services in Figure 5.4) 
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transferred from the TSO45 to the balancing market. So, in this case, the payment for ancillary services 
from the TSO to the balancing market will be shared between the P providers (central producers, the 
active consumers-transmission and the local market operator), who, in turn, will distribute the payment 
among its providers at distribution level, so: 
'N<76	QG	'6?9>>'N	H7:9?7HZ 	€
= '>'6?968	7678N 	R ℎ



+
∗ X<'7	='>'6?968	F9?7 	€/R ℎ 
(37) 
The main characteristics of the SmartNet price calculation are briefly explained in section 11.2.6. 
Likewise, the payment from the balancing market operator to the local market operator will be shared 
among the providers through this local market, which are, once again the four flexibility providers listed 
above. Each provider will be remunerated according to the energy traded and the SmartNet balancing 
price and, in the case of the aggregators, they will have to, in turn, acquire flexibility from the active 
consumers and the DER producers. 
In this coordination scheme, the payment for the flexibility received by the non-direct active 
consumers and the non-direct DER producers will be the sum of the corresponding part from the 
provision of congestion management (CM in equation (38)) and the provision of ancillary services for the 
TSO. 
)7<W67'9G6	QG	Q>79=9>9N€ 	
= 'N<76	QGQ>79=9>9N	QG	R


+ 'N<76	QG	Q>79=9>9N	QG	'6?9>>'N	H7:9?7H	€ 
(38) 
Next, it should be agreed how each flexibility provider will be remunerated. Several approaches can be 
considered; discounts in the electricity bill for consumers, €/kWh for every pattern modification, etc.  
11.3.2 Coordination scheme C 
In this coordination scheme, the TSO partially transfers the balancing responsibility to the DSO in such 
a way that there is a local market managed by the DSO for resources connected to the distribution grid 
and a balancing market managed by the TSO for resources connected to the transmission grid. 
The DSO has to manage the imbalances caused at distribution level by the different actors connected 
to the distribution grid (retailers of non-direct passive consumers, aggregators of non-direct active 
                                                                   
45 The market clearing algorithm aims not only to procure balancing, but also to avoid congestions in real-time. 
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consumers, direct active consumers-distribution, direct DER producers and aggregators of non-direct 
DER producers). Additionally, the DSO uses the local market for its own necessity of congestion 
management. The addition of the balancing for DSO and the congestion management by the DSO is named 
ancillary services in Figure 5.6.  As in the case of TSO, it is considered that the DSO does not earn or lose 
any money for doing the balancing, so, the price to be paid or received will depend on the total imbalance 
of the system. So, the corresponding payment from the DSO to the local market operator for the provision 
of these services (congestion management and balancing for DSO) is: 
'N<76	QG	'6?9>>'N	H7:9?7H,Z	€
='>'6?968	QG	XO


+ G687H9G6	<'6'87<76R ℎ
∗ X<'7	='>'6?968	F9?7 	€/R ℎ 
(39) 
The main characteristics of the SmartNet price calculation are briefly explained in section 11.2.6. 
The local market allocates this payment among the available flexibility providers at distribution 
level46. Each provider will be remunerated according to the energy traded and the resulting price from 
the clearing process for the congestion management and balancing for DSO. In the case of the aggregators, 
they acquire, in turn, flexibility from active consumers and the DER producers. 
On the other hand, the TSO solves the congestions arisen in real time and the imbalances caused at 
transmission level (named ancillary services in Figure 5.6) by central producers, direct passive consumers 
and direct active consumers-transmission through the balancing market47, in which only the central 
producers and the active consumers-transmission can submit bids. So, the payment from the TSO for the 
ancillary services will be shared between the P providers participating in the balancing market based on 
the energy traded and the balancing clearing price. 
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(40) 
11.3.3 Coordination scheme D 
This coordination scheme promotes a common flexibility market for DSOs and TSO, with resources 
connected to transmission and distribution level. The TSO and the DSO are both responsible for the 
organization and operation of the market. The DSO attends the common balancing market to solve its 
                                                                   
46 Direct DER producers, Aggregators of non-direct DER producers, Direct active consumers-distribution and Aggregators of 
non-direct active consumers. 
47 The market clearing algorithm aims not only to procure balancing, but also to avoid congestions in real-time. 
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own congestions and the TSO to balance the transmission network and to solve the real-time congestions 
(named ancillary services in Figure 5.8). 
The equations in section 11.2.6 are applicable to all coordination schemes and, for that reason, they 
are included within the General formulas section. However, in the case of the CS D, a specific formula 
needs to be reformulated in order to take into account specific issues regarding only to the common 
balancing market deployed in this CS. Specifically, when calculating the results for CS D, equation (29) 
should be replaced by equation (41). 
'N<76	QG	'6?9>>'N	H7:9?7H,Z


€
+'N<76	QG	?G687H9G6	<'6'87<76,Z€


=	'>'6?968	QG	XO


+ )R
+ G687H9G6	<'6'87<76	QG	XO	R ℎ
∗ X<'7	='>'6?968	F9?7 	€/R ℎ 
(41) 
 
Therefore, the payment from DSO for the congestion management and from TSO for balancing its 
network is allocated between the providers of the service, which may be either connected at transmission 
(central producers and direct active consumers-transmission) or at distribution level (direct DER 
producers, aggregators of non-direct DER producers, direct active consumers-distribution and 
aggregators of non-direct active consumers). Each provider will be remunerated according to the energy 
traded and the resulting price from the clearing process for the congestion management for DSO and 
balancing for TSO. In the case of the aggregators, they acquire, in turn, flexibility from the active 
consumers and the DER producers. 
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